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Documentation

SPECIAL REPORT: POLAND IN CRISIS, 1980-1981

Background

The two documents that follow provide important new information on events behind the scenes in Poland and Washington in 1980 and 1981. Readers unfamiliar with the chronology will find this brief review of the public record helpful.

The story began in December 1970, when Edward Gierek succeeded Wladyslaw Gomulka as the Polish leader — or, to use the formal title, as first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' party. Gierek's rule was characterized by an unfortunate combination of ambitious economic planning and mismanagement, leading to an astronomical growth in the foreign debt and in worker frustrations.

These problems culminated on July 1, 1980, when the government announced an increase in the prices of some cuts of meat. Work stoppages in industrial plants began the next day. The Lenin shipyard in Gdansk went on strike on August 14, and from there strikes spread throughout the Baltic Coast and Silesia. On August 16, workers in Gdansk organized an Inter-Factory Strike Committee to formulate and negotiate their demands. Its advisers included intellectuals associated with KOR (the Workers' Defense Committee), a group dedicated to monitoring human rights abuses. A coalition between workers and intellectuals was unprecedented in the history of Soviet-type regimes, and it proved powerful.

After rapid and tumultuous negotiations, representatives of the government and the strikers signed an agreement on August 31, 1980, a date that marks a new era in Polish history. A new force came into existence: Solidarity, an independent, self-governing trade union. On September 6, the Polish Central Committee accepted Gierek's resignation and appointed Stanislaw Kania party leader. On September 26, Lech Walesa, chairman of Solidarity, applied for the legal registration of the union. On October 30, leaders of the Polish Communist party went to Moscow where they met the Soviet general secretary, Leonid Brezhnev. On November 10, the Polish Supreme Court granted legal status to Solidarity.

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As Solidarity grew in popularity, a faction within the Polish communist leadership called for order and discipline. On December 5, a Warsaw Pact summit conference in Moscow analyzed events in Poland and expressed confidence that the Polish Communist party "would be able to overcome present difficulties."

Despite these views, the revival of Polish civil society gathered momentum. A monument went up in Gdansk in December 1980 to honor the victims of police repression. As censorship loosened, the media exposed the many privileges enjoyed by party and state officials. Private farmers launched a campaign to acquire the right to form their own trade union in January 1981. On January 26, a new wave of strikes paralyzed 110 industrial plants. In February, students at Lodz University engaged in a sit-in to demand an independent student union.

General Wojciech Jaruzelski, minister of national defense, became prime minister on February 9. He immediately presented a platform that called for ninety days without strikes. The threat of Soviet intervention appeared to increase after Kania and Jaruzelski visited Moscow on March 4. The joint statement that followed declared the defense of "revolutionary conquests" to be not only "a matter for every socialist state but also for the entire socialist community." In this way, leaders of the two countries reiterated basic tenets of the Brezhnev doctrine — Moscow's assertion of the right to intervene in communist states when it feels Marxism-Leninism is endangered — devised in 1968 to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Faced with this new challenge, the Polish Communist party divided into two main factions, often called the hard-liners and the moderates. This split contributed to a stalemate in the negotiations between Jaruzelski and Walesa. It also helps explain the nomenklatura*'s nervous actions, including the physical assault on three members of Solidarity, and the Polish Politburo's public blame of Solidarity for an atmosphere of "mass neurosis." The union responded by calling for a general strike and then, on April 14, publishing a draft of its program.*

The Soviet leadership found these acts intolerable. The Kremlin's chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov visited Warsaw on April 23-24 to warn Polish Communists about the danger of a counterrevolution. Encouraged by Moscow, a group of Polish neo-Stalinsts organized the Katowice Party Forum to attack the moderate wing within the Central Committee. On June 5, the Kremlin sent a threatening letter to the Polish Central Committee, accusing Kania of making "never-ending concessions to anti-socialist forces." The letter was discussed by the Polish Central Committee during its XI plenum, on June 9-10. Despite the hard-liners' pressure, the Central Committee turned down a motion that would have replaced Kania as party chief. A

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U.S. government spokesman condemned Soviet interference in Polish internal affairs on June 11.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko visited Kania and Jaruzelski in Warsaw early in July. Later that month, the Polish Communist party's IX Extraordinary Congress re-elected Kania first secretary. The Congress also promised democratization within the party, but Solidarity leaders, who wanted to democratize the whole society, scorned this concession. A government decision to proceed with a 20 percent cut in meat rations then heightened public expectations. About this time, General Jaruzelski established the secret Anti-Crisis Operational Staff (on which Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski served).

In August, Solidarity's National Coordinating Commission called for economic reform, the democratization of power, and complete autonomy for unions. On September 8, the Solidarity National Congress sent a message to East European and Soviet workers declaring support for those "who have decided to follow the difficult struggle for a free trade union movement." The official Soviet reaction came quickly, publicly urging Polish leaders on in the struggle against "anti-Soviet and anti-socialist forces." The Polish leaders echoed this line, accusing Solidarity of having violated the August 31, 1980, agreements. Undaunted, the Solidarity Congress adopted a political program calling for a self-governing republic.

General Wojciech Jaruzelski replaced Stanislaw Kania as head of the Polish Communist party on October 18. He met Walesa and the primate of Poland, Josef Cardinal Glemp, on November 4 in a supposed effort to reach a national accord. The government recalled military task forces from the countryside on November 20. Walesa met with Glemp alone on December 5; a day later, the authorities accused Solidarity of launching a campaign to take power, an extremely serious charge. TASS, the official Soviet news agency, then endorsed this view.

In Solidarity's last major act, its National Commission met in Gdansk on December 11-12 to discuss the idea of a national referendum on Jaruzelski's government. During this meeting, the National Commission proclaimed December 17 as "a day of protest against oppression and a symbol of social unity." If the government did not renounce its emergency powers, Solidarity planned to hold a national referendum on February 15 to consider the basic issues of political life in Poland (such as the need to retain military guarantees to the Soviet Union).

Such a referendum deeply threatened the Polish Communist leaders and their Soviet protectors. To prevent it from taking place, Warsaw proclaimed martial law and a Military Council of National Salvation replaced the civilian government on December 13. Also on that day, Solidarity's legal status came to an end. This event marked

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the first successful military coup in a Soviet-type regime and the beginning of a new stage in Polish history.

— The Editors

Introduction to Ryszard Kuklinski
by Richard Pipes

The following interview with Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski reveals the circumstances surrounding the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 and provides insight into the mentality and practices of the Soviet High Command.

Kuklinski served in 1980-81 in the central Polish apparatus charged with organizing the reimposition in Poland of communist authority after it had been all but undermined by the rise of Solidarity. In 1967 he had witnessed the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Convinced that by ignoring Warsaw Pact preparations for this action, the West had given Moscow the wrong signal, and hoping to prevent a similar tragedy in his own country, he established contact with the Central Intelligence Agency. From him, the U.S. government learned the most secret plans of the Soviet and Polish authorities. In the fall of 1981, the KGB began to suspect a leak at the very highest level of the Polish command, but before it could arrest him, Colonel Kuklinski and his family fled Poland.

From Colonel Kuklinski's account it transpires that Moscow decided as early as the fall of 1980 to crush the free trade union movement in Poland either with an invasion force of eighteen Soviet, Czech, and East German divisions, or through internal actions of the Polish government. This decision confronted the communist rulers of Poland with the apparent choice of declaring war on their own people or having their neighbors invade and occupy Poland. Kuklinski believes that if the Polish Communists had had the courage firmly to withstand Soviet pressures, Moscow would have had to retreat because it could not have risked attacking a united Poland and alienating the West. But the Polish leaders caved in. "Kania and Jaruzelski took the side of the USSR and agreed in principle with the Russians that they were facing a counterrevolution," he writes. "Given such an attitude . . . Moscow was not facing the organized strength of a sovereign state ready to resist; instead, it was merely facing a defenseless society." In this analysis, the latest Polish tragedy was due, first and foremost, to the moral cowardice of General Jaruzelski, who, while posing as its savior, was, in fact, Poland's gravedigger.

Richard Pipes is Baird Professor of History at Harvard University and served in 1981-82 at the National Security Council as director, East European and Soviet Affairs.

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Kuklinski sheds valuable light on the modus operandi of the Soviet military. Formalities notwithstanding, the Soviet General Staff treats Poland as if it were part of the USSR: the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact acts as if he were a Gauleiter of what in tsarist days used to be known as the By-Vistula Provinces. At the height of the April 1981 crisis, when invasion seemed imminent, Soviet planes routinely violated Polish air space; in the event of hostilities, 90 percent of the Polish armed forces were to have come directly under Soviet command. During 1981 the Polish government made major formal concessions to Solidarity even as it was setting in motion the machinery to crush it. The timing of the action — Sunday morning — and the format of spurious military "exercises," were meant to lull the victims into a false sense of security.

And finally, Kuklinski sees the warnings issued to Moscow and Warsaw by the Carter and Reagan administrations as important inhibitors of the Soviet invasion plans, which forced them to rely instead on indigenous Polish forces.

Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons — one being the absence at the critical moment of a national security adviser due to the resignation of Richard Allen — Washington did not take advantage of the information supplied by Kuklinski at such great personal risk. The U.S. government as well as Solidarity was caught by surprise on December 13, 1981. The full background of this episode will become known only when the pertinent Washington archives are opened to scholars.

While serving in the National Security Council in 1981, I had an opportunity to read some of the reports supplied by Kuklinski, including accounts of remarks made by Jaruzelski in the circle of his intimates. It became clear that Jaruzelski is a dedicated "internationalist," that is, a Communist for whom the interests of the communist movement invariably take precedence over those of his own nation. No doubt, as Colonel Kuklinski concedes, he agonized over the treachery he had decided to commit under relentless Soviet pressure. No doubt, too, in the end his conscience was assuaged by the conviction that he had acted on behalf of a superior cause.

The Crushing of Solidarity[1]

Early Decision for Martial Law

(. . .) I had worked on preparing the martial law for more than a year, or more exactly, 380 days, and sometimes nights as well. I had already known by rote various alternatives of action. It sufficed to consult my memory in order to realize that:

[1] This interview with former Colonel Ryszard J. Kuklinski originally appeared in *Kultura* (a Polish-language journal published in Paris), Number 4/475, April 1987, pp. 3-57.

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First, the decision to impose martial law in Poland, made under pressure from the Soviet Union, was in early November 1981 virtually irrevocable. Were General Jaruzelski to reject it at the last moment, the radio and TV address to the nation would be made by General of Arms Eugeniusz Molczyk, or by another general resolved to take this step.

Second, martial-law operations were to be conducted exclusively by Polish police and army forces. If, however, for some reason, they were to prove incapable of crushing the resistance of the society then fully combat-ready Soviet, Czech, and German divisions waiting at Poland's frontiers would march in.

Third, on November 7, 1981, that is at the moment when I was leaving the General Staff of the Polish Army, the preparations for imposing martial law had been so highly advanced that pressing the proverbial button would have sufficed to mobilize that entire police-and-army machine. The only remaining problem was preparing a pretext acceptable, at least to part of the society, for commencing the confrontations and choosing the optimal time for striking the blow.

Fourth, the main variant of action provided for a surprise imposition of martial law on some night between Friday and a non-working Saturday. But should the domestic situation not permit this (for example, were Solidarity to undertake some preventive action), the martial law could also be imposed in various operationally unfavorable [circumstances], such as during a nationwide sit-in strike. (. . .)

Those who had listened attentively could perceive the quite explicit signs of the coming coup. The authorities also were aware that an insider among themselves was sending out alarm signals. Let me give just one example. Namely, on September 13, 1981, just before the so-called struggle for Solidarity's access to the mass media, at an emergency session of the Committee for National Defense on aspects of the imposition of martial law, General Kiszczak revealed that a large number of Solidarity activists knew in detail abut the plans to impose martial law, including the internment plan, inclusive of the list of persons to be interned and the code name of that operation. (. . .)

Witness to Prague 1968

You asked whether some event or order had triggered my decision . . . . There is no doubt that that event was the Polish August [the emergence of Solidarity during the Gdansk strike in 1980], and also the order which I had to execute nearly from the very beginning of the eruption of strikes on the Coast, and which I thought to be conflicting with the interests of the country and the nation which I

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served. But even earlier personal experiences had probably influenced my ultimate choice.

One of these experiences, which occurred in August of 1968, that is almost exactly twelve years before the Polish August, I had already mentioned in answering your question about my military service. At the time the government-controlled mass media had informed the society about the machinations of imperialism in Czechoslovakia and the attempts to tear that country away from the community of socialist countries. Mentions also were made of Warsaw Pact troop exercises conducted in accordance with the plan, but they were not particularly publicized. These exercises had already been under way a full year when I received a completely innocuous order directing me to proceed immediately to the command post for directing the exercises in Legnica, established there by the Supreme Commander of the United Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact Countries Marshal of the USSR Ivan Yakubovskiy, where I was to take part in planning operational exercises of units of the Polish Army.

When I reported to the staff of Marshal Yakubovskiy, I already found there representatives of all the armies of the Warsaw Pact, with the exception of Czechs and Romanians. The atmosphere was rather calm. No one uttered the word "invasion," "armed intervention," or "aggression." Such terms were proper for characterizing the activities of Western imperialism. We were merely engaging in exercises. But there was something unusual about these "exercises," foreign to my experience. Namely, some stages of the exercises which we were planning, and which were given the code name "Danube," were to be held on Czechoslovak territory but without the participation of the Czechoslovak side. Similarly, operational exercises were, to be sure, conducted in the defense of socialist Czechoslovakia, but this time not against any aggressive NATO forces, that supposedly being the purpose for which Warsaw Pact had been formed, but strangely enough against the Czechoslovak People's Army which after all was part of the Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact, but which as of that time began to be designated on staff maps with the color blue, that is, a color reserved exclusively for the enemy. In a word, there could hardly be any doubts as to what this was about, so long as it would not be called by its name.

Once the plans for a lightning-quick envelopment of garrisons of the Czechoslovak People's Army and their neutralization through persuasion were readied and the invasion troops were only awaiting a signal in order to cross the border of our southern neighbor, I tried to orient myself about world opinion on this subject. I had thought that the concentration of such large military forces around the borders of Czechoslovakia could not escape the attention of world opinion. I also had thought that perceiving Soviet intentions would be all the easier considering that during the final stage of preparations for

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the invasion, upon the order of Marshal Yakubovskiy, so-called EFIR [ETHER] exercises, consisting in putting into operation a large number of radio stations, were commenced with the object of demonstrating to the Czechoslovak side the large concentration of Warsaw Pact forces. This demonstration in the ether could not have escaped the West's attention. Feeling certain of this, I began to listen to Western newscasts in order to confirm my a priori assumption that the world knew of the coming invasion, that the world was resolutely opposed to it and protesting it, and that lastly perhaps we could succeed in avoiding the worst.

I felt deeply disenchanted and helpless. That world on which I had counted so much was preoccupied with the war in Vietnam and with the mass protests against it that were then surging across nearly the entire Europe as well as the United States. Some mention of Czechoslovakia also was made, but it was of an idyllic nature. No one was protesting against the potential invasion of Czechoslovakia. On this subject both the Eastern and the Western mass media preserved total silence.

Not wanting to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, I telephoned Warsaw and, under some pretext, requested my superior to recall me from Legnica. My wish was immediately granted. My post was taken over by Colonel Stanislaw Radaj. I returned to Warsaw, cherishing a tiny hope that perhaps I could succeed in alarming the world. Unfortunately, in my situation that was neither simple nor easy.

Nearly a week later, on the night of August 20, 1968, Soviet paratroopers landed at the airport in Prague and units of the Polish Army commanded by the then Chief of Staff of the Silesian Military District Division General Florian Siwicki had, together with other Warsaw Pact armies, crossed the Czechoslovak border.

I could not escape participating in the invasion. Once it started, I was appointed to the Special Command Center of the Polish Army in Czechoslovakia, established at the General Staff of the Polish Army in Warsaw. Later, I did not regret it. By maintaining direct contact with the operating troops, listening to live reports from their commanders, and preparing special reports on the subject for the then Minister of National Defense General Wojciech Jaruzelski and Wladyslaw Gomulka, I had a unique opportunity for gaining insight into this chapter of our postwar history.

Once the invasion was over, attempts to sum it up and infer conclusions for the future were made within the PRL [People's Republic of Poland] Armed Forces.

Along the official line, upon the initiative of the Minister of National Defense General Wojciech Jaruzelski and under his auspices, a scientific symposium on Operation Danube was held at the General Staff of the Polish Army. That was a gala event, attended by nearly

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the entire leadership of the MON [Ministry of National Defense], the commands of the Armed Services and Military Districts, Polish participants in the invasion, and, of course, the main authors of the invasion — representatives of the Soviet Supreme Command. The participants in the symposium vied with [but did] not surround the Czech garrisons as rapidly as did Soviet units, the world's best, but they subsequently compensated for it by their exceptional success in persuading Czechoslovak commanders to support changes at the highest level of their party and state. It was viewed as an outstanding accomplishment that, despite the hostile attitude of the Czech population, which formed living barricades in front of tanks and armored vehicles, it was in principle possible to avoid any major loss of lives and property, and that only one child, and by accident at that, had died under a Polish tank. In sum, the symposium viewed Operation Danube as a major military and political success of the community of socialist countries, to which the people's Polish Army had contributed significantly.

When Polish armed forces were mobilized on Moscow's order with the object of using them against Polish workers, intelligentsia, and youth, I simply said to myself, no.

Along the unofficial, that is, in semiofficial discussions as well as in conversations between friends and among colleagues, Operation Danube was viewed less enthusiastically and the conclusions were diametrically opposite. The participation of Polish Army units in the invasion of Czechoslovakia was viewed almost everywhere as an unforgivable mistake of the then political and military leadership of the PRL, a mistake for which a high price would have to be paid once Poles will claim their inalienable right to live a life of dignity and clamor for social and democratic changes which the USSR will not accept.

My assessments and conclusions were rooted precisely in this undercurrent, and that was probably when it all began.

I did not have to wait long for additional sociopolitical and civics lessons. I had learned them in December 1970 [a time of worker riots] and from its tragic harvest. When the alleged counterrevolution on the Coast was already in its death throes, the bodies of forty-four "disturbers of order in the people's state" were buried in cemeteries. They included thirty workers and seven trade-school pupils in their low teens. A total of 1,164 wounded, including a large number of young people, were treated at hospitals.

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The meaning of these numbers was and is terrifying, but to me personally the most terrifying thing was the ease with which the authorities, which dub themselves people's power, had resorted to the armed forces in order to direct them, in a manner contrary to their calling, against their own society, and the fact that someone had issued the orders, "Blockade," "Stop them," and "Fire!" without anybody — beginning with the minister of National Defense and ending with the lowest-level commander — declaring that he would not obey these orders.

I was continually bothered by these thoughts. When ten years later, in 1980, history began to repeat itself, when this time Polish armed forces were mobilized on Moscow's order with the object of using them against Polish workers, intelligentsia, and youth, I simply said to myself, no. I believed that a soldier not only is not bound to carry out orders contrary to his conscience and beliefs but also that he should not carry them out. What is more, I believed that the Polish people had no chances for overcoming the confrontation [martial law] being prepared, and that therefore something extra should be done to counteract it. (. . .)

The Soviet Threat

[Question] Let us now switch to a principal topic of our interview. The United States had been warned about Soviet preparations for the invasion in December 1980 and March 1981. Both times, the United States government publicized the warnings internationally. Did these warnings come from you?

[Answer] It seems to me that assessments of military operations of the type represented by the preparations for invading Poland in 1980 and in the following spring, could not have been based solely on the warnings of a single individual. Nevertheless, I am justified in assuming that my appeal for halting Moscow's drive had at least partially reached Washington and was properly appraised there.

[Question] (. . .) In your opinion, was Solidarity doomed from the outset, or do you believe there was a chance for its survival?

[Answer] (. . .) Had the Kania-Jaruzelski duumvirate said no to the Russians from the very beginning, then, under the pressure of overt attacks and threats of Moscow, Solidarity would have had to alter its front of struggle and primarily champion the country's sovereignty and integrity. I am certain that it would have been more inclined toward compromise and that the Soviet Union would retreat, had the party-army leadership and the nation created a united front.

Even Stalin did not attack Yugoslavia militarily. This also happened with Albania, and in recent years with Romania when Ceausescu had refused to obey Moscow and rejected subordinating his armed forces to the Soviet Union.

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While observing Soviet military moves from a privileged position, and even being in direct contact with them, I never had any doubts that, while the Soviet Union could have afforded and been ready for a military action such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia (and in principle without material and human losses), Moscow certainly would not have wanted and could not have afforded war with Poland had it been opposed by a united front of the Polish high command, the army, and the nation. Even had such a war been of a very brief duration, the price to the Soviet Union would have been too high.

Moscow certainly would not have wanted and could not have afforded war with Poland had it been opposed by a united front of the Polish high command, the army, and the nation.

Aside from the moral and political cost to Moscow in the sphere of international relations, it seems to me that it had weighty reasons for assuming that a Czechoslovak-style military action against Poland would not be as smooth. To crush the eventual resistance of the people's Polish Army alone, the Russians would have had to commit a majority of their armed forces from the European part of the USSR and even to throw in part of troops from Czechoslovakia and the GDR.

The Russians were aware that spitting at tanks, which they had encountered in their sneak invasion of Czechoslovakia, is not in the style and character of Poles. They also were aware that Polish society was the richer by Czech experience and by its own experience in 1956 and 1970, and that the population not only was not intimidated by tanks but had learned how to burn and destroy them effectively in cases when they were directed against it. They also realized that, from the beginning of the crisis onward, Poles were reacting to the appearance of new, even small, Soviet subunits or installations and probably judging correcting that this was just a game. At that time, an aide to the Permanent Representative of the Supreme Commander of the United Armed Forces [of Warsaw Pact] at the Polish Army, with whom I had been in working contact, complained to me that Poles were already saying officially that "Soviet tanks burn better than Polish ones."

Hence, were the USSR to meet with an open resistance of the PRL leadership supported by the society, or even with symbolic defense gestures (for example, deployment of troops around the nation's capital), the outcome would of a certainty have been a war of

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nerves and, if the Polish side were to withstand that kind of war, Moscow would likely have had to retreat in the end.

However, a totally different situation arose once, in the course of the internal Polish conflict, the party-army leadership of the PRL, that is, Kania and Jaruzelski, took the side of the USSR and agreed in principle with the Russians that they were facing a counterrevolution, promising them that they would deal with Solidarity on their own by means of political-administrative measures, asking merely for more time.

"Soviet tanks burn better than Polish ones."

Given such an attitude of PRL leaders, Moscow was not facing the organized strength of a sovereign state, ready to resist; instead, it was merely facing a defenseless society. (. . .)

Planning for Martial Law

[Question] Suppose that we now try to recreate the course of events in the chronological order. What came first: the threat of the invasion or the [idea of] martial law?
[Answer] Unfortunately, the martial law.
[Question] When did this idea surface first, and who had proposed it?
[Answer] From information sent in writing to the Soviet leadership, which I had personally prepared with the cooperation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs upon the recommendation and according to the directives of General Jaruzelski it ensues that the idea of imposing martial law on Poland had been conceived as early as during the peak period of the August 1980 sit-in strikes, that is, nearly 16 months before martial law was imposed by Gen. Jaruzelski.

The collective author of this idea was the so-called Party-State leadership Staff headed by the then newly appointed Prime Minister of the PRL Government Josef Pinkowski and established on August 24, 1980 (immediately following the Fourth PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party] Central Committee Plenum which, as known, had expressed its support of negotiations with the striking workers). The members of that Staff included the PZPR Central Committee Secretaries Kazimierz Barcikowski and Stefan Olszowski, Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Jagielski, and probably Tadeusz Grabski, and also, of a certainty, the heads of the principal ministries — National Defense, Wojciech Jaruzelski, and Internal Affairs, Miroslaw Milewski.

To cozen the mutinous society, the Leadership Staff adopted the tactic of agreeing to sign a rather imprecisely worded social agreement in order to extinguish the conflagration of strikes that had

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spread nearly across the entire Poland and in the resulting more favorable conditions to switch to a counter-offensive by means of administrative measures, including as a final resort the imposition of martial law.

Since already the initial attempts — made in September 1980 — to outmaneuver the society by means of various administrative measures had produced opposite results, the Leadership Staff adopted the general decision to commence preparation for imposing martial law.

Within the Polish army these preparations had commenced on October 22, 1980, that is, two days before the proceedings for registering Solidarity at the Warsaw Voivodship Court were instituted.

On that day, at the instruction of the then Minister of National Defense Army General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the General Staff of the Polish Army began urgently to draft a plan for imposing martial law on PRL territory.

General supervision of the planning was exercised, from beginning till end, by the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army Arms General Florian Siwicki. Participation in the initial stage of the planning at the General Staff of the Polish Army was confined to the deputies of the Chief of Staff, namely: General Tadeusz Hupalowski, General Jerzy Skalski, General Antoni Jasinski, Brigadier General Mieczyslaw Dachowski, and I myself, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski. (. . .)

The preliminary draft (or rather an assessment study) of the plans, including drafts of certain martial-law decrees, was completed as early in November 1980 and, within the same month, presented for consideration to the Committee for National Defense, chaired by the then Prime Minister Pinkowski. The plans were presented in a general outline, without going into details, because, in the judgment of the military leadership, some of the members of the National Defense Committee had been among the so-called Smoncesy [Yiddish for "nincompoops"], that is, persons of doubtful loyalty displaying inclinations toward remodeling the political system of the PRL and being merely temporary members of that body. (. . .)

The initial vision or concept of the imposition of martial law — insofar as it regarded postulates and wishes as to what should be suspended, prohibited, ordered, militarized, and delegalized, where should the army be dispatched and where the security forces, who should be protected and who interned — was not far removed from the final concept implemented thirteen months later.

December 1980

[Question] The plans for imposing martial law were temporarily shelved. Was that precisely the reason for the threat of a Soviet invasion in early December 1980?

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[Answer] Basically, yes. As seen by the Soviet leadership, the delay in imposing martial law not only was promoting the organizational strengthening of Solidarity, which the USSR had been opposing from the outset, but also opening the road for the formation of new independent social structures in the PRL. (. . .)

All this had strengthened the Russians' suspicions that the leadership of the PRL, and primarily Kania, was employing delaying tactics and may even have been playing a double game.

Against this background, at the end of November 1980 the Soviet leadership began to organize behind the stage a new PRL leadership team, with the active participation of its embassy in Warsaw and the Supreme Commander of the United Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact Marshal Viktor Kulikov and its representative at the Polish Army, Army General Afanasiy Shcheglov.

The seizure of power by the hardliners who even then were ready to settle Solidarity's hash was to be preceded by the introduction of large military forces of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries into Poland. The related discussions, as well as discussions concerning the eventual neutralization of the Polish Army, which was viewed as demoralized, were conducted between the Russians and Army General Wojciech Jaruzelski. The details of these dramatic conversations are unknown to me. General Jaruzelski alone can and should reveal them. As for me, I only know of their results. Immediately after these discussions, upon the personal recommendation of the utterly devastated General Jaruzelski, on January 1, 1980, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army Division General Tadeusz Hupalowski and Colonel (ret.) Franciszek Puchala flew by special aircraft to Moscow in order to familiarize themselves with the details of Soviet plans for introducing military intervention forces into Poland.

Judging from the information they had received on the same day, that is, on December 1, 1980, at the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces in Moscow, and also judging from the registered blueprints of the finished invasion plans copied from Soviet maps, it ensued that three Soviet armies totaling fifteen divisions, one Czechoslovak army consisting of two divisions, and one division of the GDR National People's Army were to be sent into Poland under the guise of "Soyuz 8" [81] Exercises. Altogether, eighteen Soviet, Czechoslovak, and German divisions were to participate in military operations on the territory of the PRL. The readiness of the invasion forces to cross the frontiers of the PRL was fixed at December 8, 1980. According to the plan assumptions, Soviet forces were to operate in central and eastern Poland and Czech and German forces in western Poland. The operations of the invasion forces were to be combined with a tight sea blockade of the PRL by the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the GDR [East Germany] People's Navy. In the initial stage of the

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intervention, units of the Polish army were to remain at sites of their regular deployment (as had happened in Czechoslovakia). It was only following dramatic bargaining by General Jaruzelski that the Russians agreed to the participation of a few Polish units in implementing secondary tasks. In this way, two armoured divisions (5 and 11) were to be attached to the Czechoslovak army, and two mechanized divisions (4 and 12) to the German army.

[Question] What you are saying now, six years later, is depressing. How did these Soviet preparations and plans affect at the time the Poles on Jaruzelski's staff?

[Answer] The ruthless and uncompromising attitudes of the Russians, who in their conversations with General Jaruzelski refused even to consider the eventual exclusion of the GDR National People's Army from the intervention forces, and who had even questioned the possibility of any participation by the Polish Army in the military operations, had completely paralyzed the then top leadership of the Ministry of National Defense. General Jaruzelski was in a state of shock, stayed behind locked doors in his office, and was completely inaccessible to even his closest associates. Not much better was the condition of General Siwicki, and this also applied to General Hupalowski to whose lot had fallen the mission of bringing invasion plans from Moscow. This paralysis lasted throughout November 30 and December 1. Everyone was waiting for a miracle. But there was no miracle. The blueprints of invasion plans brought from Moscow by General Hupalowski and Colonel Puchala had confirmed in principle the general outline of what was known even earlier from the discussions between the Russians and General Jaruzelski.

A detailed analysis of the Soviet plans, conducted at the General Staff of the Polish Army after they had been brought to Warsaw, led the leadership of that institution to conclude that the Russians were totally misunderstanding the situation in Poland; that they were unaware of the actual mood of the society and underestimated the strength of Solidarity, and lastly that, instead of calming the society, the invasion could result in a still greater social unrest and possibly even in the outbreak of a nationwide uprising.

Against this background, on December 12 the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army General Florian Siwicki made another attempt to persuade General Jaruzelski to renew talks with the Russians and eliminate this worst variant of the unfolding of events. Influenced by his aides, General Siwicki suggested presenting to the Russians various other options, and especially the option of imposing martial law in Poland without waiting until conditions become more favorable for it. But General Jaruzelski continued to be in a state of such complete apathy that he did not even tolerate discussion.

A new element of the situation appeared only a day later, when Army General Eugeniusz Molczyk joined the issue. Now, General

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Molczyk, who had attended between December 1 and 3 the Bucharest session of the Committee of Defense Ministers of Warsaw Pact Countries, upon returning to Poland and familiarizing himself at the General Staff of the Polish Army with the plans brought from Moscow, undertook another attempt to persuade General Jaruzelski to intervene in Moscow and present there a specific plan for an immediate crushing of Solidarity and the Opposition by Polish forces alone. He had supposedly told General Jaruzelski, "History will never forgive us if they do the job for us." (. . .)

[Question] In your opinion, what had influenced the Soviet decision to abandon the then already highly advanced invasion plans? Pressure from the West or the offer of General Jaruzelski to settle the matter without an invasion?

[Answer] Both. As we recall well, the preparations for invading Poland did not escape the attention of the Western world, unlike in the case of Czechoslovakia. Thus, in this case the Soviet Union not only was deprived of the important surprise factor but, owing to the warning reactions from the Western governments, and even from Third World countries, it was bound to increasingly realize that intervention would result in ending the political détente in Europe, disrupt economic cooperation between the East and the West, and, in all likelihood, even accelerate open military cooperation between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Consider that in the first few days of December, that is, at a time when the military high command responsible for the national defense of the PRL had been sunk in total apathy and desperation, the reaction of the United States was unusually sharp. On December 3 President Carter sent an urgent dispatch to Brezhnev in which he demanded that the Polish government and nation be enabled to resolve independently their own problems and warned against the negative consequences of a decision by the USSR to use force against Poland. On December 4 the same declaration was made publicly by President Carter.

In sum, considering the firm pressures and explicit warnings by the West that the invasion would prove very costly to the USSR, Moscow was now more inclined to let the Poles handle the problem on their own, even at the expense of having to wait for some time. (. . .)

April 1981

On February 16, 1981, when the country was still under the impression of the famous speech by the new Prime Minister-General in which he had presented his idealistic but ultimately positive program and appealed for "Three months of diligent work — 90 days of calm," a group of forty-five higher MON and MSW [Ministry of In-

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ternal Affairs] officers and two functionaries of the Propaganda Department under the PZPR Central Committee gathered in the auditorium of the building of the Inspectorate of Territorial Defense and Internal Defense Troops on Aleje Niepodleglosci Boulevard, with the object of refining and meshing the plans for introducing martial law by enacting a war game. (. . .)

Everyone present in the auditorium was asked to sign a special pledge of secrecy. The presented concepts of action could not be prepared in writing and were merely referred to orally. Only the game's scorekeepers (on the MSW side, Colonel Jan Wasiluk and Colonel Jan Czyzewski, and on the MON side Colonel Czeslaw Witt and I) were authorized to take notes.

During the discussion, the players had reached, to be sure, a consensus that imposing martial law at that time could be the beginning of the greatest drama in Poland's history, but the final conclusions that they had inferred from that appraisal merely brought that drama closer.

Thus, above all, the idea of Army General Tadeusz Tuczapski that the government should submit for consideration to the PRL Sejm [parliament] emergency martial law decrees was ultimately rejected. The players concluded that eliminating the multi-million Solidarity was possible only in the presence of total surprise. It was established that the most favorable moment for commencing the operation would be a day of leisure, preferably a night between Saturday and Sunday.

The so-called Operation Springtime, intended to intern approximately 6,000 activists of Solidarity and other independent occupational and social organizations, was perceived to be the most important martial-law move. It was established that this operation can produce the expected results only if it is carried out 12 to 6 hours prior to the official imposition of martial law.

During the game, final agreement was also reached on the question of the division of roles between the army and the security forces and their cooperation during eventual confrontations with the population.

It was agreed that only security forces would operate in the regions of industrial plants, work establishments, and higher educational institutions. As for the army, it would act more cautiously, at most as a supporting force, deployed in the cities and blockading the industrial centers.

The war game concluded the second, so-called spring period of martial law planning. On February 20, 1981, the conclusions of that game were presented to General Jaruzelski. On the following day, that is, on Saturday, February 21, the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army Arms General Siwicki informed me that the report was approved by General Jaruzelski. The Prime Minister had merely

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made a few minor revisions and recommended that the report be renamed, "On the Status of the State's Preparations for Imposing Martial Law," so that he could present it to the Soviet leadership during the 26th CPSU Congress. (. . .)

Only a few persons knew that during the meeting in the Kremlin on March 3, 1981, while presenting the program of his government to the Soviet side, Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski had also submitted the detailed report "On the Status of the State's Preparations for Imposing Martial Law" and given assurances that the Polish leadership, "being aware of the support of the Allies, is resolved to resort to this measure of defending the country against the counterrevolution."

[Question] From what you said it ensues that already in the spring of 1981 the government side was ready for a confrontation with the society, and that the Soviet Union was well-informed about it. Why then did another attempt at armed intervention by the USSR take place in March and April? Could you present at least the basic facts elucidating that event?

[Answer] Your comment that in the spring the government side was ready for a confrontation with the society is imprecise. The government had plans for imposing martial law, and it had a plan for destroying Solidarity, but in the circumstances at that time it simply had not seen it possible to translate these plans into reality. Aside from any other motives prompting General Jaruzelski, he saw no chance for imposing martial law out of purely pragmatic considerations. For the point was not only to commence that operation but also to complete it victoriously for "people's power." In the spring of 1981 this was neither realistic nor even possible, because the authorities had at their disposal a partially disintegrated MSW, an army of doubtful loyalty, and a handful of hardliners in a disintegrating PZPR, while on the other side they were opposed not only by the millions of Solidarity members but also by nearly the entire hostile society. Given such a ratio of forces, the success of the coup was doomed in advance.

In such a situation, General Jaruzelski continued to assure Moscow, both before and after March 3, that he was resolved to impose martial law, but in his never-ending talks with the Russians, for which I personally had prepared materials according to his directives, he used to explain that it was necessary to wait a little until the ratio of forces would improve at least a little, until Solidarity would lose in popularity and the government gain at least partial support of the society. He also pointed out to them that time was needed in order to consolidate the forces that would support the authorities (this concerned the well-known weaknesses within the MSW and the party.)

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The Russians — as usual in all their contacts with General Jaruzelski — listened only to what was convenient to them or what they liked to hear. Early in 1981 they heard only that he had expressed readiness to "defend socialism" in Poland and was resolved to impose martial law. As for his comments that it was necessary to wait until conditions would improve, and chiefly until the ratio of forces would improve, the Russians considered them insubstantial, since they were ready at any moment to alter the unfavorable ratio of forces by sending their divisions, and even Czech and German divisions as well, to Poland.

It was precisely against this background, just before General Jaruzelski had become prime minister, that Moscow stepped in with the initiative of holding a previously unplanned large command-staff exercise in Poland and around its frontiers, in which some 150,000 troops, including 30,000 in PRL territory, were to take part.

The General Staff of the Polish Army had in this respect the worst premonitions, because the Russians did not conceal that the exercise was closely linked to the situation in Poland and conceived as a form of internationalist assistance to Polish communists. Given the tactic of calming Moscow that it had adopted since the beginning of the crisis, the Polish party-government leadership accepted this offer of internationalist assistance. As to how the Russians interpreted this assistance, that became obvious soon afterward.

Thus, shortly before the Eighth PZPR Central Committee Plenum, at which decisions were taken to replace the prime minister of the PRL Government, a group of eighteen Soviet generals from the United Command had arrived in Poland. They included all the deputies of Marshal Kulikov and their ostensible purpose was to verify the readiness of the Polish Army for Soyuz 81 Exercises. With the approval of the MON, they toured all military districts and services of the Armed Forces, sometimes visiting divisions and even regiments. These Generals were not at all interested in aspects of the training or combat readiness of the troops; their sole concern was the attitude of the command personnel toward the counterrevolution. What they had voiced in their (sometimes private) conversations with Polish officers was not just agitation but a summons to fight against their own nation.

At 1 Mechanized Regiment in Wesola near Warsaw the matters went so far even that Army General Anafasiy Shcheglov (one of the nastiest figures of Russian chauvinism) had the nerve to ask the regiment's CO, "What are you going to do in the event that it will be necessary to remove strikers from a plant or factory?" (. . .)

On March 27, 1981, a USSR government plane landed on the military runway of Okecie Airport and disgorged about thirty officials of the Committee for State Security (KGB), the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the Gosplan, who arrived in order to familiarize them-

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selves thoroughly with the plans for imposing martial law in Poland. The military group was headed by Marshal of the USSR Viktor Kulikov and the KGB team by Andropov's first deputy.

Upon studying our plans the Russians thought them to be insufficient and presented their demands. According to the Russians, the imposition of martial law was dictated by the need to defend socialism. The imposition should be accompanied by a suspension of the Constitution and by the transfer of all power to the hands of the Supreme Military Command .... The Russians also recommended that internment followed by investigation and summary courts-martial be conducted 14 hours prior to the imposition of martial law. Furthermore, they declared that security forces together with the army should be used to crush the counterrevolution and strikes. They recommended that the General Staff of the Polish Army and the commanders of districts and arms of service accept Soviet advisers. (. . .)

On April 3 in the evening, under the shelter of darkness, a Soviet aircraft brought Kania and Jaruzelski to face Brezhnev himself. The conversation must have been brief, because in the morning of April 4 the same Soviet military aircraft brought them back to Warsaw. I am ignorant of the exact wording of these conversations, but I can reproduce their atmosphere, and even their nature, on the basis of the activities of the General Staff of the Polish Army in these days.

Thus, on April 3, that is when Kania and Jaruzelski were getting ready to fly and meet with Brezhnev, the Russians began an air war of nerves with Poland. On that day, without advising in advance the Polish air traffic controllers, they transferred from their Czechoslovak to their Polish bases 32 Mi-6 helicopters and airlifted to Brzeg, by means of 10 AN-12 aircraft, unidentified military cargo. In the following days these helicopters performed combat overflights to the region of Torun and to other parts of Poland. Aside from their terrorizing aspects, these overflights were a major menace to the PRL's airspace, since the Soviet pilots did not obey our air traffic controllers. (. . .)

On April 7, during his sojourn at the Congress of the Czechoslovak CP, Leonid Brezhnev decided to end Soyuz 81 exercises. Formally these exercises were over, but the military terrorism of the USSR against Poland continued. (. . .)

On April 10 Kulikov, together with his Deputy for Allied Fleets, Admiral Mikhaylin, returned to Poland in the region of Swinoujscie, whence he tried to get an appointment with Jaruzelski. But he was told that the Prime Minister was with Kania and could not meet him until April 13. General Jaruzelski wanted to avoid that meeting, because the Soviet side continued to insist on fixing a specific deadline for imposing martial law. In preparation for the meeting with Kulikov fixed for April 13, General Jaruzelski arrived at the General Staff of

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the Polish Army in order to familiarize himself and a group of close associates, with the completed plans. He looked clearly depressed, and even devastated. After he had examined the most important plan documents, he became even more depressed. He declared plainly, "Even in my blackest imagination I could not conceive our doing anything like that. I would rather be no longer Prime Minister when these documents have to be signed and implemented. But the situation is such that bloodying three noses in Bydgoszcz has led us to the edge of the abyss."

As he continued to voice his disjointed thoughts, he criticized Rulewski of Bydgoszcz Solidarity and Bujak of Warsaw Solidarity, claiming that "their attitude is typical of social-fascism." General Jaruzelski declared himself in favor of an eventual intermediate variant between mass internment of the Opposition and a merely brief and selective detention and arrest of the most extremist activists. Jaruzelski's further reflections on these topics were interrupted by the daily TV newscast, which he wanted to view. On that day the newscast was rather gracious toward him, because both the Polish society and the foreign commentaries (of course, only those from the West) generally responded well to his address to the Sejm the previous day. This had evidently cheered him up and, after viewing the TV newscast, he left the General Staff of the Polish Army. On April 13 he met with Kulikov, but he resolutely opposed fixing a date for the imposition of martial law and signing the related documents.

In mid-April the threat of armed intervention by the USSR slowly began to recede, although in reality it probably never disappeared. The Soviet Union has never withdrawn from the PRL the wartime system of command of the intervention forces developed during Soyuz 81 exercises. (. . .)

During the crisis in Poland, Marshal Kulikov handled not only the military aspect but also the burden of direct contacts and talks with the party-political leadership of the PRL. The contacts between Kania and Jaruzelski, on the one hand, and Brezhnev on the other were merely occasional. On a day-by-day basis it was Kulikov who tortured them. Toward the end of the crisis Kulikov did not even want to talk every time and with all. He prided himself, for example, of having ejected Kania from the palace on Sulkiewicz Street where the Marshal had resided now and then, because Kania had come to see him at a late hour and moreover was drunk. That Kania was at the time under the influence of alcohol may have been a notion of the angered Marshal, but the fact remains that he was asked to leave Kulikov's residence because he had adhered to the line of the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress and was opposed to the use of force, and this is a historical fact.

[Question] (. . .)What circumstances restrained for the second time, in your opinion, the Russians from resorting to direct armed inter-

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vention in Poland? Was it again the West's reaction, which had been prompted by your secret reports, or were there other influencing factors?

[Answer] It seems to me that the reasons why the USSR refrained from invading in the spring of 1981 were the same as in the previous December. On the one hand, there was the very strong diplomatic action by the new American Administration of President Reagan and a majority of West European countries, and on the other hand, the apprehensions of the Russians about the reaction of the Polish society, or even the Polish army itself, to the use of force. (. . .)

Given the resolute attitude of the Western countries, and in view of the explicit rise, following the Bydgoszc provocation, of a kind of national front of resistance against the use of force, which was even joined by a considerable part of the People's Polish Army, the offer by the Polish authorities, and especially by General Jaruzelski, to accomplish this [the coup] on their own, proved more tempting to the Russians than instigating in Poland a conflagration that would be difficult to extinguish or whose cost to the USSR would be too high.

Further Plans for Martial Law

General Jaruzelski displayed a marked inclination toward solutions based on the use of force, even before the "favorable conditions" he was awaiting would occur, probably under the influence of a terrific Soviet pressure coordinated with the activities of the native *Targowica* [hard-liner] group, which was accompanied by domestic tensions of no smaller magnitude. He was already very close to using force in mid-June.

At the same time, transition to a wartime command structure began at the MON. As part of that structure, the Operation Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Army was to be the main center for directing the state during martial law [the Polish expression *stan wojenny* means both a state of war and martial law]. After the Directorate was reinforced with officers from other MON institutions and functionaries from key civilian ministries, two teams were to operate within it: the planning team, to which I was appointed as the head; and the command team, to be directed by Colonel Franciszek Puchala.As of the end of September, work stations began to be prepared and provided with special communications equipment for directing operations during martial law.

The modest premises of my Section began to become crowded, and the atmosphere of work became increasingly tense. The regular operations team which had been on duty constantly ever since the strikes on the Coast had been proclaimed in 1980 was complemented with officers from other central institutions of the MON and func-

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tionaries of the MSW. The door to my office, where all the threads of planning had converged, was nearly never closed. After almost a year of preparations for imposing martial law, I became accustomed to pouring plans onto paper. But in September the first collisions between these plans and the human element commenced. I felt sickened, listening to the representative of the Propaganda Department under the PZPR Central Committee who was commenting to me on his vision of shutting down weeklies and newspapers which I used to read and even value, or when he began to name columists and journalists whom I liked to read or listen to and whose voices were to be soon quenched. I felt terrified on listening to the names of various opportunistic journalist mediocrities who were to replace my favorite editors. (. . .)

When on October 31, we, the Polish Army's delegation headed by General Molczyk, landed on the military runway of Okecie Airport, a highly place military person, one of the welcoming committee, told me what I had been dreading already on September 13, "The decision has already been taken. At this moment 'the Supremo,' that is, Jaruzelski, is coordinating the deadline and plan for the operations with the Allies."

Under Suspicion

On November 2, at about 1400 hours, I was summoned to Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army Division General Jerzy Skalski, who supervised the planning of martial law by the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. Along with me, also summoned were the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff General Waclaw Szklarski and his other two deputies, Colonel Czeslaw Witt and Colonel Franciszek Puchala.

General Skalski told us in a tone of the highest gravity about two new and unusually important factors that would markedly influence our planning . . . . The second factor was information from a reliable source that the Americans knew about the latest version of our plans, including the draft decrees on martial law. (. . .)

The news that our secrets had leaked to the West and that Solidarity might be warned at any moment was a shock to all those present.

A dramatic exchange of opinions took place. One after another, we took the floor: General Szklarski, Colonel Puchala, and Colonel Witt claimed that they had no part in it and placed themselves at the disposal of Security. The last of that trio to speak, Colonel Witt, repeated a view he had been long voicing that all the actions of Solidarity so far, since its rise till now, demonstrate that it has a hidden ally at the very center of power.

When afterward all eyes were directed at me, I had already regained control of myself and decided to support Colonel Witt's

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notion and declare that I was one of them and present my rationale. I began by saying that I fully shared the opinion of Colonel Witt, and that I placed myself at the disposal of the authorities and was ready to cooperate in the investigation under way .... When I began to collect my thoughts in order to continue speaking, Gen. Skalski interrupted me, declaring that he was not conducting the investigation (that was being handled by the security services) and that, moreover, the circle of suspects was not limited to us four. Next, he said that we should consider how to organize our work optimally in order to accomplish the tasks facing it. (. . .)

[Question] It is natural and human that, in face of a major peril to your life and eventual repressions against your nearest family members, you decided to leave the country. Could you describe how it happened?

[Answer] The peril did not arise suddenly and unexpectedly at the beginning of November. I still had not conceived the idea of leaving the country. Even after September 13, when the security services began a vigorous search for sources of the leak of our plans to Solidarity from within our community, I stayed on my post. Since the revelation of the code name of the internment operation, "Springtime," narrowed the circle of suspects to those who had know it, I expected arrest any any moment. However, my entire reaction was confined to writing something in the nature of a political testament. But at that time I still had felt needed. Between November 2 and 7 I increasingly lost that belief.

On the morning of November 7 I attended a routine briefing by the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army. General Siwicki had nothing new to say to us, but actually this convinced me even more that now nothing stood in the way of the imposition of martial law.

On leaving at around noon the small conference room of the General Staff of the Polish Army I began to collect my thoughts. What next? Once I got into my Volga, the chauffeur took off at full speed from Rakowiecka Street in order to, as usual, take me to our home in Nowe Miasto via Pulawska and 1 Armia Wojska Polskiego streets and thence via the Lazienki Route and the Vistula River Highway. I told him, "Today there's no need to hurry," and asked him to drive very slowly. For the first time in more than a year I began to watch the passersby, buildings, and even trees of my city. (. . .)

As we exited the Vistula River Highway into Sanguszki Street, my likable army chauffeur, of whom I was as fond as if he were my own son, asked me when was he to return and drive me to work. I answered, "Tomorrow drive directly from your regiment to the parking lot of the General Staff. The car might be needed by the officers in our Section. Monday do the same thing .... If I need you, I'll call

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. . . ." While passing Przyrynsk Street, once again I noticed two young men who quickly turned their faces away. The same thing happened at the end of Rajcow Street, directly in front of the vestry of the Church of the Holy Virgin Mary, that is, a little less than 50 meters from my home. They had been keeping watch there day and night for nearly a week. I was perfectly aware that they were not Solidarity extremists who, according to the official warnings of my superiors, intended to kidnap family members of important military personages so as to alleviate or even disrupt martial-law operations by means of blackmail. I also know perfectly well that they were not guarding my family against that eventuality, because the army rather than the civilian security service was to be used for that purpose. I guessed that I was already under surveillance.

I did not expect an immediate arrest or even arrest within the next few days, because the Security Service had first to sniff out my eventual conspiratorial contacts and linkages within the PRL armed forces and in my relations with the Soviet Army and other Warsaw Pact armies, with the party, with the Opposition, with Solidarity, etc., which were to be essential to their investigation. Nevertheless, the situation was serious and my calculations might go astray. Thus, I began by putting my home into order: it contained not only a large library which also included certain second-circulation [prohibited] publications but also a large collection of top-secret materials and documents concerning the unequal military cooperation between the PRL and the Soviet Union within Warsaw Pact and all the preparations for imposing martial law, which could be readily considered evidence of espionage. (. . .)

I regarded all these collected documents as a kind of elaboration and expansion of the diary I had been keeping with few interruptions since August 1968, or rather of observations jotted down at night with the idea that one day perhaps they would see the light of the day. I selected and burned personal papers such as letters, a record of telephone numbers, addresses, snapshots of friends, anything that might in the least incriminate innocent people, during November 4, 5, and 6. On November 7, immediately upon returning home, I began to burn my valuable archives. The apartment was full of smoke because, given such a large amount of papers, the chimney ceased to work. To avoid being suffocated, I began to open the windows, but the smoke issuing from my apartment attracted the attention of the security agents circling the building and they might at any moment burst into my home.

On the other hand, I increasingly realized that I was destroying copies of documents of great historical importance whose originals would certainly never be made public. Since I would not come to any greater harm if I were caught possessing them, I decided that I might as well leave the country with the remaining, still unburned

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documents. It seems to me that it is still too early to describe how it [my escape] took place. I believe, however, that in the future this too can be made public.

Under the Soviet Thumb

[Question] Could you describe the relationship of dependence of the Polish Army on the Soviet command? Is it a relationship between a subordinate and a superior, or is Jaruzelski able to oppose the decisions of the Warsaw Pact or submit them for discussion?
[Answer] The situation of the PRL, whose leaders had begun since the late 1960s to gradually discard Poland's sovereign rights to dispose of its own armed forces and national defense as it sees fit, is greatly complicated, although it is not hopeless in all circumstances and in all situations.

In the event of a war peril or war, as much as 90 percent of the Polish Army will find itself directly under the orders of Soviet commanders.

Hopeless it is only in times of war peril and in time of war, because, according to the so-called Statute of the United Armed Forces and the Organs for Directing Them in Time of War, which was accepted by the PRL sometime between the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980, in such situations directing Poland's defense and command over its armed forces entirely passes into the hands of the so-called Single Supreme High Command. The PRL had agreed voluntarily that the Single Supreme High Command would be exclusively the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, and that its working organ would be exclusively the Soviet General Staff. The Polish side had even agreed to the present and future absence of any Polish representative or even just a liaison mission at that Supreme High Command.

The Polish Armed Forces will be commanded by the Soviet Supreme Command through the mediation of the latter's lower command echelons. Thus:

The Polish Front, that is, all the operational land troops and the air force will be directly subordinated to the Soviet Supreme Commander of the Western Theater of War.

The entire Navy of the PRL, including its land bases, will be commanded by the Commander of the USSR Baltic Fleet who, in a situation of peril of war or actual war, automatically becomes the commander, and his staff the staff of the so-called United Baltic Fleet of Warsaw Pact Countries.

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Even the National Air Defense Troops (regarded from the moment of their formation as the core of home defense) will be led by Soviet rather than Polish commanders. A piquant aspect of the pertinent agreement was endowing the Soviet high command with rights to use Polish air defense units outside the PRL territory.

In sum, in the event of a war peril or war, as much as 90 percent of the Polish Army will find itself directly under the orders of Soviet commanders. Left within the purview of the national military-political leadership will be, properly speaking, only domestic logistic units, engineer maintenance units for safeguarding the transit of Soviet troops across PRL territory, and units expected to train reserves for complementing war losses.

All orders and directives of the Soviet commanders will be addressed directly to their subordinate Polish troops, bypassing the Polish high command. In practice, this means an unbounded right of the USSR to dispose of the people's Polish Army without any prior consultation with PRL authorities.

The role of the Polish high command will be confined solely to that of supplying all materiel to the Polish troops fighting under Soviet command, training reserves, and compensating for human and material war losses.

All the foregoing decisions are, in view of their exceptionally sensitive nature, classified top secret and no one in the Polish Army apart from a handful of heads of the MON has the least notion of them. Even the commanders of arms of service and military districts are familiar with that part of the decisions which concerns them directly.

In peacetime, Soviet guidance of the armed forces and defense of Warsaw Pact countries is camouflaged under the screen of the so-called United Command of the United Armed Forces. That command is so structured that all the leading posts, from the Supreme Commander through the Chief of Staff and the deputies of the Supreme Commander for Air Defense, Air Force, Navy, Technology, and the Rear, as well as at all the levels downward, ending with the section (department) chief at the Technological Staff and Committee of the United Armed Forces, are staffed exclusively with Soviet personnel. Regardless of the posts they nominally hold, the officers of the other Warsaw Pact armies exercise only information and liaison functions with respect to their own national armies.

From the moment that General Jaruzelski became minister of National Defense, the Russians had never had any trouble with Poland in the field of politics and military solutions. During 1968-1981 they had gotten whatever they wanted without having to act above the head of the Polish high command. In the early 1980s they already had under their control practically anything relating to the national defense of the PRL and the operation of its armed forces.

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For example, it is Moscow that determines the long-range numerical size of the Polish army in peacetime and in time of war, its organizational structures, armaments and facilities, state of combat readiness and mobilizational readiness, directions of training, tasks and plans for its use in time of war, etc.

The implementation of the obligations accepted by the PRL Ministry of National Defense in this connection is checked upon by the Russians twice a year. There exists a dual reporting system. Some reports are transmitted to Moscow by the PRL Ministry of National Defense, while others, identical in form and content but based on Soviet sources, are dispatched by the Soviet Mission of the Supreme Commander of the United Armed Forces to the Polish Army. Moscow analyzes and compares these reports and expects profuse explanations from the Polish side whenever it uncovers any deviations from the adopted obligations, underfulfillment of plans, or even merely inaccuracies in the Polish version of the reports.

There also occur paradoxes such that the numerical size of the Polish Army made public by Poland during the Vienna negotiations (and of course not consonant with truth) was specified by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces in Moscow. Since the incorrrect figures were complicating the negotiations in Vienna in 1980, the General Staff of the Polish Army intended to bring them somewhat closer to actual figures. In that connection I accompanied Gen. Siwicki during his attempts in this matter in Moscow and I had personally witnessed a two-star Soviet General of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces tell my chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, *Nel'zya* [impossible], whereupon he handed us a prepared card bearing data which we could use in our negotiations with the West.

Pursuant to the obligations assumed by the PRL, the Polish General Staff has to coordinate with the Soviet high command the peacetime deployment of units of the Polish Army, among other things.

The Russians have a guaranteed right to conduct inspections and monitoring of Polish Army units. The absence of precise rules defining what they can control and what they cannot has resulted in, e.g., the situation that took place in early February 1981 when, under the pretext of monitoring the readiness of the Polish Army for the Soyuz 81 exercise, Soviet Generals from the United Command principally checked upon the readiness of various Polish levels and units for the confrontation with Solidarity.

The Warsaw Pact does not give any member country or any group of member countries of Warsaw Pact the formal right to interfere in the internal affairs of another member country, let alone the right of armed intervention. This can be referred to by adherents of this principle. I know of instances in which the Socialist Republic

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of Romania said no on issues of the highest importance to the USSR and suffered absolutely no consequences. One such instance happened at a session of the Advisory Political Committee which took place in Moscow on November 23, 1978. At that session, the Romanian side refused to agree to a resolution containing a general provision to the effect that the Supreme High Command of the USSR Armed Forces was acknowledged to be the sole high command of Warsaw Pact forces in time of war. When loyal allies of the USSR began to attack Romania because of this, President Ceausescu got up from the conference table and, together with the entire Romanian delegation, left Moscow. Soviet pressures on Romania continued for the entire year 1979, but in the end Moscow had to give in. President Ceausescu wants to be a loyal ally of the Soviet Union without being its vassal. His country did not participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia and, as I noted earlier, it did not sign any agreements placing in doubt the sovereign status of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

The situation of General Jaruzelski, who had in the past provided active support to the Soviet Union in its invasion of Czechoslovakia, that is, acknowledged de facto the right of Warsaw Pact to interfere in the internal affairs of its member countries, and who has caused Poland's defense capability to be so greatly contingent on the Soviet Union, is totally different, and therefore it is difficult to me to imagine circumstances in which he could, even if he had wanted it very hard, say a resolute no to the Russians.

[Question] As known, there are some people in Poland and abroad who view General Jaruzelski as a kind of Konrad Wallenrod [hero of Mickiewicz's eponymous work] who, out of patriotic considerations, saved the country from a catastrophe. How do you view it?

[Answer] My view has been consistently that in Poland there had existed a real chance for avoiding both a Soviet intervention and the martial law. At the onset of the crisis General Jaruzelski was not the top figure in the government. Nevertheless, since August 1980 his voice had the greatest weight. Had he, together with Stanislaw Kania proved capable of greater dignity and strength, had they honestly adhered to the concluded social agreements instead of knuckling under to Moscow, present-day Poland would undoubtedly have looked completely different.

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White House Diary, 1980

by Zbigniew Brzezinski

Until recently, telling the full story of the Carter administration's intense efforts to deter Soviet military intervention in Poland during the fall of 1980 might have compromised sensitive intelligence sources. The situation changed in the spring of 1987 with the publication of the recollections of a patriotic and brave Polish officer, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, who played a critical role in depriving the Soviets of the advantages of secrecy and surprise and thus deterred them from a step that would have had dangerous, perhaps catastrophic, international consequences. Kuklinski has now recounted in some detail how he alerted the Americans to Soviet plans to invade Poland. While not the only source of U.S. information, he played an important role in helping to save his country from being overrun by its powerful neighbor. His public disclosures facilitate a more comprehensive account of deliberate U.S. efforts not to be as passive as in regards to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, thereby also deterring and thus averting a major collision in the heart of Europe.

What follows is the day-to-day account of the U.S. response to the Polish crisis, as experienced by one key participant. Dictated at the end of each working day, the notes suffer from many stylistic shortcomings. On the other hand, they may have the advantage of authenticity and immediacy. In any case, they have not been edited, though in some instances subsequent events have changed my judgment. The only exceptions are a few cuts made to avoid excessive repetition or irrelevancies, several minor cuts (marked with ellipses), to preserve confidentiality, and the addition of a few explanatory notes.

It should be noted that these notes deal only with the U.S. efforts to prevent a Soviet military intervention in Poland. During the fall of 1980, President Carter and his team worked hard to help Poland stabilize its economic situation in the hope of creating a felicitous setting for an internal political compromise. The president exchanged messages on that subject with the principal European allies and discussions were also held with emissaries from Warsaw. Senior American officials spent much time discussing ways of helping to reduce internal tensions within Poland. Ongoing U.S. economic as-

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sistance to Poland was increased while Washington advised all Poles who would listen to exercise maximum restraint and moderation.

But, these broader matters are not covered in the material that follows, which focuses only on the direct Soviet military threat. It is hoped that these notes from my daily journal may provide an additional perspective on the history of U.S. policy toward Central Europe and a revealing case study of active political deterrence.

October 4, 1980 — I reported on the situation in Poland, warning of increasing political and economic difficulties and suggesting that Soviet intervention is not to be excluded. In fact, I think it is quite possible unless we make energetic efforts to deter it. Accordingly, letters to [French President Valery] Giscard [d'Estaing] and [West German Chancellor Helmut] Schmidt ought to be sent in the President's name.

October 23, 1980 — Later in the morning I chaired the SCC [Special Coordination Committee, operating at cabinet level] on Poland. [Secretary of State Edmund] Muskie attended; [Deputy Secretary of State Warren] Christopher showed up late; [Defense Secretary Harold] Brown, J[oint]C[hiefs of]S[taff] and CIA. Participation was restricted because of the sensitivity of the meeting. The agenda was how to respond in the event of a Soviet intervention in Poland. I made it very clear at the opening of the session that we should not discuss how likely such an intervention is but focus on what we would do (1) to deter it if it was imminent and (2) how we would react to it if it took place. Since I briefed Muskie on it somewhat the day before, he was not as negative as I feared he might be. We went through the checklist of possible responses and agreed that a number of them should be raised in the course of the following week when consultations are held in Europe with our principal allies. I did not press for any recommendations because that would not only be premature but probably divisive. If an intervention took place, the emotional reaction to it would be such that we would be under great political pressure to act. In the meantime this meeting will help to sensitize not only the State Department bureaucracy but our allies to some possible reactive steps. Moreover, this may have the effect of encouraging our allies to do more vis-à-vis the Soviets. They should quietly go on record and discourage the Soviets from taking any action; and in the meantime, they should begin their own contingency planning in the event that such an action took place. Contrary to my expectations, the meeting itself was quite amicable; no fundamental disagreements between Brown or Muskie; Christopher also did not raise too many objections. (. . .)

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October 29, 1980 — This afternoon I had a meeting with [CIA Director] Stan Turner. I pressed very hard on three issues: first, what is the latest assessment of the chances of Soviet intervention in Poland. I am becoming increasingly concerned that this is likely. The Germans have told us at the Quad meeting [four-power conference with Britain, France, West Germany, and the United States] that détente should not be the victim of such intervention; in other words, the Germans are saying that in the event of a Soviet intervention the Germans would be prepared to continue with their East-West relationship. This was the best proof yet of the increasing finlandization of the Germans.

The Germans are saying that in the event of a Soviet intervention the Germans would be prepared to continue with their East-West relationship. This was the best proof yet of the increasing finlandization of the Germans.

November 26, 1980 — In the morning briefing the question of possible Soviet intervention in Poland came up again. The President told me in the light of my comments to him to write a memorandum to Brown and Muskie soliciting their reactions to my thought that it might be useful to give a backgrounder to the press on the possible consequences for the Soviet Union of the Soviet intervention. Accordingly, I sent Muskie and Brown a memorandum, asking them to comment on the following points: such an intervention would produce a rupture in the political détente in Europe; it would disrupt East-West economic cooperation in Europe; it would generate increased NATO budgets; it would create a rupture in relations between the communist parties of Western Europe and the Soviet Union; it would further alienate the nonaligned movement from the Soviet Union; it would probably precipitate overt American-Chinese cooperation; and it could precipitate turmoil elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc. I suspect that Brown will react positively to this and Muskie negatively.

November 30, 1980 — Gathering clouds over Poland are getting darker. Intelligence report to the effect that the East German frontier has been restricted. That is the area from which the Soviet troops will probably deploy in the event of an invasion of Poland.

I had a mini-SCC run on Friday by [Deputy National Security Adviser David] Aaron, and I am beginning to stress to the press more openly the calamitous consequences of a Soviet intervention. Even though the State Department wishes nothing to be said on this subject, I feel that we ought to start stressing publicly what would happen. Moreover, [U.S. Senator Charles] Percy in his conversations with

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Brezhnev in the last two days did raise the issue very much along the lines of what I said to him when we were coming back from Portugal a week or so ago. At that time I urged Percy to be absolutely unambiguous about the consequences for East-West relations if the Soviets intervene in Poland. I will also speak tomorrow to [Richard V.] Allen, the Reagan adviser, in order to get the new administration more on the record.

December 1, 1980 — During the briefing I told the President the situation in Poland has become critical. The East German-Polish border has been sealed off, Soviet forces on the Eastern border of Poland seemed to be in a higher state of alert, and there are mounting indications of accelerated preparations in air fields, depots, and so forth. I told the President that we had to ask ourselves whether we had been clear enough in our public statements on Poland. Have we gone sufficiently on record in expressing anxiety? Have we done enough with out allies?

Later in the morning he sent down a proposed message to Giscard, [British Prime Minister Margaret] Thatcher and Schmidt. It said in effect that the President is increasingly concerned about the unusually high level of Warsaw Pact military activity that is taking shape in and around Poland and he noted the unprecedented travel restraints that are being imposed by the chief of Soviet forces in East Germany along the border with Poland, noting that this means that the situation in Poland has reached its most critical phase and Soviet preparations for intervention are further advanced than ever. The President went on to say that we will be expressing our deepest concern to the Soviets and urged our allies to do the same. I approved later in the afternoon that a copy of this message be sent to our various ambassadors with the request that the foreign ministers of our allies be apprised. My hope is that we will thereby precipitate stronger reactions by our allies to the Soviets.

December 2, 1980 — I am sending a memo to the President saying that a Soviet intervention in Poland has become quite probable in view of the latest intelligence alert. Accordingly, I urged him to issue a joint statement with Reagan expressing concern and stating that such Soviet action would have a most adverse impact on U.S.-Soviet relations. I indicate in the memo that Muskie will probably object to it, but that it is timely for such a statement to be issued. In my view it is important to establish a clear historical record that we did all we could to deter the Soviets from taking such a historically consequential action.

I have met over the last several weeks with various official and unofficial emissaries from Poland. To all of them I have given the same message. First, strive for maximum compromise at home. The Party, the Church, and the free trade unions should get together and not push the issue to a confrontation. The time is to consolidate the

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gains and not to produce a showdown. Second, the government and the Party tell the Soviets they are determined to preserve Poland's social and political order, its membership in the Warsaw Pact, and the formal primacy of the Communist Party. However, if the Soviets intervene the country and the government will resist. That is important, in my judgment, to deter Soviet action. The Soviets are more likely to intervene if they feel confident that it will be a walkover as in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

December 3, 1980 — At the morning briefing I told the President that the changes effected yesterday in the Polish Politburo indicated the intention of the Poles to combine continued reform with increased intimidation. [General Mieczyslaw] Moczar will reassure the police and the Party and he also represents a potential alternative to [Polish party Secretary Stanislaw] Kania. I then asked the President whether he has reviewed the joint statement that I suggested to him by my memo of yesterday to be issued by him but referring also to Reagan's endorsement. He told me he hadn't seen it and told me that he would have his reaction to me before I meet at noon with Brown, Muskie and Turner to consider Polish developments.

At noon I met in my office with Brown, Muskie and Turner. In the meantime I received back from the President the proposed statement on Poland. The President made only minor editorial changes in it, crossing out the line in which it was stated "I have consulted President-elect Reagan about the developments. He shares my concerns." After some back and forth in which I said to the other three that in my view we needed a statement for the record, that while it may not have a decisively deterrent effect on the Soviets it is still something that the Soviets need to hear, the three agreed that it ought to be issued. I had earlier drafted this statement and I laid emphasis in it on two propositions: the first that the United States does not intend to exploit the Polish developments to its own political ends, and the second that Soviet intervention would have far-reaching consequences for East-West relations and that the attitude and future policies of the United States toward the Soviet Union would be directly and very adversely affected by any Soviet use of force in Poland. Harold Brown then raised the question whether we should instead of a public statement inform the Soviets privately. After some exchange of views on this subject, he and I concluded that it would be better (I believe it was my idea) to send a quick message to Brezhnev informing him that a statement will be issued. I then dictated such a statement to the secretary in front of the other three. It read as follows:

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to inform you that later today I will be issuing a statement of concern regarding the developments around Poland. Before doing so, I wish to convey to

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you the firm intention of the United States not to exploit the events in Poland nor to threaten legitimate Soviet security interests in that region. I want you to know that our only interest is in the preservation of peace in Central Europe, in the context of which the Polish government and Polish people can resolve their internal difficulties. At the same time I have to state our relationship would be most adversely affected if force was used to impose a solution upon the Polish nation. The statement which I am issuing is a public expression of that view.

I submitted both texts to the President around one o'clock and shortly after my return from lunch they came back with a note from the President to the effect "proceed." The only change he made was to add "Best wishes, Jimmy Carter" to the message to Brezhnev.

In the later afternoon I met with Jody [Powell, White House press spokesman] to coordinate the insurance of the statement and to make certain that Brezhnev first gets the message. At 4:21 we received word from Moscow confirming receipt of this message. Around the same time I briefed the press in Jody's office on its significance, again emphasizing the two propositions that we do not wish to intervene but that a Soviet intervention would have the most adverse reactions. I stressed in my briefing the need for moderation and restraint on the part of all sides to the conflict within Poland. The press was its usual agitated self. The journalists immediately wanted to know if we expect a Soviet invasion to take place almost immediately. I made the point of saying that we viewed it neither as imminent nor as inevitable. I think it is important not to create the impression that the Soviets are about to strike because the sense of inevitability in a way makes such a strike more likely and in a curious psychological way almost legitimates it.

December 4, 1980 — During the morning briefing I reported briefly on the messages that we have sent out on Poland, as well as on the reaction to the Presidential statement yesterday on Poland. That reaction was quite good. It put a clear marker down on where we stand. So far no comment from the Soviets. However, Radio Moscow is now stepping up its charges that I have been conspiring with the Polish dissidents. We issued a strong denial. In the afternoon a meeting with Ambassador [Peter] Hermes of [West] Germany. He maintains that the Germans would adopt economic sanctions against the Soviets if the Soviets invade Poland. He says public opinion pressures would push them that way. I hope he is right because the official German position is much more reticent.

December 5, 1980 — I told the President this morning that the German Ambassador told me that the Germans would probably move forward with economic sanctions in the event that Poland was invaded.

The press, incidentally, has played rather well my statements of yesterday. The three words moderation, restraint and compromise were used in a number of stories as well as the statement to the effect that we have no interest in upsetting existing international

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arrangements in Central Europe and that we respect the historical and geographical realities.

I also told the President that Harold has submitted a paper recommending a broad NSC review of our long-term security problems. I suggested that we discuss this at breakfast.

At the breakfast (attended by the Vice President, Warren Christopher, Brown, [presidential assistant Jack] Watson, Jody and myself) the President said that no more is to be said on Poland. We have a good general line. He referred to my comments and he said that we should stick to that. The Vice President asked me to explain the three words that I used, and how they should be applied, and I explained that I am trying to convey the thought that there would be far-reaching consequences, adverse ones, if the Soviets act, but that at the same time we are trying to reassure the Soviets that we are not abetting or exploiting the developments in Poland. The President said that in his judgment it is inevitable that the Soviets will intervene. The economic crisis will drive the Soviets in. In effect, he feels that [Soviet Ambassador Anatoly] Dobrynin with his recent comments is now preparing the ground for this.

When I returned to my office I received a call from Stan Turner at 9:10 a.m. He informed me that according to a very reliable source, which has previously reported accurately to us, 18 Soviet divisions will enter Poland Monday morning. The Polish General Staff is apparently debating as to whether to offer any national resistance. I immediately went to see the President at 9:15, informed him of this development. I told him that I would be convening if necessary an SCC on this subject on Saturday afternoon immediately after my return from Montreal. If there is a need I will propose that we hold an NSC Sunday morning and that several of us could come out to Camp David. The President told me that he would be back Sunday morning and hence we can hold the NSC in the White House and that I should keep him informed. At 9:25 I called Brown and Christopher . . . , informed them of this intelligence and told them that they ought to stand by for an SCC crisis meeting on Saturday afternoon. I told them that I would return from Montreal instantly if the situation deteriorates. In my view if we have evidence of Soviet movements on Saturday afternoon we ought to convene a meeting of the Security Council of the UN and in general proceed to press our allies for a rapid definition of a common response. Over the last several weeks we have hammered out the basic outlines of such a response, and now would be the time to get them to line up.

While in Montreal Friday afternoon, following my speech at the Canadian Club on the regional security framework, I received a report that the Warsaw Pact had met. It issued an ambivalent statement. On the one hand it seems to be emphasizing détente, and it pledges non use of force. On the other hand it states the Warsaw

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Pact is prepared to give Poland its support, a phrase which could be used to justify intervention. My hope is that my statements of yesterday together with the President's firm posture may have somewhat deterred the Soviets while at the same time reassuring them that we do not have any direct involvement in the matter. However, it is doubtful that any single set of statements would have too much impact on the Soviets if in the meantime they had reached a comprehensive decision to intervene. If they do intervene we will have to mount the most massive international response possible. I will press for as much movement on the U.S.-Chinese security relationship as is possible. Nonetheless it will be a tragic note on which to leave office.

December 6, 1980 — Just came back from Montreal. I was advised in mid-day that there ought to be an SCC on Poland. I chaired it at 4:00 p.m. and it was attended by Brown, wearing his jogging suit; Christopher, Turner, General [John] Pustay, [Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs] George Vest, David Aaron and several members of the staff — [Marshall] Brement, [Robert] Blackwill, [Steven] Larrabee. Stan Turner gave us his assessment. There is a continued Soviet military buildup East and West of Poland. In the Moscow Warsaw Pact meeting interior ministries were represented and it is now the Agency conclusion that the Soviets will be ready to go within 48 hours. Moreover, it is the Agency conclusion that they will go into Poland on Monday or Tuesday in what Stan called "peaceful mode." In other words, the notion is the Soviets will enter Poland in conjunction with security operations by the Polish police, cracking down on Solidarity. In brief, he shared with us three central conclusions: 15 Soviet divisions are likely to enter Poland, particularly from the East, in the course of the next 48 hours. More divisions will follow. Secondly, the Poles will crack down heavily on Solidarity. Third, there will be bloodshed. There is mobilization going on elsewhere in the Soviet Union.

We then discussed this and I raised the question of coordination of Polish security operations with the Soviets. In my view, if the CIA scenario is correct, Polish security will first conduct a sweep in order to seize Solidarity leadership and other key centers and then to break the psychological back of any disorganized resistance the Soviets will encounter. In effect, the Polish security sweep will be in the evening and the Soviets will enter in the course of the night. We discussed at some length instructions to a Quad meeting next week in which there was general agreement that we ought to be as specific as possible in telling our allies what our economic and political sanctions will be. I emphasized the importance of this, stressing that we did not do that sufficiently before Afghanistan and as a consequence our allies complained that they weren't sufficiently brought into our own planning.

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There was general harmony in the meeting. I also raised the question whether we should in some fashion publicize this news once we are confident that it is accurate. I asked, for example, whether we should send a message perhaps tomorrow to the Secretary General of the United Nations asking him to use his good offices to deter the Soviets and/or to convene a Security Council meeting. We could let the fact of such a message become publicly known, and thereby give some time to the leadership of the Polish dissent movement and of the free trade unions to take refuge or to take whatever other precautions they deem desirable. In effect, the point was that we have the moral obligation to forewarn them if we are fairly certain in our own minds that this is about to happen. At the same time Christopher, Brown and I agreed not to do this today because to some extent we are still hesitant about the accuracy of the CIA analysis. (. . .)

Another source of skepticism in my own mind at least is the extent to which the Polish leadership would be prepared to collude in this and the degree to which such collusion could be kept secret. I would have thought that at least some Polish leaders would object to this and thus the news would spread. I recommended and the meeting accepted an instruction to our embassy in Warsaw to step up the political reporting of all U.S. diplomatic personnel in Poland. Our political and other officers are to travel more frequently, to talk to as many people and to place under special observation all Polish security units and headquarters. Also some officers are to be sent to some towns which are likely to be critical and in which we do not have consulates, e.g. Gdansk, Szczecin, and Silesia.

After the meeting was over shortly before six I talked to the President on the phone. He was up at Camp David. I was told he was busy, then I was told he was resting and sleeping, but I insisted he be woken up. As it turned out he was not sleeping. I apprised him of these steps and I told him that our recommendation is that for the moment we do not inform Reagan or Congressional leaders of this information. He quizzed me at length on this and seemed to favor some such briefing. I told him that if we brief them it would immediately leak out as news and if it turns out that it is not accurate we will have created a panic pointlessly and with some damage to our own credibility. I told him that we decided to hold a meeting tomorrow at one. He insisted he be briefed at 9:00 a.m. and I have scheduled a meeting involving Brown, Muskie, Turner and myself.

One of the issues that came up in this afternoon's discussion was whether we should step up some of our military sales to the Chinese. The question is whether we could provide some engines for the Chinese aircraft. Defense and I were inclined to go in that direction; State still objected. I intend to bring up at tomorrow's meeting the question of perhaps blockading Cuba in retaliation. We could warn the Soviets that we intend to do so.

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December 7, 1980 — In the morning we met in the Cabinet Room again on the Polish situation. Attending in addition to the President were Muskie, Christopher, Brown, Turner, myself, Steve Larrabee as notetaker. The President first asked me to summarize yesterday's meeting, which I did, drawing his attention to the three basic conclusions; namely, that the Soviets would undertake what they would like to consider to be a "peaceful" move into Poland with 15 divisions within the next 48-72 hours. This would be done under the guise of an exercise and at the request of the Polish government. The Poles would simultaneously crack down on Solidarity with their security forces. This scenario was unlikely to succeed and bloodshed would probably follow.

We then had a prolonged discussion on whether to go public or not with this matter. The President favored going public, and as the discussion went on I also argued that we should go public. Muskie and Christopher have some reservations but by and large they also were inclined to the view that it would be useful to go public. We have decided to call in some congressional leaders for two o'clock and our group will meet again at one o'clock to review a possible public statement as well as some other diplomatic initiatives, such as an appeal to [United Nations Secretary-General Kurt] Waldheim. We will also consider whether we should try to warn the Polish dissenters. The President also will review the proposals for sanctions, political and economic, that would be put to our NATO allies as well as some military steps designed to enhance our readiness. After all, the Soviets are using or are about to use 15 divisions, and this reduces the lead time required for any preparations for action against NATO as well.

In the course of the meeting Stan Turner was called out. . . . He came back at 9:34 and said that he has had now an additional intelligence report . . . , namely, that on the 5th preparations for an invasion were completed. That is to say, two days ago. Units are to enter Poland from the western Soviet Union and simultaneously from Czechoslovakia and East Germany. All the units have already been assigned specific objectives. The Soviets will at the same time demand the immediate liquidation of all counterrevolutionary elements in Poland. A joint decision to invade was made on December 5 and can come as early as the morning or night of the 7th. That is to say, tonight.

Yesterday at the SCC meeting which lasted from 4:00-5:40 p.m. I said that it is important to be very specific on what we might do in order to avoid the kind of situation that occurred before Afghanistan. The more specific we can be in response to the Soviet invasion of Poland, the better. I stressed that if the CIA scenario comes to pass, it is likely that leaders of Solidarity would be arrested late at night on Sunday and that early morning the population would wake to find Soviet troops in Poland. There was some discussion as to

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whether we ought to address ourselves to this matter publicly in order to deny the Soviets the element of surprise. After that, I spoke to the President and he insisted that we have a meeting this morning at 9:00. He also was in favor of a public statement.

At one o'clock today we met again. First I presided in the Cabinet Room over what was an enlarged SCC meeting. We agreed on the proposed text of the statement which would be made public. Its purpose would be to warn the Soviets once again and also to deny them of the element of surprise. The statement which the President approved when he came in 15 minutes later was drafted as follows:

Preparations for a possible Soviet intervention in Poland appear to have been completed. It is our hope that no such intervention will take place. The United States government reiterates its statement of December 3 regarding the very adverse consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations of a Soviet military intervention in Poland.

In addition to the statement we agreed on a message which was then sent out immediately to Schmidt, Giscard, Thatcher, [Canadian Prime Minister Pierre] Trudeau, [Secretary General of NATO Joseph] Luns, [Italian Premier Arnaldo] Forlani, [Australian Prime Minister Malcolm] Fraser, [Japanese Prime Minister Zenko] Suzuki and Waldheim. This was more explicit. It was to the effect that preparations for a Soviet intervention in Poland appear to be essentially completed. Further, we have some evidence which indicates that the Soviet Union has made a decision to intervene with military force and that the entry into Poland by a substantial Soviet force, possibly under the guise of a joint maneuver, may be imminent. This may be accompanied by widespread arrests by Polish security forces. We cannot be confident that this is the case, but the probability is sufficiently high that in my view Western nations should take whatever steps they can to affect Soviet decision-making and thus try to prevent the entry of Soviet forces into Poland. "Accordingly, I am issuing the following statement at 2:00 p.m. Washington time today. I trust that you will be able to issue a similar statement soon. Such statements will demonstrate to the Soviets the resolve of the Western alliance and will serve to warn the Polish people of the serious nature of the current situation."

I then briefed the press at 2:00 p.m., explaining to them that in our judgment the preparations for intervention have been completed, and this is why we are reiterating the serious statement on our policy that we made several days ago. I was asked if I felt that the invasion was still not imminent, as I had said four days ago. I responded by saying that at that time that was the correct view because I was being asked as to whether the invasion might take place in the course of the immediate night or the very next day. As of now, we are not in a position to say whether it is imminent or not. We are in a position to know that it could take place because preparations for it are completed. I was asked what we mean by prepa-

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rations and I said preparations subsumes under it all of the logistical and deployment activities which are required to give a major power the opportunity to inject its forces into a sovereign foreign country.

We then briefed the congressional leaders on the disposition of Polish forces and Soviet forces. According to the information that we have, Polish forces are stationed mostly in western Poland and it is expected that Soviet divisions entering from East Germany will essentially try to engage these forces so that at the same time a large number of Soviet divisions will swoop from the east into Poland westward, occupying Warsaw, Gdansk, Silesia and so forth. In my own judgment the three centers of resistance are likely to be around Gdansk where there are some Polish forces stationed, near Warsaw for historical reasons, and probably around Silesia.

After the meeting I alerted ... to inform Polish dissidents through his own channels so that they can take necessary cover. I spoke to [AFL-CIO President] Lane Kirkland, so that he could use the trade union channels, and I phoned up Rome and spoke for 10 minutes with the Pope. (...)

My hope is, though I do not have too much hope, that all of this public activity may have the effect of deterring the Soviets from making the move if especially they counted on the element of surprise as a very major ingredient of their planning. What we have done at least is deny them that element of surprise. (...)

Later this evening I ordered the State Department to send a copy of the message on the prospective invasion also to [Indian Prime Minister Indira] Gandhi since Brezhnev was scheduled to visit India as of tomorrow. The Indians might as well weigh in, too, if they are willing to do so.

The meetings today were quite harmonious. Muskie, Christopher, Brown and I all worked well together. Whatever differences arose were only essentially of a drafting type. There were no fundamental disagreements on the posture that we ought to adopt.

December 8, 1980 — The Soviets have not entered Poland last night and today the press is playing well our statement of yesterday. The headlines highlight the fact that the Soviets have completed their preparations for an intervention. The distinction is made between the completion of such preparations and that we are not asserting that the Soviets have actually decided to invade. Nonetheless, the effect is to heighten international awareness of what is happening. The decision to go public was made by the President at the meeting yesterday (Sunday morning). (...)

Toward the end of the meeting Warren Christopher asked what had changed over the last few days to warrant the statement. Did such a statement make an intervention more or less likely? I responded by saying that our goal should be (1) to maximize international pressure on the Soviets in the hope of preventing an invasion

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and (2) to give some warning time to the Poles so that the leaders of Solidarity can go into hiding. I also noted that at some point it would become known that the Soviets were ready and we would be asked why we had not done more to prevent the Soviets from moving in. On my instructions V[oice]O[f]A[merica] and R[adio]F[ree]E[urope] were ordered in the early afternoon to broadcast immediately the President's White House statement.

In effect I see four objectives to what we are doing. One is to deprive the Soviets of surprise. This we have already done. Two, perhaps to encourage the Poles to resist if they are not taken by surprise, for this might somewhat deter the Soviets. The publicity is already doing that. Thirdly and paradoxically, to calm the situation in Poland by making the Poles more aware that the Soviets may in fact enter. The Poles have until now discounted this possibility and this may have emboldened them excessively. Here in effect we have a common interest with the Soviets, for they too may prefer to intimidate the Poles to a degree. And fourth, to deter the Soviets from coming in by intensifying international pressure and condemnation of the Soviet Union. The last, of course, runs the risk of seemingly crying wolf, but I believe we can always later reveal what we know about Soviet preparations and thus claim, and I think with some justification, that we will have helped to deter the Soviet move if it does not take place.

As of this morning, however, intelligence indicates the Soviets are continuing to mass their forces. Four Czech divisions have been deployed, communications have been intensified between Soviet forces in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, Soviet officers have moved in large numbers into the Polish Defense Ministry, presumably to coordinate any "joint" maneuvers and to disrupt any Polish resistance ... we will have helped to alert the Polish dissenters so they will not be caught unaware in the event a crackdown occurs.

This afternoon Nicko [Sir Nicholas] Henderson, the British Ambassador, came to see me. A tall, slightly stooped, crumpled figure, with hair falling over the side of his head and forehead, but an extremely thoughtful and imaginative observer of the international scene. He was very concerned that in the event of Soviet entry into Poland, which he described as tantamount to the destruction of Poland, there will be massive disarray in the West. He said the Germans are totally soft, not prepared to do anything, and he feels that the French will not be much better. As a consequence, he said, we will not only get the crushing of the Poles but also a demonstration of Western futility and weakness. As he was leaving he said, "the President said a year ago that America was in a malaise. I wish Europe was in the kind of malaise in which you are said to be. We are much sicker than you." I am afraid he may very well be right.

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December 9, 1980 — I told the President this morning that there are some reports that Reuters is unable to contact its offices in Warsaw and Moscow, that the AP line to Moscow has ceased to function, and that French, Danish and Belgian radio are quoting [the Polish news-agency] PAP that 60,000 troops are moving into Poland. I also told the President that I instructed Col. [Leslie] Denend to phone the Warsaw Embassy and that we established that telephone lines are open and hence communications have not been broken and therefore this report probably is inaccurate. I also told him that we have deprived the Soviets of tactical surprise and we have also avoided the errors of Johnson in 1968, namely of not speaking up when we knew that the Soviet buildup was reaching its culminating stage. I gave him two editorials from the *Wall Street Journal* of 1968, one from July [July 22, 1968] arguing that the U.S. should be speaking up, and one in September [September 12, 1968] after the August invasion criticizing the U.S. for having been silent.

In the middle of the day I studied a comprehensive review .... There is massive evidence of movement of Soviet armies. It indicates that as of now there are at least 27 Soviet divisions available for intervention in Poland. Movement is comprehensive on almost every front surrounding Poland ... convoys in motion. Divisions, regiments and communications are in an advance state of alert. Logistical support units and even hospital facilities have been prepared. Airborne equipment has been loaded into Soviet aircraft used for the deployment of airborne forces. In brief, the preparations are massive. I am trying to counter this as much as I can by generating maximum international concern. At least the Soviets will be deprived of the element of surprise and conceivably made more aware of the massive international costs. Brown, Muskie and I are working in unison. The President is fully sympathetic to the effort.

December 10, 1980 — (...) the Soviets are preparing tents near their military hospital in Kaliningrad. About 27 divisions are ready to move. A great deal of logistical material has been assembled near the Polish frontier. Soviet airborne units have been alerted. The CIA estimates the most likely period of movement would be December 11-16. I also told the President this morning that the French have been informed by their ambassador in Moscow that as of December 4 preparations for an invasion have been completed. This was good timing because it was just prior to our notification of our allies of our conclusion to that effect.

Meeting at noon with [French security adviser] Jacques Wahl in the French Embassy. He made two key proposals: (1) that we set up a four-power group here in Washington composed of the three ambassadors and myself to monitor Polish developments and to prepare for them. I have written today a strongly worded memo to the President requesting such an initiative even if the State Department

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doesn't like it. The matter is too important to be subject to bureaucratic squabbles.

What follows is also some additional material on the December 7 NSC meeting. It was held in the Cabinet Room from 1:00 to 3:00 p.m. I opened it by reading an AP dispatch from Moscow which had just been received. It read as follows: "The Soviet news agency TASS, in an unusual report Sunday, confirmed a joint Soviet-Polish military. . . ." The transmission was suddenly interrupted. Everyone considered this to be a very important item of intelligence suggesting confirmation of the CIA analysis. Incidentally, subsequently it turned out that this was an AP computer error.

I read this item to the President, told him that Senators [Alan] Cranston and [Theodore F.] Stevens and Congressmen [John J.] Rhodes and [Thomas P. "Tip"] O'Neill will join us in the White House at 2:00. I then told the President of a proposed text of an official announcement, which he approved, and then read to him the proposed text of a message to our principal allies. The President changed a word in it from "workers" to Polish "people" and instructed me to send it out to some additional governments. We also approved Turner's suggestion that intelligence briefings be provided to our key friends. We discussed some contingency military steps and then turned again to the question of non-military reactions. Christopher warned that we need to be prepared for a sophisticated Soviet approach in which there may not be too much bloodshed and hence the situation would be ambiguous. Turner noted that the Soviets might portray any insertion of Soviet troops into Poland as part of normal procedures since the Soviets already have two divisions in Poland. He said there was virtually no defense against a Soviet invasion from the East. I noted that there is likely to be bloodshed in any case.

We then discussed how to brief the Congressional leaders and I suggested to the President that he mention to them the likelihood of widespread arrests in conjunction with a Soviet entrance and that he conduct his briefing by first reading the formal statement that will be issued publicly and then the text of the message that will be sent to our allies. This will provide a good context for any discussion with them. The President followed that advice with the congressional leaders. All of them were very concerned and quizzed us particularly on the question as to whether there is likely to be much Polish resistance. Aaron raised the question of refugees, stressing that this was an area where Congress could play a key role. Congressman O'Neill asked what the response of the allies had been so far. I replied that the British were the most concerned; the French the next most concerned; the Germans the least forthcoming. I stressed that the military steps by themselves really were not so important. The economic and political steps were far more crucial.

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Since then I have been stressing to all concerned and also to journalists that what the Soviets might achieve by inadvertence is the creation of a solid West European-American-Japanese and even Chinese alliance against themselves. They would thus become encircled. They ought to be made aware that this is a possible consequence. In brief, we denied them the element of surprise, we have stimulated international pressures not to go in and the Italian Party has now joined in these pressures by warning that it will break off relations with the Soviet Union if they intervene; and we have perhaps contributed to greater deterrence by making the Soviets more aware of the enormity of the costs that would be involved.

I am keeping my fingers crossed because all indications point to massive Soviet preparations. Nonetheless I believe we have handled this so far much better than the Czechoslovak crisis of '68. If the Soviets intervene, at least we will have done everything we could to make sure that they know what the costs are, that the Poles know that the intervention is coming, and that the world is as aroused and outraged as possible.

December 12, 1980 — We are still keeping up the pressure on Poland hoping to deter the Soviet action . . . continued deployment of Soviet troops near the Polish frontier has been noted. I raised with the President the question of grain because we could simply refuse to deliver grain to the Soviet Union even below the eight million ton mark. At the morning breakfast, attended only by the Vice President, Christopher, [White House Legal Adviser Lloyd] Cutler and [Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert] Carswell, because we wanted to discuss the Iranian issue, the President raised the possibility of a trade union boycott. There was some disagreement on this subject because [Vice President] Fritz [Mondale] felt that the Afghanistani experience wasn't too encouraging. However, everyone concerned felt that the trade unions would be tougher this time. After breakfast I phoned up Lane Kirkland and spoke with him. I asked him what they would do and he told me that they would organize a comprehensive boycott. I urged him to explore the possibility of a collective international transport workers reaction which could paralyze any movement of Soviet ships or airplanes which would have the effect of embargoing any movement of goods to the Soviet Union. He told me they were preparing the ground work for such a reaction. I urged him to move on this before the Soviets intervene so that the very fact that this is being seriously discussed with other trade unions would become known to the Soviets. He agreed to do so and told me that he would be in touch with some of the heads of the West European transport unions.

I then let a friend of mine on the *Wall Street Journal* know about this so that early next week there will be a story to the effect that such an action is contemplated. I think it is important for the

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Soviets to know what might happen so that we deter them as much as possible. The President also said during breakfast that he phoned up Muskie and told him to take a very tough stance on Brezhnev's proposal made two days ago in India on the proposed neutralization of the Persian Gulf. He told us that Muskie responded quite well and in fact in a press conference in Brussels he made some very forthright and tough-minded comments.

I would like to make an observation if I may with respect to Brezhnev's proposal of yesterday. You had asked me about it last night before I had a chance to study it and I have had a chance now to read it at least as reported in the press and I assume that was an accurate report. I would describe this proposal as the fox in the chicken coop proposal. What he is saying to us in effect is now if you people just leave the Gulf, forget your bases, eliminate your navies and just leave the Gulf in our hands we will protect your security interests.

This was a good and tough response and I am sure that a few weeks ago it would not have been made. We are all again marching in step, and I think the NATO response to the possibility of an intervention in Poland is much better than one might have anticipated two weeks ago also.

I also sent a memorandum to Harold Brown entitled "Weapons for China," in which I ask him to have DOD study what might be offered to the Chinese in the way of military weaponry in the event of a Soviet aggression against Poland. I said that DOD should prepare a list for consideration by the SCC. My expectation is that this memorandum will leak all over the Defense Department and therefore become again publicly known. The more we can let the Russians know that we will be very hard and comprehensive in our response, the more likely we are to deter them.

My essential goals here are threefold: (1) to calm down the Poles but at the same time prepare them against any surprises; (2) to increase the costs to the Soviets of any action in the event that it takes place; and (3) by making that known in advance, to enhance deterrence of any Soviet military move.

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Forum

Next to the Volcano: Mexico's Future

How important is Mexico to the United States? Knowledgeable observers are nearly unanimous in agreeing that it can become very critical very quickly. Burdened by corruption, poverty, and an immense foreign debt, the Mexican government faces economic collapse, political instability, and possibly even revolutionary violence. Indeed, the crisis of 1982 threatens to make Mexico — for the first time in many decades — a top concern for U.S. foreign policy.

This ORBIS Forum examines Mexico's domestic politics, economic dilemmas, and foreign policy. The contributors are SOL SANDERS, *author of* Mexico: Chaos on Our Doorsteps; SUSAN KAUFMAN PURCELL, *director of the Latin American program at the Council on Foreign Relations; and* DANIEL JAMES, *president of the Mexico-United States Institute.*

THE COMING TROUBLES

by Sol W. Sanders

Mexico's government is disintegrating. Only a few months ago most American observers would have argued that the regime's mystique would again carry it through the current crisis. But a widespread recognition that Mexico is facing a most serious crisis — certainly the worst since the 1920s, when the basis of the present regime was formed, and perhaps the worst in its history — prompted a change of view.

Mexico's sixty-year record of stability, unique in Latin America, was the best argument for the conventional assessment that the regime would surmount the crisis. But all of that has changed. Mexico's national income and standard of living have dropped by half since the onset of the economic crisis in 1982. The livelihood of many Mexicans had already been under considerable pressure as a result of a population explosion: the population has doubled once since the end of World War II, will double again in the 1990s, and again in the early part of the next century. Although some Mexican authorities claim that the fertility rate is dropping in the face of growing urbanization, the impact of this long period of maximal biological in-

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crease will be felt for decades. In 1986, for example, some 1.1 million new workers joined a labor force that traditionally has experienced high unemployment and enormous underemployment. More than half the population is under fifteen years of age, and the economy feels all the social and political strains associated with this imbalance.

Beyond the current economic crisis and the impact of the population explosion, there is abundant evidence of a fundamental political crisis. The "Mexico model" once represented a viable alternative to the Westminster model that had disillusioned so many in the newly independent Asian and African countries after World War II. Mexico, it was argued, offered stability, economic progress, and even a rudimentary democracy in a state dominated by one party. That party, it was said, contained all the principal constituencies and buffered the country against extremes of both Right and Left. In fact, although Mexican left-wing propagandists would have been chagrined to admit it, the regime represented an effective application of Benito Mussolini's corporate state. That it advertised itself as a regime of the Left rather than the Right actually had little bearing. It was a government of interest groups that compromised their differences at the apex of a highly centralized bureaucracy and political hierarchy.

Whatever their claims of representing the country's political constituencies, however, the corporate structures deteriorated as the regime aged. The military, for example, has had only token representation in the government since 1940. Other once-powerful corporate bodies representing the trade unions, professionals, and political activists have lost their roots in the population. Officials in the youth organization of the Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI), recently expelled in an intraparty fight, revealed that the PRI youth group had only 3,000 members overall. And a new, restless, ambiguous lower-middle class, a product of the modernization and the urbanization of Mexican life, does not seem to be represented at all.

The PRI was designed in the 1920s for Mexico's largely rural, impoverished, and isolated population of fifteen million who had just been through a horrendous civil war at a cost of a million military and civilian casualties. But the regime now must deal with a population that is 65 percent urban and a country that contains the largest industrial plant in Latin America. Millions of Mexicans have traveled, worked, and lived outside their country. The predominance of the United States has lent new weight to the cliché, supposedly first voiced nearly a century ago by the dictator Porfirio Díaz after a visit with an American president, "Poor Mexico! So far from God and so near the United States."

Gone is the Mexico whose French-speaking elite fancied itself more European than American. English is spoken widely, and today a degree from a U.S. business school is the hallmark of the rising

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private-sector executive or young bureaucrat, however nationalist or anti-*gringo*. This broadening of social and intellectual horizons, however, has not been reflected in the country's political institutions. Unlike much of the rest of Latin America, Mexico has not progressed toward an expansion of popularly elected government in the last decade. Nor is there much — certainly not in the growing political cynicism and absenteeism in the government's charade of the political process — to suggest that the present regime will make the basic changes that would align its system more closely with those of Western Europe, the United States, and the new popularly elected regimes in Latin America. Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado came into office in 1982 proffering an expansion of the political reforms of his predecessor along with a program of moral rejuvenation. When the first free elections in Mexico's recent history turned over certain municipalities — including the fourth largest city in the country, Juárez — de la Madrid retreated from political reform. Although there were arrests — including the former powerful head of PEMEX, the government oil monopoly, Díaz Serrano — corruption and the strangle hold of drug traffickers on much of the government security apparatus did not abate.

There is as yet little evidence of any challenge to the ruling Institutional Revolutionary party. In a polity that has seen the corporate structures of the 1920s wither, there has been no effort from the regime nor great success by the opposition in replacing them.

In addition, a glaring anomaly in the regime bodes ill: the presidency, which has almost absent-mindedly absorbed more and more power from other areas of the government once juxtaposed to it in the written constitution, has at the same time become politically weaker. The Mexican president is constitutionally more powerful than any other executive in the modern world, even including those in the Communist bloc. Mexico is governed more by presidential administrative decree than it is by congressional law. President López Portillo took the drastic step of nationalizing the banks in 1982 without congressional or judicial authority. More than six months later, de la Madrid — an opponent of the nationalization — followed him into office and received ex post facto a supreme court decision legalizing López Portillo's action, even though the chief judicial authority in the country had previously been quoted as saying that the president had the legal authority under the constitution to go forward with the nationalization. Furthermore, in the recent past the incumbent has chosen his successor.[1]

To make matters worse, the last three occupants of this all-powerful office have all been bureaucrats with little or no elective experience. They have conducted their presidencies in an increas-

[1] See Sol Sanders, *Mexico: Chaos on our Doorstep* (Lanham, Md.: Madison Books, 1986).

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ingly administrative manner, justifying policies and using strategies that rely more on the ideas of U.S. political scientists than on the reality around them.[2] De la Madrid epitomizes this infatuation. The two earthquakes that struck the relatively small central area of old Mexico City in 1985 were important and revealing tests for the regime. The army's emergency plan was rejected, apparently because de la Madrid and the civilian leadership were wary of introducing martial law and military authority. In the end, the episode proved the government's corruption (in the construction of public housing) and its ineptitude in handling the crisis. There were flagrant abuses of public confidence when rescue parties had to be bribed to recover bodies and when relief goods from abroad were sold on the black market. Popularly organized rescue work and control of sites to avoid looting provided additional proof of the PRI's loss of grassroots contact and the new spirit of reform and rebellion among Mexicans.

De la Madrid's tapping of his minister of the budget and planning, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, in October 1987 as the PRI candidate for the next presidency is intended to perpetuate his policies. At thirty-nine, Salinas is almost a clone of de la Madrid — a member of the rich, educated, and sophisticated elite, a Harvard-educated econometrician, a so-called technocrat without political experience. Salinas has every chance to succeed de la Madrid, given the history of the government losing virtually no important government post for sixty years. But he will encounter more difficulties in what some PRI ideologues like to call the election fiesta.

The regime's strongest opposition comes from Mexico's conservatives, who remain, despite official professions to the contrary, deeply Catholic and traditional. That opposition has coalesced in the National Action party (PAN), although many Mexican conservatives remain in the PRI for opportunistic reasons, believing that the PRI will continue to dominate.

PAN is a sixty-year-old movement started by the Catholic Right that has come to embrace "modernist" and secular leaders in the privately owned heavy industries in Monterrey. Lately, it has taken on populist overtones and has become the main vehicle to express legitimate opposition to the regime. A new element has emerged with the election of a new PAN leadership, the so-called Neo-Panistas, in March 1987. These are largely centered in the state of Chihuahua, where the most flagrant violations of the electoral process occurred in the governor and municipalities elections in August 1986. The Chihuahua PAN leadership has used civil disobedience similar to that

[2] There is an obvious parallel to be drawn between the advisers of the prerevolutionary dictator, Porfirio Díaz, social scientists steeped in French positivism who called themselves *científicos* because they saw their social theories as "scientifically based," and the present Mexican regime's technocracy, which is, to a considerable extent, a projection of U.S. scientism. In that regard, de la Madrid's training at Harvard may have been an important ingredient in his attitudes toward the regime's problems.

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of Gandhi and the U.S. desegregationists but threatens to take a much more confrontational stance toward the PRI and the regime.

As a political organization intent on changing the system, most of its problems spring from the fact that its leadership and direction come from the same narrow Mexican elite that now rules the country through the PRI. Its fundamental dilemma is easily stated: How can a movement dedicated to achieving power peacefully through the ballot do so if those ruling the country openly claim a monopoly of power, and say that no one will take it from them save by force of arms?

The PRI, despite its revolutionary rhetoric, is an archetypal Latin American oligarchy. Even a passing acquaintance with the Mexican scene quickly reveals its static society. The same small group of families manages the country and shares the disproportionate part of its wealth that did so even before the chaos of 1910-24. The regime uses corruption and sometimes brutal repression to co-opt any signs of pluralism in politics. These methods also assure the loyalty of the bureaucracy and the military.

Mexico has been spared the traditional Ibero-American *caudillismo* — the man on horseback — because of the success of the PRI's policies of co-option. In addition, the history and structure of the Mexican military differ from those of most other Latin American countries. Mexico has no hereditary officer class viewing itself as sovereignty's last resort. The military's low levels of education, weaponry, funding (until recently), and training make it unlikely to come into play during a national crisis.

What action then should the United States take in the face of what appears to be a rapidly worsening situation? The implications of a Mexican breakdown are almost too horrendous for U.S. policy makers to consider. This partly accounts for Mexico's low political priority in Washington, the poor reporting about Mexico, and the limited contingency planning in reference to Mexico.

The more mundane aspects of a Mexican breakdown are important enough for the United States: For most of the post-World War II period, Mexico has been our third- or fourth-ranked trading partner. The United States has grown increasingly dependent on Mexico's abundant petroleum reserves; in 1985 it was the most important foreign supplier. Continuing turmoil in the Middle East could make access to Mexican oil a matter of extreme urgency for U.S. security in an international crisis.

While it is true that the principal opposition to the present regime now appears to come from the Right rather than the Left, Washington cannot ignore the well-organized communist apparatus in Mexico. The Soviet embassy maintains the largest KGB station outside the Communist bloc in Mexico City, an intelligence cadre primarily targeted against the United States. The many episodes of

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espionage and defection in which the Mexican route played a role proves that Moscow sees Mexico as a back door to the United States. Cuban Communists also maintain an elaborate organization in the country and have a wide range of contacts with the Mexican population — particularly in the educated elite and the trade unions. Finally, both these communist states have used Mexico City as an operating center for communications, subversion, infiltration, and intelligence for the rest of the hemisphere.

It is also true that the Communists, working through the 1930s, made enormous inroads into the intellectual community. Indeed, most of the government's educational establishment is in the hands of Marxist-Leninist sympathizers. The union of Mexican primary and secondary school teachers, the largest in Latin America, is entwined in the international communist trade union network. Such prestigious institutions as the Colegio de Mexico, the country's leading think-tank, have a strong left-of-center bent. Intellectual, media, and artistic circles are heavily Marxist-Leninist. And being a card-carrying Communist party member in Mexico does not put one beyond the political pale. The Mexican Foreign Ministry is notorious for its pro-communist proclivities and influence, and the current minister, Bernardo Sepúlveda Amor, has been treasurer for a leading pro-Moscow foundation.

The de la Madrid administration, formerly represented at the United Nations by Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, a presidential aspirant in 1980 and bitterly anti-American, has played a coy game of flirtation with the Soviets. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze went directly from the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting in Reykjavik to a meeting with Mexican officials in Mexico City. An invitation to Gorbachev has recently been renewed, and it is believed he will accept should a summit take place in the United States. There has been a flurry of rumors, apparently leaked from the Mexican Foreign Ministry, of new facilities for the Soviets, including consulates in the northern border towns. Much of this is apparently intended as propaganda to point up the ability of the Mexican government to create problems for Washington should the Americans take a hard-line position on any bilateral issues — debt, illegal migrants, or drugs.

In a period of destabilization, one cannot rule out the possibility of the communist powers' fishing in troubled waters — or even of a populist movement that would look to the Communists as its model. Recent developments within the PRI are of concern in this regard: Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of the lionized left-wing President Lázaro Cárdenas of the 1930s and a former governor of the Cárdenas' native Michoacan, was expelled from the PRI after a party congress in March 1986. Cárdenas had joined the so-called democratic current within the PRI calling for more democracy within the party and, specifically, more participation in the process of choosing a presidential candidate.

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Cárdenas has a reputation for honesty and integrity, but the "democratic current" includes the most pro-communist elements in the PRI. Cárdenas himself has often been to Havana and considers himself a friend of Fidel Castro. He has also called for a radical program of repudiation of the foreign debt. He could well be the charismatic figure the Left has been waiting for, around whom a popular movement could be built that would challenge the PRI on a program of reform and rejuvenation while pursuing a radical socialist agenda.

Fears about the impact of a destabilized Mexico on the United States go beyond economic and even strategic considerations. One has only to recall that during the period of 1910-1924, some one-tenth of the Mexican population migrated to the United States. That was in a period when modern communications did not exist, and long before radio and television tied Mexico so closely to the United States. At that time the elite looked to France, and the small Mexican-American population was limited to rural areas. It was also a Mexico of only fifteen million people.

Should a new breakdown occur in Mexico, millions of Mexicans would cross into the United States to avoid the violence and seek a livelihood. The prelude to such a movement is already under way. Some 1.8 million illegal entrants were taken into U.S. custody at the southern border in 1986, about a million more than in 1985. Large numbers of Mexicans — perhaps four times as many as those apprehended — enter the United States every year. There is also evidence that the old pattern of migrant agricultural workers returning to their villages in central and southern Mexico has changed as Mexican conditions worsen and illegal entrants fan out across the United States.

In the few circles where U.S. policy toward Mexico is debated, it has unfortunately become fashionable to frame the options as stark opposites. That is, U.S. policy can be directed — as it has been in recent years — to bolster the present regime or to effect a new political structure in Mexico.

Myriad reasons argue against the latter policy. The U.S. experience since World War II has proved repeatedly that social engineering in other countries is extremely difficult. To manipulate others requires a Machiavellian government apparatus that does not exist in the United States. Nor is it clear that a Mexico, now in deep crisis and without experience in the processes of representative government, could handle the destabilization implied in the transition to a more democratic regime.

On the other hand, it ill behooves the United States to assume that it must cooperate on the present Mexican regime's terms. Look at the self-deception by the bankers after the 1982 financial crisis: they assured themselves that Mexico had only a cash-flow crisis and offered it additional loans. Now they face a dilemma, caught between

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giving more funds — a $7.7 billion new loan has just been approved — or writing off a bad debt.

Confidence in the political as well as the economic future of the country is the sine qua non of economic recovery. Until that confidence is re-established, new lending to Mexico only increases the flight of capital, adding to the billions of dollars already owned by Mexicans in the United States. To re-establish confidence, the regime has to turn its back on the pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric of the past half century; return the banks and state-owned industries to private ownership; establish land-tenure regulations; abandon the manipulation of foreign exchange; welcome foreign investment, and change its protectionist policies. There is little hope these steps will be taken, or taken quickly enough, to reverse the downward spiral of confidence and investment. Yet bankers, as so many American academics and foreign-policy observers have noted, have been reluctant to face the political bankruptcy of this regime.

After tentative moves in the early months of the de la Madrid administration, there has been no further evidence that the regime intends to move in the direction of reform. Even movement toward pluralism, such as permitting governors and mayors to face legitimate opposition in fair elections, has been rejected by the PRI machine. Fair elections, although a risk in a society that has never known them, might let off steam and begin the process of giving Mexico a replica of the democracies of Europe, North America, and Latin America. This would be a great improvement over the regime's false claim to a new and workable option.

Nor is there evidence that the regime is willing to abandon, at least quickly enough, the statist economic policies that have had as much to do with bringing on the present crisis.

The United States, then, probably has to muddle through the coming crisis, extending generous aid while applying pressure on the Mexican government toward a pluralistic political system, market economics, and an anti-communist foreign policy. This requires that Washington make clear in no uncertain terms that even propaganda flirtations with the Soviets, which de la Madrid has been indulging in, will bring down the full fury of the U.S. Congress and people (even were the State Department willing to excuse it).

But such a muddling through requires more than anything else full understanding of the Mexican scene. American knowledge of Mexico — governmental, academic, and public — is abysmal. For half a century the United States has ignored Mexico while pursuing an active policy in the farther world. And what efforts there were to study Mexico suffered because intellectuals felt guilty about U.S. policy toward Mexico in the nineteenth century. Such weaknesses are

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no longer tenable; the sooner Americans devote real resources to the pursuit of knowledge about their huge southern neighbor, the better.

CRISIS BUT NO COLLAPSE

by Susan Kaufman Purcell

Mexico has been beset by problems since the government ran out of money to service its debts in August 1982. Its economy has experienced little or no growth since then. Most of the capital that left the country has not returned. The peso has depreciated drastically, and inflation has reached triple digits. Unemployment continues to grow at a time when Mexico needs to create approximately one million new jobs each year. In the meantime, tens of thousands of Mexicans cross the U.S.-Mexican border illegally each year in search of work. Recent elections for state governors in northern Mexico were characterized by electoral fraud and followed by mass demonstrations calling for political democracy.

These problems are interconnected, making it difficult to decide which is the most serious. Perhaps Mexico's economic crisis of mid-1982 is the key, for until then the other problems seemed manageable. Economic growth did not cure all ills but it did provide the resources to paper them over. It also bought time, permitting the government to deal with problems sequentially instead of all at once. In all, then, the absence of sustained economic growth is today Mexico's biggest problem.

Mexico's political leaders seem to agree with this conclusion, for they have given priority to restoring economic growth since mid-1982. Their strategy involves experimenting with radically new economic policies.

Since the 1950s, Mexico has followed an economic development strategy known as import-substitution-industrialization. This has involved a large economic role for the state and protective tariffs for domestic producers. The strategy aimed at encouraging the development of manufacturing in Mexico, freeing the country from spending scarce foreign exchange funds on imports.

Initially, the strategy had considerable success. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Mexico had one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Its GNP increased by an average of 6 to 8 percent annually, and industry and commerce grew. These achievements — it should be noted — occurred at a time when the international economy was also expanding rapidly.

This picture began to change in the early 1970s when OPEC raised petroleum prices and an international recession followed. At

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about that time, it also became evident that import-substitution-industrialization had produced some unfortunate results. Decades of protection had made Mexican industry inefficient and highly uncompetitive internationally. The state's large role in the economy had produced a swollen, inefficient, and costly bureaucracy. By the time Luis Echeverría Alvarez became president in 1970 it was clear that sustaining the current high levels of state spending would require additional revenues. When Echeverría failed to generate such revenues internally, he turned to foreign borrowing.

José López Portillo, the next president, was more fortunate, at least initially. He took power in 1976 just as the existence of vast petroleum reserves in Mexico was confirmed. But the massive earnings Mexico reaped from the oil were inadequate in the face of López Portillo's grandiose plans. Determined to be the president who would transform Mexico into a fully industrialized country, he offered untapped petroleum reserves as collateral for foreign loans. This explains the apparent paradox of Mexico becoming heavily indebted during a period when it was earning huge sums of money from oil exports.

In fairness to López Portillo, his decision was not entirely irrational. International inflation rates were very high, making real interest rates extremely low. Had these two trends continued, with oil prices remaining high, Mexico would have repaid its loans at negative interest rates. But the price of oil collapsed through the early 1980s. Instead of adjusting his ambitious development plans to the new reality, López Portillo kept borrowing more money to replace the missing oil revenues. By the time he realized that the decline in oil prices was not temporary, it was too late. Mexico owed more than $80 billion to foreign creditors and lacked the hard currency to service this massive debt.

When President Miguel de la Madrid took office in December 1982, it had become clear that oil was no longer going to be Mexico's salvation. Nor would commercial banks be willing to lend new money to the country. Mexican leaders were therefore forced to reassess their economic development strategy.

They did not have many alternatives. The country had to start moving away from the import-substitution-industrialization model toward a strategy that required less state spending. But because the austerity program reduced the size of the domestic market, exports of non-petroleum products had to be increased to obtain the needed capital. This in turn meant forcing Mexican producers to become more efficient and able to compete abroad by reducing protectionism.

The de la Madrid administration has made some progress in restructuring the economy along these lines. Perhaps most important was its decision to bring Mexico into the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, symbolizing Mexico's commitment to a more open econ-

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omy. The administration also closed down several costly government enterprises, such as Fundidora de Monterrey, a state-owned steel plant. Some state-owned companies have been offered for sale to private owners. Tariffs have been reduced while import permits for many products have been eliminated. The authorities' formerly negative attitude toward foreign direct investment has been replaced by an attitude somewhere between ambivalence and friendliness.

The change in economic course has not been easy to implement. Economic austerity has taken its toll on those many Mexicans for whom government spending represented the difference between a tolerable standard of living and a miserable one. Thus far, most Mexicans have been surprisingly docile, but their patience is not endless. After five long years of austerity, people seek some reason to believe that their sacrifices have achieved something and that a revival is in the offing.

But the government's policies, unfortunately, have not produced impressive growth rates. In part, this is because restructuring an economy takes time. Also, de la Madrid's two immediate predecessors pursued policies that destroyed the confidence of investors, both domestic and foreign. While de la Madrid's choice of Carlos Salinas de Gortari to succeed him was generally welcomed by business and financial interests, a "wait and see" attitude continues to prevail among them.

External factors also have not been favorable. Industrialized countries have experienced sluggish growth, strengthening pressures for protectionism especially in countries with high unemployment. This comes at the wrong time for Mexico, which needs to expand its penetration of foreign markets.

To make problems worse, President de la Madrid gave priority to restoring Mexico's economic health as a way to defuse or delay taking on political problems. Without a growing economy, the tensions that result from the extremely skewed distribution of wealth will persist and probably increase. It appears that the government will have to meet its dissatisfied citizens at least halfway, changing some of the most unpopular aspects of the Mexican political system.

One strong demand has to do with democracy. It is not that Mexicans have suddenly realized that their government is not democratic; they have been under no illusions about the nature of the political system and the domination of the "official" party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). They knew that votes were manipulated to show PRI victories. Nevertheless, as long as the system worked, Mexicans tolerated its shortcomings. In effect, they traded away political participation for an improving standard of living.

But the bad economic policy making of the 1970s and early 1980s led to a reassessment of this tacit agreement. Many Mexicans concluded that the abuses of power were responsible for their plight

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and demanded that the system be opened up. The new economic policy of the Mexican government is also a factor; many Mexicans believe that opening up the economy and reducing the role of the state require the political system be opened and decentralized. They argue that the economic role of the state will remain too strong so long as political power remains highly centralized within one party. Reducing the economic role of the state, therefore, implies a reduction of the state's role in the political system.

To make matters worse, Mexico's political system lost substantial legitimacy through comparison with developments in the rest of Latin America. Although far from a model democracy, Mexico's politics during the 1950s and 1960s looked relatively good compared to the dictators and military regimes that occasionally traded places with weak civilian governments in most of the hemisphere. In contrast, Mexico enjoyed stable rule under continuous civilian government. The comparison looked different, however, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as many Latin American countries long ruled by authoritarian governments made the transition to democratic civilian rule. It was not just the relatively advanced countries of Argentina and Brazil that did this, but also most of the "banana republics" of Central America. These changes elsewhere in Latin America magnified Mexico's political ills and reinforced demands for change.

The PRI has made some reforms to strengthen its legitimacy; it is considering others. It is not, however, prepared to reform itself out of power. A lively debate within the party is taking place on the question of how much the government can liberalize without eroding the PRI's dominance. Some officials favor recognizing opposition party victories at the gubernatorial level. Others believe such a move would result in a string of PRI defeats, undermining the party.

If recent gubernatorial elections in the north are any indication, the hard-liners have won. The PRI claimed victory in every gubernatorial election. It is possible, of course, that the PRI's candidates really did win, but the evidence of substantial electoral fraud gives the benefit of the doubt to the main opposition party, the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN).

Despite this, there are signs that the PRI has decided to win more popular support. It has begun to select more qualified candidates to stand for election. The government also passed a reform bill increasing the representation of opposition parties in Congress, though it also prevents them from joining together against the PRI.

Additional reforms are still needed. The PRI must increase its support in urban areas. New middle-class organizations will have to be formed and incorporated into the party. The party must improve its ties with Mexico's more skilled, educated, and independent workers. In short, the PRI must better reflect the interests that now play a major role in Mexican society. The party was organized in 1929,

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when Mexico was essentially a rural, agricultural country. Today, most Mexicans live in cities and work in the manufacturing or service sectors. The party, however, retains its earlier structure.

The United States has a large stake in Mexico's successful transition to a more modern economy and political system. Though Mexicans sometimes find it difficult to believe, U.S. interests are in fact best served by a stable and prosperous Mexico. If Mexico fails to resolve its most serious problems, massive migration from Mexico to the United States will be only one of many problems facing Washington. A hostile Mexico, intent on actively provoking problems for the United States, would be, of course, even worse.

This stake in Mexico makes it natural for the United States to try to influence the course of events there. But its efforts may prove counterproductive. The legacy of suspicion and the asymmetry of power cause many Mexicans to believe that what benefits the United States must hurt Mexico and vice versa. As a result, Mexicans often do the opposite of what the United States wants, regardless of the merits. For these reasons, the United States must exert pressure only in a private and subtle manner. It should also avoid acting unilaterally toward Mexico; it would be better to try to work with other countries and institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (as has been the case).

There is a sense in Mexico that significant steps already taken have not received adequate recognition in the United States. Mexico seeks rewards for its efforts — specifically a decrease in its debt burden. This seems a fair idea that should be explored. Trade offers another useful area for cooperation. The two countries can explore areas for reciprocal lifting of barriers. Perhaps more sensitive is the establishment of free-trade zones along the border. This could eventually lead to discussions regarding some kind of North American Common Market.

On the political side, the United States probably cannot accomplish much. Pressures for political liberalization are resented as interventionist more than pressures for economic liberalization. The United States must be very careful about pressing for political change in Mexico. Nevertheless, Washington need not support the PRI unconditionally. It should seek a gradual liberalization of the Mexican political system. The most constructive role for the United States is to support fair elections; it should not back any particular party.

In the end, Americans cannot solve Mexico's problems. But they can help Mexico move toward a brighter economic and political future if they take care to respect its sensibilities.

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FORUM

MOSCOW'S FRIEND?

by Daniel James

The Mexican government's support for Nicaragua's Sandinista government bewilders liberals and conservatives alike in the United States. Is the Mexican leadership actually sympathetic to the Sandinista's Marxism but hiding this sentiment not to anger Washington? Or does it have an understanding with Fidel Castro, supporting his pro-Sandinista policy in return for his pledge not to engage in subversion in Mexico? Or is there some other explanation?

An answer lies in the record of recent decades. It must be recognized that Mexican policy toward Nicaragua fits a much larger pattern. Mexico City has long pursued a policy of increasingly identifying with Cuba and the pro-Soviet camp. When the Organization of American States voted in 1962 to break diplomatic relations with Cuba and expel it from the American comity of nations, the Mexican government alone refused to agree. It did join the rest of Latin America in backing the United States during the Cuban missile crisis later that year, but then quickly resumed a policy favoring Castro. In 1964, for example, it was the only American state not to impose economic sanctions against Cuba. Mexico's ties with Cuba grew closer during the presidency of Luis Echeverría Alvarez (1970-76). Echeverría enjoyed warm personal relations with Fidel Castro, whom he came to admire. Departing from the custom of previous Mexican presidents, he visited Cuba in a show of solidarity. Cordial ties with Cuba contrasted with less-than-cordial, even antagonistic relations with the United States. In a remarkable breach of etiquette, Echeverría once denounced U.S. policies on the floor of the U.S. Congress.

Echeverría's hand-picked successors, José López Portillo and the incumbent, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, have both pursued the same foreign policy. No Mexican leader has ever publicly criticized Cuba. The radical turn in policy under Echeverría, which his successor López Portillo extended to include aggressive support for the Marxist Sandinistas, confirmed a concealed bias towards Marxist-Leninist governments and movements. Though not as ardently pursued by de la Madrid as by his predecessors — due primarily to the worsening crisis at home — Mexico City's policy of favoring the Central American enemies of the United States remains basically unchanged.

In the United Nations, Mexico City positions itself on the side of Soviet global interests about 80 percent of the time. In a March 1987 meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Mexico cast the deciding vote in a 19 to 18 decision in support of an Indian resolution not to debate a U.S. motion about Cuban human rights violations. Mexico could have abstained along with six other states that did, but, apparently, its leaders wanted to shield Castro's gulag.

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Mexico's history helps to explain why Mexicans have grown nationalistic, even xenophobic. Four long wars that wracked the country during the course of a century go far to explain Mexico's foreign policy. The 1810-23 struggle for independence ended in victory for the insurgents but exhausted the nation. A dozen years later Mexico fought its hitherto idolized northern neighbor, beginning with the Texas secession of 1836 and ending in 1848 with the loss of over half its territory. Another decade later an internecine conflict erupted between Benito Juárez's Liberal reformers and a reactionary army-church-monarchist alliance, and escalated into war against an invading French army. This conflict lasted ten years and left the country prostrate. Finally the Mexican Revolution, the bloodiest civil conflict of all, began in 1910 and continued into the 1920s, and cost one million lives.

Although these conflicts were rooted primarily in internal social and political causes, Mexicans usually found themselves fighting against foreign powers: Spain, France and the United States. The Mexican-American War was wholly foreign in origin and was the most traumatic of the four, ending as it did with the amputation of the northern half of Mexico.

Thus, the anti-American quality is not new. In its early years, actually, the Mexican republic was pro-United States: its struggle against Spain was inspired by the American Revolution, its leaders were fervent admirers of Washington and Jefferson, and its first constitution was modeled closely on that of the United States. But philo-Yankeeism turned into anti-Yankeeism during the 1848 war. Woodrow Wilson's efforts to impose his agenda upon the Mexican revolutionaries (with whom he basically sympathized), resulting in the humiliating occupation of Veracruz, further exacerbated this sentiment. Hate and envy of the United States have since dominated Mexican attitudes — those of the elite at any rate — and are at the root of Mexico's foreign policy.

Venustiano Carranza, leader of the victorious revolutionary armies and then president (1917-20), played a major role in shaping Mexico's nationalist doctrine. His twin principles of national sovereignty and nonintervention became the mainstays of Mexican foreign policy; these found formal expression in 1929 with the creation of the National Revolutionary party (PNR) by Plutarco Elias Calles, perhaps the most astute Mexican politician of the century. The PNR was not, however, just a nationalist party; it also promoted socialist ideas. Calles concocted a unique Mexican ideology — the so-called revolutionary nationalism — from these nationalist and socialist elements. The PNR, renamed the Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI) in 1946, has ruled Mexico uninterruptedly for the past fifty-eight years.

Unfortunately, neither the party nor the ideology has changed with the times. Because the Mexican leadership retains the obsolete

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notion that the United States remains an imperialist power, it fails to understand U.S. goals in Mexico or elsewhere. While the United States has changed radically over the last one hundred and fifty years, Mexico remains captive to the past, apparently unable to recover from the trauma of 1848.

An era of good feeling, usually prompted by an outstanding show of friendship by Washington, sometimes breaks bilateral tensions. Mexican leaders appreciated Lincoln's refusal to recognize Napoleon III's puppet emperor Maximilian, and the United States gave Juárez the aid that proved decisive in driving out the French invader. In our time, Mexico City welcomed Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy, especially its pragmatic acceptance of the 1938 nationalization of foreign oil companies.

More recently, Mexico again profited from an important act of friendship by the United States. Had it not been for a $3.5-billion emergency aid package in August 1982, provided within hours of Mexico's informing the U.S. Treasury that it was unable to make interest payments on its $85-billion foreign debt, Mexico's economy would have collapsed. A total of $12 billion in U.S. and international loans over the next three years sustained the economy. Washington came to the rescue once again in the fall of 1986, when Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker pressured lending institutions into buttressing the De la Madrid administration with a financial package totaling $13.7 billion, the largest known transaction of its kind. During five excruciating, crisis-ridden years, Washington twice rescued Mexico from bankruptcy; moreover, the United States has provided every sort of humanitarian aid in two catastrophic earthquakes.

Of course, the blame for uneven relations does not all fall on the Mexicans. Washington, for its part, fails to understand the complexities and legitimate needs of Mexico, and this has contributed significantly to the two countries' unsteady relations. Washington has neglected Mexico since 1945, a policy that has run aground. Grim realities in the Western hemisphere — foremost among them Fidel Castro's harsh rule and then his swift descent into the Soviet orbit — have shown this to be a mistake. Washington tolerated Mexico's policy of befriending Havana even after the other members of the Organization of American States had broken with Cuba.

Still, these faults do not explain why Mexico's government should now pursue anti-American and pro-Marxist policies. Why is this so consistently the pattern these days? The answer may lie in what is termed *echeverrismo*, an outlook based on that of former President Luis Echeverría Alvarez. If the nationalist element dates back to the Mexican-American War of 1848 and the leftist component goes back to the Mexican Revolution of 1910, the turn toward Third Worldism goes back only to the 1970s.

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Echeverría identified Mexico with Third World countries fighting against "imperialism" and for "national liberation."[1] This implied a special relationship with Cuba, the sister Latin American nation leading the anti-imperialist world struggle; eventually it meant identifying with the Soviet Union. The Mexican elite seized upon the opportunistic premise of a struggle between the poor and the rich countries as a rationalization for its old envy of the United States. By identifying itself with the Third World, the elite found international support for its old, losing struggle with the gringo. It also resulted from Echeverría's own concerns: his guilt for having been in charge of the federal police when they bloodily repressed leftist dissidents in the 1968 "Tlatelolco massacre," the Marxist tenets he dared not voice until becoming president, and his ambition to become secretary general of the United Nations.

The notion of Mexico as a Third World country actually repulses the Mexican elite, which entertains much grander views of its country. As President de la Madrid himself likes to point out, Mexico's productive capacity is now the ninth largest in "the [free] world,"[2] while the sophistication of its industrial infrastructure rivals that of most Soviet-bloc countries. It is an urban country whose people are no more impoverished than those of Greece and Yugoslavia. Identification with the Third World stems from what Octavio Paz characterizes as the surrealistic quality of Mexican politics.

The foreign policy of Echeverría and his successors distorts Calles's mix of nationalism and socialism. As instituted in Mexico, the "new economic order," enriched the rich and impoverished the poor. It ruined the Mexican economy and robbed the future of hope. Echeverría's administration paved the way to the financial collapse of 1982 and the subsequent crisis. Ironically, *echeverrismo* prevailed just when the socialist experiment was acknowledged a failure in many other countries. In this regard, it expresses an intellectual parochialism. Nevertheless, *echeverrismo* can do great mischief to Mexicans and Americans. Its ideological orientation puts Mexico in tacit alliance with the Soviet Union, as evidenced by its support of pro-Soviet regimes. In short, it plays a vital role in undermining the West of which it is part, and nowhere more than in Central America.

López Portillo's foreign secretary, Jorge Castañeda, gave *echeverrismo* its sharpest expression with regard to Nicaragua and El Salvador. Appointed foreign secretary on May 16, 1979, he officiated at a meeting between López Portillo and Fidel Castro on the Mexican

[1] Domestically, Echeverría adopted a program favoring the "worker and peasant masses" while harassing *la burguesia*; in effect, he pursued a policy of class struggle. He inspired peasant invasions of privately owned lands and reduced the size and power of the businesses in private hands. The government's share of the economy increased during Echeverría's term from one-third to well over one-half.

[2] Miguel de la Madrid H., "Mexico: The New Challenges," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1984, p. 65.

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island of Cozumel just one day later. This was an unprecedented and highly symbolic affair — no Mexican president had invited Castro to Mexico in the twenty-two years since he had left the country for Cuba. On Cozumel, López Portillo and Castro reached an understanding that the two countries would work "to establish closer bilateral relations and work for a new international economic order." In effect, Mexico would identify more closely with Cuba's policies. Castañeda told a Washington symposium that "the idea of closing ranks with the Third World is intrinsically valid. We should continue our efforts to establish and consolidate a New International Order."[3] López Portillo further agreed with Castro that Mexico would align itself with Cuba's policy toward Nicaragua — a logical extension of *echeverrismo*.

This radical shift in Mexico's foreign policy is often viewed as part of a larger deal whereby Castro promised not to stir up trouble within Mexico in return for Portillo's support for the anti-Somoza guerrillas in Nicaragua backed by Havana. That is not the case. This change in Mexico's foreign policy, it is important to note, sprang from its leaders' own predilections, not from implicit Cuban threats to Mexico.

The effect of this re-orientation was quickly felt, especially in Central America. Just three days later, on May 20, 1979, López Portillo severed diplomatic relations with the Anastasio Somoza government in Nicaragua because it of its "horrendous genocide" against the Nicaraguan people. The rupture, as a leading Mexican newspaper put it, "caused stupor" in Mexico. It violated the Estrada Doctrine, a fifty-year-old tenet of Mexican foreign relations holding that the authority of another state be recognized regardless of its politics or ideology. While there had been earlier exceptions to the rule (against Francisco Franco's government in Spain and Augusto Pinochet in Chile), Mexico City had never before severed existing relations in peacetime. Castañeda then sent special missions to five Latin American countries to persuade them to help his government bring about "the diplomatic and political isolation of Somoza and to speed the downfall of his bloody regime."[4] This contravened another long-standing Mexican principle: non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.

Mexico's diplomatic intervention probably decided Somoza's downfall, paving the way for Cuban guns. Indeed, Mexico City materially helped the Sandinistas well before its diplomatic intervention. Without Mexican aid the Sandinistas might never have dominated

[3] Remarks of Jorge Castañeda in the panel, "Mexico and the World," at the Mexico Today symposium, Meridian House, Washington, D.C., October 30, 1979 (English version as supplied by Meridian House).

[4] As quoted in the *Washington Post* story, May 23, 1979, datelined Mexico City, reporting on a press conference given by Castañeda. Mexico is scarcely on the high moral ground when it attacks U.S. aid to the contras as intervention in Nicaraguan affairs.

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the post-Somoza government, much less acquired control over it. "López Portillo gave the Nicaraguan insurrectionists aid that was much more solid, broader, and more binding than has hitherto been acknowledged," revealed the late Mexican journalist Manuel Buendía,[5] who was in a position to know.

After the Sandinista take over, the Mexican government provided much-needed oil supplies on credit terms so liberal as to amount to a giveaway, sent trained advisers and technicians, and is said to have lent large sums of money. Mexico City became a major center for Sandinista and FMLN propaganda, fund-raising, and espionage.

Aid was primarily funneled through the ruling Institutional Revolutionary party to avoid public embarrassment or difficulties with Washington. The PRI also served as a channel to Western Europe through the Socialist International (SI) which, under Willy Brandt's leadership, gathered much material support for the Sandinistas. The PRI also gave the Sandinistas a home base in Mexico City, where they maintained close relations with Soviet and Cuban embassies and conducted a successful propaganda campaign against the United States.

López Portillo and Castañeda pursued a similar policy in El Salvador. On October 15, 1979, not quite three months after the Nicaraguan revolution, liberal Salvadoran army officers overthrew the Romero military dictatorship and formed a junta pledged to economic and social reform. This pre-empted the Salvadoran far Left, which responded with guerrilla warfare. The Mexican government withdrew its ambassador — an indirect intervention that hurt the junta.

El Salvador's five Marxist-Leninist guerrilla groups, united by Fidel Castro under the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN), offered a serious challenge to the weak Salvadoran armed forces and the junta. In contrast to the FMLN, the junta was badly divided and confused, staggering from one crisis to the next. Yet its goal was sound: to build the political basis for a viable democracy in El Salvador. To survive against repeated onslaughts by extremists of both the Left and the Right, it needed foreign support, which was forthcoming from most Latin American countries and the United States. But Mexico joined France in August 1981 in calling for an opening to the extreme Left; this pact, engineered by Castañeda and Régis Debray (the French Marxist guerrilla theoretician and a veteran of failed efforts at revolution in Latin America under the tutelage of Fidel Castro and Ché Guevara), recognized the FMLN as a "representative political force." Although nine Latin American countries denounced this pact as an intervention in the internal affairs of El Salvador that favored "subversive extremes" of the FMLN, SI chair-

[5] *Excelsior*, January 29, 1980.

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man Willy Brandt stepped up the pressure on Duarte to accept the Franco-Mexican initiative by despatching a high-level mission to the region. But Duarte stood firm and the Franco-Mexican initiative collapsed.

President de la Madrid has cooled Mexico's once ardent espousal of the Sandinista cause, and has patched up diplomatic relations with El Salvador by posting an ambassador there. Mexico has also warmed up to Guatemala's new civilian government (fear of Guatemala's leftist guerrillas infiltrating southern Mexico may have more to do with this than respect for its nascent democracy). This results largely from the domestic crisis, which forced Mexican leaders to concentrate on averting disaster and deprived the governments of the clout it enjoyed during the 1970s' oil boom.

But the ideological nature of Mexico's policy toward Central America remains almost unchanged. De la Madrid appointed Bernardo Sepúlveda Amor as his foreign secretary, a man in the Castañeda mold who aggressively sought to legitimize the Sandinista dictatorship in Nicaragua and eliminate its opposition. In a veritable playback of Castañeda's policy toward El Salvador, he worked hard to discredit the contras and persisted in reviving the Contadora process.

The selection of Carlos Salinas de Gortari as Mexico's next president is unlikely to alter its present foreign policy in the short run. Salinas was handpicked by de la Madrid and has pledged to follow his policies. Besides, he has had no experience in foreign affairs and, thus, cannot be expected to deviate from the current line. An early telltale sign of the direction he may take could be his choice of foreign secretary: Will he be in the decidedly leftist Castañeda-Sepúlveda mold, or someone more moderate?

Equally or more important would be Salinas's attitude toward the United States. On August 27, he urged PRI leaders to "understand the economic, political, and strategic dynamics of the United States" — an unusual statement still needing definition.

It could turn out to be just a restatement of what Castañeda said in his Meridian House appearance in 1979: "Mexico's relations with the United States are at present the pivotal axis . . . of its foreign policy." Whether meant to please his predominantly U.S. audience or not, this statement was but a half-truth. The United States is indeed pivotal in such matters as helping Mexico bring its foreign debt under control by arranging huge multilateral loans. Mexican leaders felt no inhibitions about shedding their traditionally independent stance and coming to Washington for financial aid. But the United States is not pivotal in the realm of foreign policy; had it been, Mexico City would have never supported the Sandinistas or the Salvadoran FMLN. In foreign relations, the pivotal axis is, regrettably, the Soviet Union and Cuba. Unfortunately, Washington has failed to take this axis seriously.

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CHANGING ARAB ATTITUDES TOWARD ISRAEL

by Aaron David Miller

Arab and Palestinian attitudes toward Israel have changed greatly but quietly in recent years. Twenty years ago, an Arab summit at Khartoum vowed that the Arab world would never recognize, negotiate, or live in peace with Israel. Today, the Arab-Israeli confrontation line is stunningly quiet. Egypt and Israel are formally at peace; Jordan has a de facto peace with Israel; and Syria, while fashioning itself a confrontation state, has scrupulously respected its 1975 disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights and has tread cautiously in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese parliament endorsed a normalization accord with Israel in 1983, though this is now abrogated. In 1986, King Hasan of Morocco invited Shimon Peres to lunch — another extraordinary testament to how much things have changed.

The fires of rejection burn brightly along the periphery of the Arab-Israeli conflict — in Libya, South Yemen, Iraq, and among various Palestinian groups. But the Arab parties most involved in the conflict have come to accept the reality of Israel, and some recognize the need for an accommodation. Even Hafiz al-Asad of Syria, who is determined to carry on the fight, grudgingly accepts that Israel may be here to stay. Indeed, for most Arabs the debate has ceased to focus on the patronizing and profitless question of whether Israel should exist; it turns instead on the more practical and promising matter of boundaries.[1]

This change has little to do with an increased tolerance of Israel or an acceptance of Zionism as a just and moral force. Rather, it reflects a recognition that the old Arab ambitions and pretensions in the struggle against Israel have exceeded capabilities; and that the conflict has become an increasingly heavy burden. This reassessment has not ended the conflict. In fact, reconciling Arab requirements on the shape of a settlement with Israeli needs may well present an insurmountable challenge. But this new pragmatism has produced a number of arrangements that may alter the Arab-Israeli dispute for many years to come.

Why have the key Arab states and some Palestinians reconciled themselves to the reality of Israel? What arrangements have resulted?

[1] Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan Arabism," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978/1979, p. 368.

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Will the new pragmatism become permanent? And what do these changes suggest for U.S. policy?

The New Calculus

The new pragmatism is most evident in the four states that border Israel. As the Arab world's front line in the historic struggle against Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon have had the most to gain or to lose. They bore the brunt of the military and political confrontation, lost territory, and competed for influence over the Palestinian national movement. Indeed, these states — not Iraq, Libya, or South Yemen — will determine the parameters within which the conflict is waged or resolved. Forty years of conflict have demonstrated to all four governments that the costs of continuing an active struggle against Israel are very great, and perhaps for some unmanageable. At the same time, they have come to realize that there are incentives to managing or even ending it.

While this cost/benefit calculus has always had some role in shaping Arab attitudes, only in recent years has it moderated Arab policies. Two basic factors account for this change: Israel's strength and the Arabs' weakness. First, what was already evident by 1967 — that Israel could not be eliminated by military force alone — had become even more painfully obvious a decade later, by which time Israel emerged as the region's most formidable military power. Palestinian terrorism and an Egyptian-initiated war of attrition in 1970 underscored the limitations of the Arabs' military option. Far from sapping Israeli strength and morale, the Arabs' commitment to the military option hardened Israeli resolve. Even the October 1973 war, the Arabs' most successful military effort against Israel, reinforced the limits of the possible. The war was not intended, as Anwar as-Sadat made clear by his subsequent actions, merely to continue the Arab struggle against Israel. Rather, it was intended to break out of a bind and broaden Egypt's options. Sadat sought a means to convert limited success on the battlefield into territorial and economic gains. "If the battle does not become our springboard for reconstruction," Sadat declared six months before the war, "then even if we should win the battle militarily we would revert to a worse situation."[2]

The Arab world confronted another dimension of Israeli strength after 1977, when Israel possessed not only Arab occupied territory but a government that seemed to know precisely what to do with it. The return of Sinai brought peace with Egypt; but the formal reunification of Jerusalem, the annexation of the Golan Heights, and accelerated settlement of the West Bank indicated that the Likud government planned no further territorial concessions.

[2] Anwar as-Sadat, March 26, 1973, quoted in Raphael Israeli, *The Public Diary of President Sadat* (Leiden: E. G. Brill, 1978), p. 322.

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This situation created a new urgency for Jordan's King Husayn. Time, which had always seemed to favor the Arabs, now appeared to be an adversary. "We are alarmed by what is happening on the ground," he noted in late 1984, "whether the Arabs are expelled or remain, creeping annexation of the occupied territories unless halted, will create an explosive situation."[3] Husayn's efforts to lay the groundwork for negotiations with Israel were spurred by Israel's invasion of Lebanon — a move the king feared would lead to a radicalized Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israeli efforts to push Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan.

Second, Israel's impressive staying power provided a stark contrast to the divisions and internal problems that beset the Arab world. The shock of the 1967 debacle led to a painful reassessment of Arab strengths and capabilities. Between 1967 and 1976, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan underwent leadership changes or civil unrest that only highlighted the formidable political and economic challenges they faced. By the late 1960s, Jordan and Lebanon began to bear the brunt of Israeli retaliation for Palestinian cross-border attacks and civil strife as a result of an uncontrollable PLO and an unresolved Palestinian problem. In Egypt, Nasser's death left a leadership vacuum in the region that coincided with a lowering of the expectations and promises inherent in the pan-Arabist dream.

Paradoxically, the October 1973 war — the event that brought the Arabs to the pinnacle of their military and economic power — reinforced these trends. The states that benefited most from the war and the rise in oil prices (principally Egypt and Saudi Arabia) faced the challenge of consolidating their gains; this required accommodation rather than confrontation, stability rather than turmoil, and close, not antagonistic, ties with the United States.

Egypt

Attitudes toward Israel have changed most in Egypt. The decision to conclude a formal peace treaty with Israel was one of the most stunning political events of the century. Geographically removed from the pressures of inter-Arab politics, equipped with a strong national identity, and able to sue for peace as a victor, Egypt had the power and incentive to break from the Arab consensus and endure the consequences. More to the point, this strength was in the hands of a man who felt the urgency to shed the political and economic bonds that trapped Egypt. In April 1977, three months after the bread riots that shook his regime, Anwar as-Sadat reportedly told

[3] King Husayn, *Jordan Times*, December 8, 1984, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Middle East and Africa (hereafter, FBIS), December 10, 1984.

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President Carter he needed a settlement "this year."[4] Indeed, Sadat was a man in a hurry.

Egypt's unique characteristics, however, should not obscure the radical nature of Sadat's action. Despite Egypt's leadership of the confrontation with Israel for thirty years and its championing the Palestinian cause, it had to endure charges of betrayal. That the negotiations with Israel took place during a period when Israeli nationalism had entered a more extreme form did not make Sadat's task easier. Between 1977 and 1982, Israel conducted military strikes against two Arab capitals, annexed the Golan Heights, invaded Lebanon, and moved to crush the PLO. These actions, underscored by the Likud's open determination to hold the West Bank permanently, embarrassed the Egyptians, assured a cold peace, and reinforced the perception that Sadat and Husni Mubarak had made and maintained a separate peace at the expense of the Palestinians and Arab world.

At the same time, these years demonstrated the Egyptian leadership's determination to maintain its commitments and to reap the benefits of the peace. Egyptian-Israeli ties endured the most traumatic event that could befall the relationship: murder of the man who initiated the peace. Shortly before his death, Sadat wrote that he would not allow anyone to "shake the basis of the peace process."[5] In like fashion, Mubarak rejected calls to abrogate the Camp David accords, explaining, "I am not ready to draw the Egyptian people into this for they have suffered a great deal. I want my Palestinian brothers to remember that Egypt, which was once the richest state in the region, is now the poorest, thanks to war."[6] Egyptian-Israeli ties also survived Israel's invasion of Lebanon, an event that almost guaranteed cool relations.

Egypt's decision to maintain a relationship with Israel departs radically from the norm of Arab politics. No other Arab state has the power and self-confidence to make such a formal commitment. Although some observers criticize the Egyptian approach to the treaty as bound too much by the letter of the agreement, it is precisely this formal and institutional link that makes the Egyptian-Israeli peace unique. What other nations take for granted — the existence of the conventional elements of bilateral relations, such as tourism, trade, and diplomatic representation — did not exist in Arab-Israeli relations before 1981. Yet, Egyptians and Israelis now deal with each other routinely over issues as diverse as Israeli participation in the Cairo book fair, disputes over boating rights near Coral Island, Israeli purchase of Egyptian oil, agricultural cooperation, and a joint search for Israeli MIAs. That these ties have not developed to the satisfaction

[4] Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 285.

[5] Anwar el-Sadat, *Those I Have Known* (New York: Continuum, 1984), p. 115.

[6] Husni Mubarak, *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, May 29, 1987.

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of either party should not obscure their significance. Indeed, in an extraordinary statement, Mubarak has noted, "We deal with Israel as we do with any other nation in the world. For me there is no such thing as a most favored nation."[7]

Another dimension to the Egyptian-Israeli relationship should not be overlooked. Cairo has shown it can adhere to the treaty even while it seeks to improve its relations within the Arab world. Egypt's return to the Arab mainstream demonstrates the influence it enjoys in the region. It also suggests that some of the traditional stigma associated with those who deal with Israel may be wearing off. The relatively mild Arab reaction to the Hasan-Peres meeting and the almost casual way that Jordan reacted to rumors of a Husayn-Peres meeting reinforces this point. Indeed, in welcoming Egypt back into its midst, the Arab world is tacitly endorsing the principle of peacemaking and admitting that Sadat was indeed correct: an Arab state could be at peace with Israel and the Arab world at the same time. Egypt's foreign minister declared in early 1987 that despite Egypt's ties with Israel, there are no constraints on Egypt's action in the Arab and Islamic world. "We are linked to the Arab nation and the Arab nation is linked to us."[8]

Jordan

Other states have fashioned less formal but relatively efficient relationships with Israel. They lack the conventional elements of traditional diplomatic relations but they represent an important evolution in the Arab approach to Israel.

Jordan's relationship with Israel provides the most concrete example of this. From the earliest contacts between 'Abdallah and the Zionist leaders to Husayn's rumored meetings with the Israelis, Jordanian leaders have consistently pursued practical relations with the Jews. This does not mean that the Jordanians have ignored the constraints of Arab politics or are prepared to compromise on issues like Jerusalem and the Palestinians. It does suggest that in the absence of formal peace, Husayn can fashion a working relationship with Israel that serves Jordanian interests.

Husayn's approach is shaped partly by his own moderation and his ties to the West. More important, geographic, demographic, and political realities define areas of mutual Jordanian-Israeli interest. Jordan shares Israel's longest and least defensible border. Given Jordan's disastrous experience in the 1967 war and Israel's preponderant military advantage, Husayn has every reason to avoid confrontation with Israel. Indeed, security issues — from avoiding a major war to

[7] Husni Mubarak, Cairo Domestic Service, April 30, 1987, FBIS, May 4, 1987
[8] 'Abd al-Majid interview, *Al-Hawadith*, February 20, 1987, FBIS, February 25, 1987.

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stopping Palestinian infiltration and arms smuggling from Jordanian territory — provide the basis for an informal relationship.

Jordan approaches Israel on two levels. On one, Husayn tries to find common ground for a formal settlement of the Palestinian issue. His inability to make a Sadat-like gesture should not obscure his acceptance of the need for direct negotiations with Israel and the importance of a formal peace treaty. Husayn has repeatedly reconfirmed his support for direct talks and urged the Arab world to move from "illicit recognition" of Israel to "declared recognition."[9] He also informed the U.N. General Assembly in September 1985 of his readiness "to negotiate with Israel under suitable, acceptable, supervision, directly and as soon as possible."[10] Reports that Husayn and Peres have agreed on conference modalities suggest that Husayn's own attitudes on contacts with Israel have relaxed somewhat. The key question is not whether Husayn is ready for negotiations but how to structure the talks.

The second approach is more subtle and involves common Jordanian-Israeli interests on the West Bank. Were formal talks with Israel never to begin, Husayn still has a major stake in managing the demographic and political consequences of an unresolved Palestinian problem. He has a major stake in preventing the radicalization of Palestinians on either bank of the Jordan River and countering the efforts of those Israelis who would like to see West Bank Palestinians leave. This means preventing the economic and social dislocation that would radicalize West Bank Palestinians or prompt them to move across the river. "We must prevent the Palestinians in the occupied areas from falling into a state of desperation," Husayn noted in January 1987, "which might lead to social chaos and exodus."[11]

The Jordanian authorities' ability to influence West Bank developments has diminished due to the rise of the PLO and twenty years of Israeli occupation. Nonetheless, Amman has significant assets on the West Bank. Among other factors, Jordanian currency and passports are still in use; administrative regulations continue to apply; the Jordanian economic, social, and religious ministries still involve themselves actively in its affairs; and Jordanian television broadcasts to a wide audience there.

The open bridges policy best symbolizes the de facto peace that exists between Israel and Jordan. The bridges facilitate the movement of goods and people; moreover, their administration requires cooperation between the two sides on security matters, the regulation of a truck transport system, and the processing of the several thousand travelers who cross each day. Indeed, anyone who witnesses the

[9] King Husayn, KUNA, October 20, 1984, FBIS, October 30, 1984.

[10] King Husayn, Amman Domestic Service, September 27, 1985, FBIS, September 30, 1985.

[11] King Husayn, *L'Espresso* (Rome), January 16, 1987, FBIS, January 22, 1987.

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routine interaction at the bridges between Israeli and Jordanian officers as they exchange greetings and cigarettes sees how practical politics have transcended the emotion and ideology that make a formal Jordanian-Israeli peace so difficult.

Syria

The third type of Arab accommodation — informal and tacit understandings with Israel — is embodied by Syria and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon. Both states, to be sure, approach the problem differently. While respecting its disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights, the Syrian government still considers itself in active confrontation with Israel — a fact clearly revealed in Syria's apparent effort to blow-up an Israeli airliner in April 1986. The Lebanese, on the other hand, by virtue of their unique political structure and minor role in the conventional Arab-Israeli conflict, have been more acted upon than actor.

The Syrian approach toward Israel has been confrontational but tempered by recognition of Israel's military superiority. Of the states bordering Israel, only Syria remains a dedicated confrontation state. Hafiz al-Asad has vowed that Syria will fight to keep the "Camp David trend from becoming a reality" and to prevent Israel from establishing its "Torah hegemony."[12] Indeed, his need to avoid the image of settling with Israel is an important factor in Asad's effort to achieve legitimacy at home and maintain Syrian influence in regional Arab politics.

This said, Asad maintains considerable flexibility in his military strategy toward Israel and has left the door open to the possibility of political settlement. Henry Kissinger interpreted Asad's willingness to sign the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement as an "agonizing concession deeply wrenching" for a Syrian leader, for it implicitly granted Israel "some right to be there."[13] Damascus also reluctantly endorsed the 1982 Fez Summit resolutions which contained an implicit recognition of Israel.

Even while Asad has pursued his goal of strategic parity — a vague concept that appears to imply not only military parity but the competitive development of all facets of Syrian society — he has avoided an untimely or unwanted war with Israel. On the Golan Heights, in southern Lebanon, and with PLO groups, Asad has for the most part pursued a policy of limited risk for limited gain. Asad's recognition of Syria's limitations vis-à-vis Israel has resulted in tacit understandings commonly referred to as red lines. These arrangements have introduced some predictability into a potentially volatile

[12] Hafiz al-Asad, *al-Qabas*, Damascus Domestic Service, January 24, 1987, FBIS, January 28, 1987.

[13] Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), p. 1046.

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relationship and have helped avoid major escalations. Although the Israeli press frequently reports "secret" Israeli-Syrian contacts on security issues,[14] red lines have in fact emerged informally from Asad's assessment of Israeli tolerance levels, Israeli reactions to Syrian moves, and from trial and error. These arrangements have headed off potentially costly confrontations and created the impression of two states in bitter conflict that have managed to regulate relations to their mutual advantage.

Syria's approach to Israel is best demonstrated in Lebanon, the laboratory where Israel and Syria test the limits of each other's patience. While playing to the brink in Lebanon, Asad has avoided actions certain to trigger major Israeli military responses. Given the fluidity of the Lebanese political scene between 1975 and 1982 — Syria's intervention in Lebanon in 1975-76, the first Israeli incursion in 1978, the Syrian-Israeli missile crisis in the spring of 1981, and the Israeli-PLO mini-war in southern Lebanon that summer — it is remarkable that there was no major Israeli-Syrian military confrontation. When fighting did take place in 1982 during the course of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Asad reacted defensively, showing no interest in raising the stakes. Further, the first major confrontation in 1982 resulted not from Syrian actions, but from a breakdown of a ceasefire between Israel and the PLO. Since the Israeli invasion, Syria has generally continued to respect the limits of Israeli tolerance in Lebanon.

The two states sometimes share interests in Lebanon and this reinforces the tacit understandings already in existence. Syria's intervention in Lebanon to support the Christian community against a Palestinian/Lebanese alliance worked to Israel's advantage. The more recent confrontation between Syria and Arafat's PLO also served Israel's interests, a fact admitted by Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin in an interview in 1985.[15] Now in its fifth year, this dispute has constrained the PLO's ability to operate freely in southern Lebanon. Radical Shi'i activity also increasingly worries Damascus as it does Israel. In an effort to maintain good relations with Iran, Asad acquiesces in Hizbullah activity in the Bekaa valley (and has even supported it in southern Lebanon), but he also sees it as a threat to Syria's goals in Lebanon. Efforts by Hizbullah to weaken Amal Nabih Barri's organization, to cooperate with the PLO, and to take hostages could trigger another major Israeli move into southern Lebanon and therefore threaten Syrian interests.

Lebanon

Lebanon's relationship with Israel differs entirely from that of the other neighbors. For one, it is difficult to separate the Lebanese approach toward Israel from the reality of Syrian influence. Asad's

[14] *Ma'ariv*, May 15, 1984, FBIS, May 15, 1984.
[15] Yitzhaq Rabin, Jerusalem Domestic Service, March 30, 1985, FBIS, April 2, 1985.

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success in undermining the only example of formal Israeli-Lebanese accommodation (the May 1983 withdrawal and normalization agreement) underscores this point. Second, it is impossible to describe a single Lebanese view of Israel. Given the unique nature of the Lebanese government, the divergent views of Lebanese political groups and militias have free reign, and while some oppose accommodation of Israel, others maintain active ties with the Jewish state. Thus, the Maronite-dominated Lebanese Forces militia opened a public liaison office in Jerusalem in 1983. The Army of Southern Lebanon depends on Israeli support; and while predominantly Christian, it has Shi'i and Druze members as well. Indeed, one account holds that Druze leader Walid Jumblatt sent secret envoys to Israel in 1982 to discuss military assistance in return for Druze help against the PLO.[16]

With the exception of the Palestinians and Lebanese fringe groups — radical Shi'is, leftists, and Communists — the Lebanese have no fundamental interest in confronting Israel. Most Lebanese would gladly withdraw Lebanon from the conflict with Israel altogether. The mainstream Shi'i community would prefer a diplomatic solution to the southern Lebanon problem, one that facilitates Israeli withdrawal without leaving a power vacuum. In fact, more than a year after the abrogation of the May 1983 accord, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel openly declared his government's willingness to conclude an agreement with Israel on security arrangements in southern Lebanon.[17] The 1984-85 U.N.-brokered Naqurah talks between Lebanese and Israeli military delegations reflected this consensus.

The PLO

Palestinian attitudes have also moderated, but not as quickly as some of their Arab patrons. The new Arab order after 1973 required a less militant PLO. The Arab states simply could not afford a radical maximalist Palestinian movement intervening in their domestic affairs or triggering unwanted wars with Israel. Fouad Ajami has argued that this need provided the basis of the deal struck at the Rabat summit in late 1974.[18] In exchange for the PLO accepting the new rules of the game, the Arab states recognized the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people.

But moderating and controlling the PLO proved to be far more elusive than many of the Rabat attendees realized. The 1973 war and the diplomatic and economic interest it triggered in the United States and Europe served to push the Palestinian issue to center stage. Divided and tarred by its terrorist activities of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the PLO saw an opportunity to exploit the political gains

[16] Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 245.

[17] Amin Gemayel, *Der Spiegel*, September 24, 1984, FBIS, September 27, 1984.

[18] Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 150-51.

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of the war and the new-found interest in the Palestinian issue. Its objective was twofold: to isolate Israel by improving the PLO's image as a responsible political interlocutor; and to avoid being shut out of a negotiating process should one begin. Reflecting on changes in the PLO's strategy, Salah Khalaf, one of Fatah's key leaders, noted that "the October war forced us to revise our 'all or nothing policy.' "[19]

Toward this end, the PLO's Palestine National Council in 1974 endorsed the principle of accepting a "national authority" on any part of Palestine "liberated" from the Israelis. Implicit in this change was the idea that the PLO now accepted a Palestinian state alongside of Israel rather than insisting that the Jewish state be dismantled. Skeptics argued that this was only a tactical adjustment embodying the idea of *marhaliyya* — the liberation of all Palestine in stages. Still, a reduction in international terrorism, observer status at the United Nations, and increased diplomatic representation abroad all seemed to suggest that the Palestinians, like some of their Arab patrons, were beginning to give more attention to politics as a tool for achieving their objectives.

Not surprisingly the Palestinians were slower to grasp the reality of Arab limitations and Israeli power than the Arab states with which they were allied. Possessing so little, Palestinians were unable and unwilling to make compromises without fear of being exploited by both Israel and the Arab states. Dispersed among a dozen Arab countries struggling for economic and in some cases physical survival, Palestinians found it difficult to articulate and implement a unified and pragmatic political strategy. And the PLO, caught up in maximalist rhetoric, a dependence on more militant Arab regimes, and its search for unity, always seemed a few steps behind the diplomatic game. This lag separating the moderate Arab state's view of Israel from that of the PLO is a crucial issue in Middle East politics and a source of frustration for would be peacemakers.

The New Pragmatism: Will It Last?

The states that border Israel have all come to terms with Israel and adjusted their approach accordingly. Each state maintains a different form of accommodation, although only one has diplomatic relations with Israel. Egypt adheres to a formal peace treaty and maintains conventional diplomatic ties; Jordan has a de facto accommodation but lacks the conventional instruments of state-to-state relations; and Syria and Lebanon have worked out tacit understandings on specific issues. None of this would prevent some unforeseen event — military confrontation, assassination, or major terrorist attack — from upsetting the status quo. Nonetheless, the cumulative

[19] Abu Iyad, *My Home, My Land* (New York: Times Books, 1981), p. 133.

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effect of these arrangements reduces the prospects of a major Arab-Israeli confrontation.

Key Arab states now accept the reality of Israel.

What may have begun as a tactical shift in the Arabs' approach toward Israel took on a more strategic character after 1977. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the Iran-Iraq war created circumstances favorable to Israel; they also triggered some of the worst inter-Arab rivalries. An awareness of Arab weakness underlay the Arabs' growing acceptance of Israel. "Do the Arabs want another war with Israel," President Mubarak asked an interviewer. "Are they not satisfied with what they have now — Lebanon, Iran, and the Sahara?"[20] This process of separating illusion from reality has been a painful one. Yet, as Yehoshafat Harkabi has observed, most Arab states have been forced to subordinate an idealized grand design (the end of Israel) to a realistic policy (reconciling their own interests with an acceptance of Israel).[21]

Fifteen years earlier, Harkabi noted that Arab attitudes toward Israel could change as a result of a number of factors, including the Arab states' increasing concern with their domestic affairs, leadership changes, and exhaustion and disappointment in the struggle against Israel.[22] He was correct. Key Arab states now accept the reality of Israel; some would even like to end the conflict with Israel. As they had to recognize Israel's staying power and their own limitations, the cost/benefit calculus became more relevant.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has not ended; but it has evolved into a series of arrangements between the two sides. This has created a lull in the confrontation which has by now come to assume a more permanent character. But stability in the Arab-Israeli arena is not an inexhaustible commodity. A permanent impasse in the Arab-Israeli peace process may make it increasingly difficult to preserve the accommodations that now exist. Also, the question arises: if key Arab states have accepted the reality of Israel, which Israel have they accepted? Is it an Israel in control of the West Bank, Gaza, and Golan Heights or one prepared to cede territory to its neighbors in return for formal peace?

Skeptics also note, correctly, that the Arab world's willingness to accept Israel reflects objective realities — that Israel is strong militarily, the Arabs weak and divided. Were these conditions re-

[20] Husni Mubarak, *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, May 29, 1987, p. 20.

[21] Yehoshafat Harkabi, *The Fateful Choices Before Israel, Essays on Strategy and Diplomacy*, Number 7, (Clarmont, California: The Keck Center for International Strategic Studies, 1987), p. 2.

[22] Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1972), pp. 455-65.

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versed — the Iran-Iraq war ended, the Egyptian-Israeli treaty canceled — Arab calculations could be reversed again. Leadership changes in Jordan, Egypt, and Syria could do this too, as would the rise to power of radical fundamentalist Islamic movements. Changes in Israel — increasing power of the Israeli right, Jewish fundamentalism, moves formally to annex the West Bank, and radicalization of Palestinians within the occupied territories — could also disrupt the current balance. In short, an increasingly stable status quo could well deteriorate into a far less predictable and manageable conflict.

Implications for the United States

The challenge for the United States is to convert a favorable shift in Arab attitudes into durable political gains; this means moving forward on Arab-Israeli peace making. Many problems stand in the way. To mention just two: Egypt remains the only Arab state willing to push a pragmatic view of Israel to its logical conclusion — signing a formal treaty of peace; at the very moment when Jordan is looking for ways to negotiate, Israel is more divided than ever on relations with the Arabs. Indeed, extremists in Israel have become the mirror-image of those in the Arab world, for they openly advocate the expulsion of the enemy.

While formal Arab-Israeli peace treaties remain the most desirable form of accommodation, they may not be the most attainable. Both the regional parties themselves and an outside mediator must cope with an Arab-Israeli conflict caught somewhere between formal solution and outright confrontation. A situation of no war/no peace does not eliminate the chances for additional peace treaties, but it does suggest that the Arab-Israeli conflict could remain in limbo for a long time. This raises several important objectives for American policy.

- Preserve the only instance of a formal Arab-Israeli peace, for one peace treaty in hand is worth a dozen in the bush. Progress in the peace process would help cement Egyptian-Israeli relations. But a wide range of bilateral problems can be addressed on their own, including compensation for the Ra's Burka incident, a search for the Dakar submarine lost in 1967, search for Egyptian and Israeli MIAs, improved treatment in the media, trade and tourism, visits by government officials, and the settling of the Taba issue. The United States can help with some of these.
- Pursue the peace process. The current impasse does not rule out a wider Arab-Israeli peace. Israel and Jordan have established common ground on the modalities for negotiations, a foundation worth building upon. Whatever negotiating process emerges must include Palestinian representation at every stage; nor should the door be closed on Syrian and Soviet participation.

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• Focus on the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, Israel and Jordan must improve conditions for Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza. These areas offer the last remaining pegs on which a solution to the Palestinian issue can be hung. It is imperative that the Palestinians living there — most of whom are pragmatic and hoping for a negotiated solution — not be further radicalized or alienated.

• Reduce the dangers of a Syrian-Israeli confrontation. A solution in southern Lebanon that would permit an Israeli withdrawal and a stable south would do much toward this end.

It is not always in the nature of Middle Eastern politics to offer clear-cut, unambiguous, and direct solutions and outcomes to problems. Rather, change — even when it is the result of some traumatic conflict — comes in increments and in a manner that is often slow and confusing. The absence of formal peace treaties does not imply an inevitable slide toward war. Nonetheless, the key ingredient of a durable peace is not yet in place. A lasting accommodation will come only when Arabs and Israelis determine that the costs of confrontation are too high.

Mediators can play an important role in reducing the prospects for confrontation and in bridging gaps once this community of interests has been achieved. But outsiders cannot be expected — to use a biblical metaphor — to make bricks without straw. Throughout the four decades of Arab-Israeli conflict, the parties themselves have been primarily responsible for every major act of peace or war. One can only hope that Arabs and Israelis alike will finally see their interests better served by statesmanship and diplomacy.

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THE GREENS' VISION OF GERMANY

by John H. Vaughan

In an interview granted shortly before West Germany's parliamentary elections on January 25, 1987, Green party member Joschka Fischer characterized support for his party as a "vote for adventure."[1] It appears that the West German electorate accepted this brash challenge, for it gave the Green party a clearcut success. On election day the Green party slate garnered 8.3 percent of the vote, surging 50 percent above its 1983 showing of 5.6 percent.

The Greens thereby solidified their position as the fourth political party in the Bundestag — after the two-headed Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU), the Free Democratic party (FDP), and the opposition Social Democrats (SPD). They also demonstrated that a radical agenda attacking basic premises of the postwar order has a growing resonance in West Germany's body politic. The challenge they pose justifies a close look at their make up, their objectives, the likelihood of their success, and their posture vis-à-vis the United States.

Direct Democracy, Green Style

The genesis of the Greens can be found in the kaleidoscope of extra-parliamentary political movements — environmental, feminist, and pacifist — that swept West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. With the formation of state-level parties in Lower Saxony, Hamburg, and Berlin in the late 1970s, these movements began to enter the formal political process. Prompted by NATO's decision in December 1979 to modernize the Alliance's nuclear arsenal in Europe and anticipating forthcoming federal elections, activists gathered in Karlsruhe during January 1980 to form a new party on the federal level. They called themselves the Greens (*Die Grünen*) to highlight their environmental concerns and to express the non-conformity of their politics.

The Greens are not easy to characterize in conventional political rubrics. Some party members belonged at one time to communist organizations, and some old leftist slogans find their way into the party's literature. Thus, the 1987 election program proclaimed that

[1] *Der Spiegel*, January 12, 1987, p. 3. Mr. Fischer was the environmental minister for the state of Hessen under the one-month coalition government of Social Democrats and Greens, which broke up in February 1987.

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the Greens were "an anti-Fascist party."[2] But the Greens bear no resemblance to a "workers' party" in the Marxist-Leninist mold.

The party stands for a basic restructuring of West German society, but not in the image of any communist system. Themes the Greens promote include neutralization, disarmament, a nuclear-free society, feminism, subordination of industry to environmental criteria, and "democracy from below." The Greens dream of a West Germany with a low military profile unconnected to any alliance system; free of nuclear weaponry and power plants; an economy of small-scale, ecologically sound industries; a social order based on absolute equality of the sexes and the liberal treatment of non-mainstream societal elements; and a political system that maximizes direct citizen participation.

Central to their entire program is the principle of mass participation by the citizenry. The Greens' basic premise is that governmental policy in West Germany does not reflect the popular will. Charging that powerful economic and military interests dominate the decision-making process, the Greens maintain that "parliamentary-representative democracy needs completion through direct democracy."[3] In direct democracy the decision-making process would be reoriented, with individuals and citizens' groups replacing vested interests as the primary agents for political initiatives, the use of plebiscites to decide major public issues. These are some of the extra-parliamentary procedures that the Greens envision as part of a new political system called *Basisdemokratie* (base-level democracy).

The Greens' party organization is an example of *Basisdemokratie* in action. Alone among the parties in the Bundestag, the Greens have no party chairman. Their institutions and procedures emphasize decentralized authority and diffusion of power among the rank and file. The result has been a party of multiple, sometimes conflicting, voices giving vent to myriad causes.

Renouncing Reunification

Rethinking the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was not an early focus for the Greens. But the Greens' *Deutschlandpolitik*, as it has emerged from several years of intra-party debate, now forms the centerpiece of their policy with regard to the whole European continent. Advocating formal acceptance of the existence of two German nation-states, the Greens abandoned the ghost of a German Reich, and with it, the goal of reunification.

The Greens perceive Bonn's insistence on one German nation and the commitment to reunification as a prime source of inter-

[2] *Bundesstagswahl Programm 1987, Die Grünen*, p. 7.
[3] *Bundesstagswahl Programm 1987, Die Grünen*, p. 6.

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German tensions. As the larger state in territory (ratio of 7:3), population (7:2), and in nearly every other economic and cultural measure, West Germany's stand represents a claim against the very existence of East Germany. The sealing of East Germany's borders to the West, therefore, was a matter of self-preservation.

The Greens aim to overcome this separation by a policy of total recognition, dispensing with the concept of "one Germany" and the special status of inter-German relations. This policy begins with what they call West Germany's self-recognition. "Self-recognition of the Federal Republic means to end the self-deception of an all-German identity and press forward with the cultivation of an independent democratic identity."[5] Self-recognition means self-limitation. West Germany would be viewed as an end in itself rather than the first stage of a reorganized all-German state. East Germany would be recognized as an independent state, and lingering hopes of regaining former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse would also be given up.

How would the Greens' policy alter political life in West Germany? It would constitute a fundamental break with the country's constitutional and psychological underpinnings. Unqualified recognition of East Germany would require changes in the West German constitution (or Basic Law), which refers to the provisional nature of the Federal Republic, the goal of reunification, and a single German nationality. It would arouse determined resistance from those who cling to the vision of a reunited Germany, or at least of an all-German polity. But beyond this, what? West Germany's dream of reunification has achieved little until now. Political realities suggest that the idea of a single German nation is not more than the self-deception the Greens say it is.

In considering full recognition of East Germany, however, West German policy makers cannot escape the ethical question raised by the inter-German border. West Germans have long been aware that they have been by all counts more fortunate than their eastern counterparts. This awareness created a sense of responsibility toward the inhabitants of the "eastern zone." From the outset Bonn considered its commitment to reunification a moral obligation.

For almost four decades, West German governing parties affirmed this commitment and refused to abandon the principle of one German nation. In advocating full recognition for East Germany, the Greens must confront difficult questions. Would this grant the East German government a status that it has not earned? Would it represent the abdication of an inconvenient responsibility toward fellow countrymen, a cynical denial of basic human rights and democratic government to East Germans? Wolfgang Seiffert, a former high-rank-

[5] *Bundesstagswahl Programm 1987, Die Grünen*, p. 31.

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ing East German party functionary expelled in 1978 for his dissident stance, had some strong thoughts on these questions in his 1982 book *German Unity Will Definitely Come*:

> It would be a dangerous false conclusion — short-sighted and ultimately threatening to our existence — to seek escape from the problems of the German nation's two opposing systems by being satisfied through chance, birth, or even flight and emigration, to have found one's place in the freer, more bountiful German state. This would not only be base egoism and primitive materialism vis-à-vis our countrymen in the GDR [East Germany], who press on our conscience and even after so many "Packages for yonder!" still don't let us find peace. The inner dynamics of the German nation's current condition do not permit us to run away from ourselves with cheap tricks.[6]

The Greens believe that recognition of East Germany would allow it to lower its guard. The border would become more passable and a new era of dialogue could begin. Groups of East and West Germans would gather to discuss their societies, environmental issues, and disarmament, as well as to organize citizens' initiatives. Greens see affirmation of the division of Germany on the political level as a means to overcome the division on the human level. They call it "détente from below."

But this scenario reflects wishful thinking more than political reality. The opening of East Germany does not hinge on recognition by Bonn, but on the conviction of the East German leadership that their system would not be undermined — either by an exodus of their citizenry to the West or by the demands of their citizenry for the adoption of more Western ways. The East German regime is far from such self-confidence. "Détente from below" would be feared by the East German regime as a potential "revolution from below." Moreover, the self-perpetuating rule of the *nomenklatura* and Soviet influence further reduce the chances of such an opening.

The East German regime is not interested in ending the human separation of East and West Germans; it needs walls to survive. "Détente from below," with its free flow of ideas, is a challenge to the absolute authority of the Socialist Unity party (SED). That this type of détente is anathema to the communist regime should be clear to the Greens from a 1983 incident on Alexanderplatz in East Berlin. A number of Green members unfurled banners proclaiming "Swords to Plowshares," a universal slogan of peace (inscribed, among other places, on a statue in the United Nations garden presented by the Soviet Union!); they were quickly arrested by East German police and whisked back to West Berlin.

Further, the last decade and a half of inter-German relations showed that East German leaders prefer the *Ostpolitik* of the established political parties in Bonn to those espoused by the Greens. This choice reflects the determination of the East German regime to

[6] Wolfgang Seiffert, *Die Deutsche Einheit Kommt Bestimmt*, 1982, p. 12.

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maintain firm control. Wary of its own citizens and faced by an ever-watchful Soviet Union, the East German regime is incapable of more.

The Problem of Berlin

The former capital of the Reich poses a special challenge to the Greens, for the city's jagged division is an acute reminder of the painful "German question." West Berlin is fully integrated into the economic, judicial, and cultural life of West Germany; yet it is not a part of the Federal Republic, West Berliners are not citizens of the FRG, and Germans do not even exercise sovereignty over the city. Supreme authority rests, as it has since the end of World War II, with Britain, France, and the United States. Only through agreements between these three powers and the Soviet Union are ties between the Federal Republic and West Berlin assured, including the right of Germans to travel between the two. These constrictions necessarily limit the options available to any West German government.

The Greens and the Alternative List, their associated party in West Berlin (on issues of mutual concern they are sometimes referred to jointly as the GAL), do not yet have a unified policy for the city. The Greens' 1987 federal election program, a forty-nine-page presentation of the party's agenda, did not once mention Berlin. Nevertheless, some party members have issued position papers on West Berlin, arguing for its political incorporation into the FRG, its internationalization under a new East-West authority, or the negotiation of a new occupation statute.[7] These plans suggest a common thread: the desire to overcome artificial barriers separating West Berlin from its surrounding territory by renouncing any national role for the city. The lingering concept of capital in waiting, with its implicit claim against the legitimacy of East Germany, must be rejected. Like the Federal Republic, West Berlin must dispense with its self-image as a provisional political entity.

Another GAL theme concerns the demilitarization of West Berlin. GAL literature advocates the reduction of the Allied garrisons to a symbolic level — as if their 12,000 troops (surrounded by over half a million Soviet and East German soldiers) were not already symbolic. The GAL portrays such a troop reduction as a confidence-building measure, a statement of trust toward the Soviets and East Germans designed to disarm the East by its very openness. Indeed, the demilitarization of West Berlin is envisioned as a step toward general European disarmament.

Green alternatives for West Berlin must always be considered against the backdrop of potential nationality problems for the city's

[7] See *Die Grünen im Bundestag, Deutsch-Deutsch*; W. Guckelberger, R. Kuenast, P. Lohauss, J. Mueller-Gazurek, G. Seiler, P. Sellin, M. Wendt, *Initiative fuer eine Alternative Berlinpolitik*, February 1987, p. 17; and two articles in the Alternative List's magazine *Stachlige Argumente*, December 1986 — "*20 Thesen zu Westberlin*" and "*Berlin Wals Friedenstadt.*"

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residents. The Greens' two nation-state concept, involving West Germany's full recognition of East Germany, would supplant the concept of a single German nationality defended by the Federal Republic since its creation. It would also leave the nationality status of West Berliners, citizens of neither German state, up in the air. Integration of West Berlin into the Federal Republic could alleviate this problem, at least within the context of the Greens' *Deutschlandpolitik*, by making West Berliners nationals of the Federal Republic. Any other political status for the city, however, threatens to leave the nationality of its inhabitants in an ill-defined twilight zone, or even to promote the old East German/Soviet theory of West Berlin as a "third German state."

Unilateral Disarmament

For the Greens, the absence of a major war in Europe for over forty years does not constitute a real peace, because it was based on the confrontation of heavily armed blocs, the partition of the continent, and the ever-present threat of nuclear weapons. The Greens argue that West Germany's strong military posture and NATO membership have wedded the country to a fundamentally insecure structure. The party aims at breaking down the established "bloc logic" in West Germany and replacing it with a foreign policy designed to undermine the existing alliances.

Green party literature roundly criticizes both superpowers for exploiting militarism as a way to keep their respective alliances in tow. But the United States is singled out for reproach, accused of pursuing a confrontational policy to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. Bonn is portrayed as an active accomplice, insofar as it makes its territory available to American weaponry, maintains its own formidable arsenal, and coordinates its military strategy closely with NATO.

The Greens advocate a radical change of course to break free of this military web and defuse what they call the Powderkeg Federal Republic: "We want the Federal Republic to withdraw from the militarized foreign policy of NATO and the United States, and to retire from NATO. To that end it is necessary to begin right now with steps of unilateral disarmament."[8]

The ultimate objective is still more ambitious. The Greens conceive of unilateral disarmament as a strategy to foster a new psychological climate in the field of East-West security. "The Greens' long-term goal is a fully disarmed, demilitarized Federal [West] German society in the framework of a new European order of peace."[9]

[8] *Bundesstagswahl Programm 1987, Die Grünen*, p. 26.
[9] *SPD-Verteidigungspolitik — Ein Halber Frieden, Die Grünen im Bundestag*, p. 69. This publication by Green members of the Bundestag compares their peace policy with that of the SPD.

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The full view was expressed in a 1987 election draft on peace: "Unilateral disarmament does not mean the immediate scrapping of all weapons. Above all, the concept of unilateral, independent disarmament involves breaking through the thinking pattern of 'security through balance (or indeed superiority) of power' which forms the basis for the apparently relentless arms spiral."[10] Unilateral disarmament, with no conditions attached and no demands for reciprocal steps from the other side, would be an unequivocal statement of peaceful intentions.

The message to the East would be clear: take bold steps for peace and a process of European disarmament would be under way. Green parliamentarians in Bonn describe this as "a process of unilateral steps which will be answered from the other side by its own unilateral steps."[11] The Greens acknowledge that unilateral disarmament must ultimately spark multilateral disarmament, but they do not indicate how far they would go down the unilateral road before requiring a response in kind from the East. They assume their actions would prompt similar steps on the other side and avoid making provisions in case this assumption proves wrong.

In concrete terms, the Greens advocate three initial measures by West Germany: (1) immediate dismantling and removal of the American Pershing II and cruise missiles; (2) reduction of the military budget by 35 percent, including cessation of all further weapons production or research, no expansion of present facilities, and reduction in size of West German military forces and exercises; (3) renunciation of the 1982 Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement with the USA, whereby Bonn undertook, in the case of crisis or war, to provide civil and military support services to additional U.S. forces deployed on West German soil. The Greens charge that the agreement would permit the United States to use West Germany as a springboard for aggression, primarily in Third World countries.

The Greens also seek other changes, including: (4) abstention from Eureka (the European Research Coordination Agency), the European Defense Initiative (which foresees a greater self-reliance of the European members of NATO for their own defense), and SDI; (5) removal from West German soil of all nuclear, chemical, and so-called conventional offensive weapons; and (6) the withdrawal of all foreign troops from West German territory.

This policy of unilateral disarmament consciously rejects the traditional approach of arms control through negotiation. The Greens see the negotiating process as flawed because it is predicated on the maintenance of a balance of military power between East and West. They see it as virtually inconceivable that negotiations could ulti-

[10] *Wahlprogrammentwurf '87 "Frieden," Die Grünen im Bundestag*, p. 69.
[11] *SPD-Verteidigungspolitik*, p. 66.

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mately lead to a demilitarized Europe in which destructive war could no longer be waged. Even with the abolition of all U.S. and Soviet short- and intermediate-range missiles in Europe, a host of nuclear and conventional weapons systems would still be left. The negotiation process, in other words, does not promise genuine disarmament.

The Greens recognize that their security policies constitute a frontal assault on NATO. To meet the resistance expected from pro-NATO forces, they hope to supplement parliamentary politics with massive citizen participation — *Basisdemokratie*. The West German populace must be mobilized to employ nonviolent civil disobedience against the military presence on its soil. Tactics mentioned in the party literature include blocking military facilities, hindering maneuvers, citizens' initiatives against the noise of low-flying planes or the construction of bunkers, community declarations of nuclear-, chemical-, and maneuver-free zones, the boycott of armaments-related taxes. Confrontation is seen as an essential element in raising public consciousness and destroying the status quo.

> We need to be ready to take risks for peace instead of war! Stabilization of the deterrence- and bloc-systems will not lead us out of the current blind alley . . . only a policy that decomposes and dissolves this system will do that. It will be largely accomplished by ill-mannered, disobedient, recalcitrant, obstinate citizens who make use of a multitude of creative actions of civil disobedience and who assume the right and duty to interfere wherever their survival is at stake.[4]

Massive civil disobedience is also the basis of the Greens' strategy for "national defense" in the demilitarized West Germany of the future. As the country's armed forces are dissolved, a strategy of "social defense" (*Sozialverteidigung*) will be used against armed aggression, by which they mean strikes, boycotts, and the refusal of public officials to collaborate.

The Greens know full well that their radical ideas on disarmament do not command much support in West Germany. This became clear in 1983, when vocal and highly visible opposition to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles failed to achieve its objective, nor did the governing coalition suffer at the polls. The political viability of the Greens' disarmament strategy rests on demonstrating that the public engagement of 1983 represented the tip of an iceberg, not a small minority of extremists. They hope the 1983 demonstrations reflect a deep-seated disquiet which can be stoked into long-term agitation. The task is formidable, but the results will fairly test the accuracy of the party's understanding of the West German political psyche.

A New European Order of Peace

This disarmament strategy also depends on the breakup of opposing military alliances in Europe. The Greens aim to bring down the entire institutional structure of bloc-oriented military defense,

[4] *SPD-Verteidigungspolitik — Ein Halber Frieden, Die Grünen im Bundestag*, p. 71.

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thus ending Europe's bipolarization. Instead, they advocate the continent's evolution into neutral and non-communist states.

> We want to pursue an active policy to dissolve the blocs. That means: weakening, decomposing and destroying NATO — calculating, of course, that this policy will provoke reactions in the Warsaw Pact organization. When we who live in the stronger bloc take decisive steps toward unilateral disarmament and bloc decomposition, there is a chance that relationships on the other side of the Iron Curtain can also change — perhaps in the sense of a Finlandization of Eastern Europe. The end of such a process can be the "Europeanization of Europe," the emancipation of West Europe from the U.S.A. and of Eastern Europe from the U.S.S.R., and the creation of a new European order of peace.[12]

In Eastern Europe, the Greens foresee a vital role for indigenous peace and human rights movements (such as Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and Dunkoer in Hungary), which they regard as their counterparts in *Basisdemokratie*. The Greens imagine that West German steps toward unilateral disarmament and disengagement from NATO would strengthen these groups because the rationale for their suppression by the communist governments would disappear. With West Germany and other NATO states embarked on demilitarization and neutralization, authorities in the East would no longer have a common foe demanding a unified defensive. Communist regimes could relax their controls, giving freer rein to the politics of *Basisdemokratie* in their midst, leading to the breakdown of blocs and universal disarmament.

As with their hopes for East Germany, the validity of Green assumptions regarding the transferability of their methods and ideals to Eastern Europe is dubious at best. Peace and human rights groups there are repressed not so much, as the Greens see it, because of the threat they pose to external security, but because they challenge communist rule. Green expectations that dissident groups would be allowed to campaign openly for disarmament and disengagement from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are unrealistic. The Warsaw Pact binds Eastern Europe militarily to the Soviet Union and guarantees the maintenance of communist rule from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Discarding this politico-military structure would leave those regimes bereft and subject them to unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable demands for reform from their own peoples.

As for the Soviet Union, allowing its Warsaw Pact allies free rein on issues of disarmament and bloc adherence beggars the imagination. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Europe and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact threatens it with exactly what the Greens proclaim as their objective — Finlandization. Such a political situation is viable on the northern periphery of Europe, but the Soviets cannot tolerate such a development in the heart of Europe. Put differently, the Soviets welcome the Finlandization of Western Europe, but not Eastern Europe.

[12] Ibid., p. 68.

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Memories of the two world wars are yet too fresh for Europeans to countenance a unilateral West German solution to the "German question." Party literature therefore stresses that West Germany's disengagement from NATO and the pursuit of a neutralist course is benign, and not a cunning tack to reunify Germany. With an eye to those in all parts of Europe who remain suspicious of a too-strong Germany, the Greens stress the link between unilateral disarmament and bloc decomposition on the one hand and the self-limitation of West Germany on the other. The Greens' willingness to renounce reunification and recognize the GDR without qualifications is in part intended to assuage foreign fears.

Ironically, the Greens' democratic, demilitarized, and bloc-less "new European order of peace" accords closely with the Europe envisioned by the West German government, along with its NATO allies, as the proper foundation for Germany's reunification. This vision found expression in the "Letter on German Unity" that Bonn published in the early 1970s, wherein it pledged to continue its policy of "working toward a condition of peace in Europe in which the German people in free self-determination can regain its unity."[13]

Alliance with the Social Democrats?

As the party's electoral strength increased, a debate developed regarding the Greens' role in West German politics. Should the party participate in coalitions at the state and federal levels by making the necessary programmatic compromises, or should it maintain a pure stance and remain on the sidelines as a moral watchdog, waiting until the other major parties come around to Green ideas? This basic issue divides the realists ("Realos") from the fundamentalists ("Fundis"). Considering the party's lack of an authority figure and its philosophy of *Basisdemokratie*, the issue is not likely to be resolved soon.

With the exception of the Hamburg elections in May 1987, in which the Greens lost one-third of their support, electoral successes during the past year at both the state and federal levels have assured the party that its themes will remain important into the 1990s. Wishful prophecies about the Greens' rapid disappearance, such as were expressed in years past by leading figures of the established parties, are heard no more. Just after the January 1987 Bundestag results were in, CDU party theoretician Warnfried Dettling commented that "Green feelings are more widely spread today than the Green electoral percentage indicates — they reach deep into the center of the middle-class majority."[14] The Greens have outgrown their early identification with youth and restless students, becoming a party in the

[13] *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik*, published by Federal Minister for Intra-German Affairs (1973), Volume 11, p. 387.

[14] *Der Spiegel*, February 2, 1987, p. 19.

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mainstream of West German political life. Voting surveys indicate that they draw particular strength from white-collar workers, women, and government employees.

Despite these gains, the Greens are still a second-echelon party with little prospect of achieving the first-echelon stature of the CDU or the SPD. Their strength derives largely from public concern about the environment and nuclear weaponry. Whether this voting support indicates endorsement of specific solutions proposed by the Greens, however, is debatable. There is little evidence of a groundswell in West German society for the entire Green program and its radical transformation of the Federal Republic. For West German voters, the Greens remain primarily a party of protest; voting Green may represent a general protest, support for one or more specific items in the Green agenda, or simply an act of independence as refreshing as the party's name.

Without a realistic chance of achieving first-echelon stature, the Greens could come to power in Bonn only as the junior partner in a governing coalition. At the federal level, the one conceivable coalition partner is the SPD, though the parties differ on many key issues. The subject of an alliance came up before the 1987 elections, although mostly in the form of polemics hurled back and forth about how it could not possibly happen. Karsten Voigt, a member of the SPD's party directorate, declared in the wake of the Greens' party conference:

> The Social Democrats cannot really be interested in a detailed examination of the Greens' capacity for compromise at the federal level until the Greens give up their "no" to a security policy based also on military strength, their rejection of disarmament negotiations, their fixation with unilateral disarmament, and their demand that we quit NATO.

The Green parliamentarians in Bonn responded decisively: "Mr. Voigt, ladies and gentlemen of the Social Democratic Party, you can wait a long time for that!"[15] These harsh words reflect the gulf separating the parties on many basic issues.

Greens and Social Democrats are both engaged in intense intraparty debates about future political directions. Fundis and the more rightward-leaning Social Democrats oppose a coalition between the parties. In contrast, Realos in the Bundestag, led by Otto Schily, and the leftist wing of the SPD, most prominent among them the young minister-president of the Saarland, Oskar Lafontaine, seek grounds for cooperation. The basis for a future "red-green alliance" may already exist.

Events since the January 1987 elections have shown that the hurdles standing in the way of an alliance are formidable. The initial dialogue between party leaders, often in the form of rancorous ex-

[15] Both quotes are from *SPD-Verteidigungspolitik*, p. 74.

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changes in the press, failed to narrow the gap. This impasse was caused in large part by the strength of the Fundis, who won a predominant role in the party after the elections and, perhaps interpreting the favorable returns as a mandate for radical action, held a hard, unbending line toward the SPD. But Green intransigence undermined coalition negotiations with the SPD in Hamburg, necessitating new state elections in May 1987 in which the Greens suffered a precipitous drop of one-third of their electoral support. This defeat may signal a limit to public patience with the party's tactics. Whether the Realos can capitalize on this setback by wresting control of the party from the Fundis remains to be seen.

The Greens have reminded the Federal Republic's NATO partners that West Germany's position is more precarious than theirs.

Cooperation with the SPD, of course, would mean compromise for the Greens. Utopian visions of "a new European order of peace," would have to give way to more traditional assessments of West Germany's security interests. On the German question, however, the parties' positions are not so far apart; some Social Democrats have echoed the Greens' call for the recognition of East Germany.

This points to the fact that whether or not the Greens build coalitions with the SPD, their ideas have affected the political landscape of Europe. The Greens have reminded the Federal Republic's NATO partners that West Germany's position is more precarious than theirs. The Greens have offered provocative ideas on the issue of overcoming the tragedy of Europe's postwar division.

Implications for the United States

The Greens' political program is exceedingly difficult to reconcile with U.S. interests in Europe. The party's forceful opposition to the American military presence in West Germany and to the Federal Republic's membership in NATO is an attack on the foundations of the Atlantic Alliance. Washington has had no cause for undue anxiety about the Greens' electoral successes until now. The Green agenda is exceedingly broad, and there are few indications that the party's security policy has been a primary source of electoral support. Rather, West German voters have over the decades continually supported close political and military cooperation with the United States. And even in the face of wrenching questions on nuclear arms and strategy, West Germany's commitment to NATO and a strong military defense has retained electorally popular. Further, it should be remembered that for all their unconventional behavior,

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the Greens have operated democratically. They are, indeed, an expression of the freedoms the Atlantic Alliance was built to defend.

It would be counterproductive for the U.S. government to confront the Greens, for overt U.S. hostility would give an impression of interference in internal German affairs and garner sympathy for the Greens. Issues raised by the Greens can only be settled by Germans. Rather than be regarded as a hostile force by U.S. policy makers, the Greens should be recognized as a legitimate vent for frustrations that inevitably arise in a divided land with a frontline location and massive concentration of military forces.

At the same time, Americans would be ill-advised to dismiss the Greens as inconsequential. They articulate real concerns that Bonn defers too much to the United States and that the Federal Republic is not master of its own destiny.

The Greens' challenge to the FRG's role in postwar Europe could assume great importance for German relations with NATO and the United States. The United States must not ignore the concerns they raise, as well as the fact that German perceptions have great importance in the two countries' relations. The rise of the Greens should serve as a reminder to the United States and other NATO countries that a voluntary association of free peoples can endure only so long as the common enterprise continues to serve each state's perceived self-interest.

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HANOI REPORT

by John H. Esterline

Getting There

Hang Khong Vietnam, the flag carrier of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), makes one weekly trip from Bangkok to Hanoi. I took this flight on March 13, 1987.

Unlike the other foreign airlines in Bangkok's airport, the Vietnamese company operates out of the domestic terminal. When I arrived, the large building was empty except for a long double queue of men standing in front of a single ticket agent. These 150 Vietnamese workers, all clad in heavy woolen, ill-fitting suits and fedoras, had at their feet large multi-shaped boxes and packages. I learned that the workers were returning home from Iraq where their government sent them to earn desperately needed hard currency. A similar number are aboard each weekly flight to and from Hanoi. As part of their remuneration for laboring abroad they are permitted to bring home as many consumer items as they can carry. In fact, many of the electric toasters, hair dryers, food mixers, radios, television sets, refrigerators, and other assorted household appliances accompanied us in the aircraft cabin.

After ticket and departure formalities were concluded I was ushered into a waiting room, and sat next to one of the few Caucasians, a middle-aged woman surrounded by cartons of cigarettes in plastic shopping bags. She turned out to be on the staff of the Finnish embassy and on a courier run to Thailand. She was visibly startled when I identified myself as American. "You must realize that accommodations and facilities are extremely limited. Have you made hotel reservations? Will someone meet you? Do you know that there are no taxis or airport buses?" She also told me that because the currency is almost valueless, the preferred way to reward people who help you is by giving them cigarettes. Unaware of this, I had brought a supply of Thai silk scarfs and neckties. I also carried a two-litre plastic bottle of water purchased in a Bangkok supermarket, water purification tablets, and a half bottle of Scotch whisky.

An hour and a half after its scheduled arrival, the plane with a SRV logo pulled to the gate and a full planeload of workers got off. Then the engines shut down, the crew debarked, and the aircraft sat empty on the scorching tarmac. It was an hour before the departure

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of the flight to Hanoi was finally announced. At that time the Westerners were separated, put into a small passenger van, and driven to the plane, where the temperature was over 100° Fahrenheit and rising.

Although a familiar Boeing 707, the plane looked different; most striking was the almost complete absence of leg room between seats. An Englishman, sitting by an emergency exit with extra leg room, motioned me to go to one of the other sets of better seats. I hurried to it only to have the seat collapse, leaving me in a quarter-prone position. From there, I noted a Pan Am logo etched on the metal buckle of my safety belt; and the emergency information on the scarred and soiled wall was written in Afrikaans. The plane was in at least its third incarnation.

The cabin temperature soared as the Vietnamese workers filled the plane. They loaded the overhead racks, which lacked pull-down covers, with radios, television sets, and small refrigerators. Packages that did not fit into the racks sat on their owners' laps. Then the crew finally arrived; and, as we prepared to take off, I felt reassured that I had left my will at home in clear view on the dining room table.

In fact, the flight went smoothly. Midway through the trip an attendant distributed small glasses of Vietnamese beer and an unrecognizable snack — almost a parody of normal airline service. The deficiency of the aircraft and the service points up the poverty of Vietnam. On the plane — as elsewhere during the next week — the Vietnamese tried to provide amenities they did not possess.

This ride culminated a nine-month effort to visit the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. I began to explore the possibility of visiting Hanoi in May 1986 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finally authorized my visit in March 1987. Actually, this was an ideal moment to observe the impact of the leadership and policy changes that had taken place from mid-1986.

On arrival, I left the aircraft and entered an ancient bus which rumbled us to a nearby building for some very intensive immigration and customs procedures. Jammed into a small room, I was required to fill out innumerable forms printed on what appeared to be tissue paper. The customs inspection included a uniformed female officer insisting I remove and count my dollars in her presence.

Having made it to the baggage claim area, I recalled the Finnish woman's warning about the importance of being met at the airport. Before I could worry too much, an attractive woman in her late twenties and her companion, a young man of similar age, detached themselves from the crowd jammed into the littered baggage area and greeted me. She was Bith Ngoc, an officer from the International Relations Institute (a section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), my

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escort and the coordinator of my visit; he was also from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, apparently in a more senior position.

Bith Ngoc told me that she is not a member of the Communist party, although her father was a former mayor of Hanoi and thus (almost certainly) a prominent party member. She was vague about the matter, so the loquacious young man from the Foreign Ministry, a party member himself, suggested factors that deter a person from joining the party. An applicant undergoes an orientation and a trial period. Then, once fully accepted, he incurs a great number of obligations — participation in party functions, committee responsibilities, self-criticism, and a total invasion of privacy. "For example, cheating on one's spouse would invariably be reported and become the subject of a self-criticism exercise," he commented.

My two escorts took me to a black Russian sedan, complete with driver and rear window curtains — the hallmarks of an official automobile in communist countries. Bith Ngoc produced for me the detailed week-long program her Institute had prepared. I would spend each morning and afternoon with senior officials of major ministries. I was gratified by one item in particular: "Received by Foreign Minister (proposed)." Whether or not the session materialized, it meant I was taken seriously. Also, this would be an unusual opportunity, for a year earlier the foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach, had declined to receive a delegation of American congressmen.

Riding through the gathering dusk toward Hanoi, I saw river bottom paddy fields and small clusters of houses that reminded me of those in Taiwan and southern China. Occasional kerosene lanterns stood in doorways. A two-lane tarmac road, raised above the fields, dominated the flat landscape and was in some places lined with arching trees reminiscent of country roads in France or India. The rare motor vehicles used only their parking lights. It was dark by the end of my forty-five minute ride, so I found myself suddenly at my hotel in the center of the city. With few street lights and no lighted buildings, only the soft squish of passing bicycle tires indicated the presence of people.

The Thong Nhat Hotel is a huge colonial building in poor repair. The lobby is gray, and is made grayer still by cold and sparse fluorescent fixtures. I climbed three double flights of stairs to find my room. The sitting room featured stiff, brown, vinyl-covered furniture, enormous shuttered windows, and floor to ceiling flowered draperies. Its linoleum floors were clean but permanently stained. The bedroom boasted a small air conditioner and a double bed with rock-hard mountains and valleys; the mosquito netting was adjusted each evening by two young French-speaking men.

I deposited purification tablets into the carafe of water on the coffee table. Everyone who knew Vietnam — the Finnish woman at

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the airport, the Thai ambassador to Vietnam — had told me the same thing, "Don't drink the water without purifying it first."

At dinner the French-speaking maître d'hôtel in charge of the dim dining room was most gracious. A throwback to colonial days, he was out of place in the socialist republic. He seemed determined to make the most of the meager French and Vietnamese menu. Despite his best efforts, the food was barely edible; the omelette was gray, the bread thick and tasteless, and the meat course equally unappetizing. What saved the meal was a very good caramel custard for dessert.

I walked a block from my hotel to a department store. Its dim interior and worn concrete floors gave it the feel of a cavernous old warehouse. Merchandise amounted to no more than such items as shirts, cloth, bicycle tires, soap, a few cans of food, and some baked goods. At a nearby curio and art shop I saw several attractive paintings, but the prices struck me as too high. The proprietor whispered that she would accept dollars at a very special rate. The legal rate is 80 *dong* to the dollar and the black market rate is 600 to 1, but I could take no chances, being so dependent on the goodwill of my official hosts. I later passed a hard currency store that displayed an odd assortment of imported items such as liquor, pens, and cologne.

First Discussions

Bith Ngoc called for me the next morning with car and driver to take me for talks at her organization, the International Relations Institute. My first session was with the director, Pham Binh, a former diplomat who looks half-French. My program called for a session devoted to "Vietnamese Foreign Policy and the Regional Situation." The subject got us right to the issue of Hanoi's 1979 overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and its subsequent military occupation of the country. Among other problems, this has been a major stumbling block to achieving diplomatic recognition by the United States.

Binh categorically stated that one-third of the Vietnamese troops have been withdrawn and that the phased withdrawal of the remainder would be completed by the end of 1990. While Vietnam's neighbors and Western analysts estimate Vietnamese troop strength in 1987 in Cambodia to be 140,000, down from a peak of 180,000, they believe that many of those claimed to have been withdrawn are only being rotated. I had earlier heard in New York from Nguyen Dang Quang, first secretary of the Vietnamese Mission to the United Nations, that Vietnamese troops were being withdrawn in direct proportion to the capability of the Phnom Penh regime to defend itself against threats posed by the resistance movement based on the Thai-Cambodian border.

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Binh expanded on this thesis, stating that the question of how to organize a general election would be addressed following the achievement of phyisical security. At the same time he reiterated Vietnam's rejection of the 1986 proposal of the resistance movement, backed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for a power-sharing agreement between the resistance coalition and the Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin regime. He also asserted that Hanoi would intervene in Cambodia should a future security problem arise.

I heard some friendly sounds about relations with the United States. Although the Vietnamese authorities usually contend that the Cambodian problem is strictly a regional matter that involves only Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, Pham Binh indicated "a possible role for the superpowers."

This fits within a larger pattern. In 1978, Hanoi dropped the demand for war damage reparations and proposed the establishment of relations without conditions. With Vietnam's economy apparently near collapse, it hoped full relations with the United States would bring economic assistance. Hanoi sent other signals too: for example, it declined Soviet offers to assist in the search for offshore oil, and for some time refused to join COMECON (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), the Soviet-sponsored economic organization. Pham Binh told me that because Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, had prevented U.S. recognition of Vietnam, his government reacted by becoming the first East Asian state to join COMECON and by signing a 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.

At a subsequent seminar with professors and researchers of the International Relations Institute, I spoke and answered questions concerning U.S. perceptions of Southeast Asia and China. I talked in a bare conference room containing a long wooden table and overhead fans that created small gales. My comments were politely received by the Institute's scholars; they withheld direct criticism of the United States and were at no time antagonistic.

At an afternoon session with Nguyen Trung, head of the Economic Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was told, without elaboration, that Vietnam "is still exploited" by other nations. He may have been referring to Vietnam's role as a source of cheap labor for the Soviet bloc. Or he may have been referring to Soviet usurpation of Vietnam's industrial capacity. Factories in Vietnam produce cloth for the Soviet market from Soviet-supplied material and plastic products for Eastern Europe from chemicals supplied by East Germany. Production of these goods — as well as medicines, rugs, textiles, beer, and handicrafts — for export to the Soviet bloc effectively denies consumer goods to the Vietnamese.

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Parrying my question on the size of Vietnam's foreign debt, Trung only responded that "paying for it is the problem." He did acknowledge that the debt accrued in Cambodia alone amounts to U.S. $2 billion and that the Soviet Union is expected to provide Vietnam with eight billion rubles in grants and loans between 1986 and 1990. He confirmed that Vietnam receives direct economic assistance from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and India, while humanitarian aid comes from Sweden, France, Finland, and Australia. International organizations that operate within the country include the U.N. Industrial Organization, the U.N. Fund for Population Activities, and the Food and Agricultural Organization.

When I asked Trung about the meaning of the elusive phrase he and others in the government used, "socialist accounting and business," he replied that managers of state factories are to be held accountable to the state for their performance — mimicking the corporate manager's accountability in capitalist countries. But socialist accountability, he claimed, is tempered by the state's recognition of the "humanitarian aspect," the necessity of meeting social needs.

Encouraged by Trung's frankness, I raised the question of the government's policy of forced relocation to New Economic Zones. Beginning in 1975, some 2,000,000 persons have reportedly been relocated. Here I did not get very far. Trung claimed that only one million persons have been relocated to new land thus far, and that participation is optional. He connected this issue to unemployment, arguing that relocation is a means of accommodating a population surplus that results from Vietnam's annual birth rate of 2.9 percent.

Following these discussions, Bith Ngoc accompanied me to a hotel, the Thang Loi, on a lake in the suburbs. Our drive took us through narrow streets crowded with pedestrians and bicyclists and bursting with the bustle of thousands of small shops. Vegetable gardens appeared in every open space, and their produce was sold at tiny stalls or from carrying racks of bicycles. The trip impressed the country's poverty on me. Although not starvation-level poverty such as one finds in India, Hanoi's pervasive destitution does mean minimal nutrition for many.

The Thang Loi was constructed by Cubans for tourists — to date mostly East Europeans have turned up — and is drab and poorly maintained. It reflects the hybrid Havana-Miami architecture of the immediate post-World War II period: glass paneling throughout, two low wings of single rooms, and a flat roof lacking insulation. The rooms along the lake housed innumerable mosquitos, while the neglected, half-filled swimming pool collected a thick algae. Two souvenir shops in the lobby featured expensive but low-grade silver trinkets.

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After a hotel dinner of the usual omelette, bananas, caramel custard and bottled lemonade, Bith Ngoc took me to the "Workers' Club," a huge marble theater built as a showpiece by the Soviets. Simple but handsome, it seats about two thousand. The stage curtain is magnificent in rose and gold. Extremely attractive, young and energetic dancers treated the capacity audience of mostly youthful workers to ballet, jazz, rhumba, and cha-cha routines. The program was sophisticated, hardly a staid party-line production. The elegant costumes gave me pause, since the shops stock only the plainest cottons.

After the performance I went out to the vast apron-like approach to the theater and saw one car — my chauffer-driven limousine. The other two thousand spectators walked, for there were no taxis or nearby mass transportation.

I was surprised by the paucity of revolutionary motifs and the apparent absence of a personality cult. I saw just one depiction of Ho Chi Minh, a billboard over the State Bank. But few of his portraits, or those of the current leaders, adorned government offices. Roadside boards and banners bore quotations from Ho, but these appeared to be exhortations to work for the glory of the country, rather than paeans to him. Although I frequently passed Ho's tomb on drives through the city, my escorts never suggested a visit.

The Foreign Minister

The meeting with Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach did materialize. A few words of background: in addition to his authority in foreign affairs, Thach enjoys wide party and economic decision-making powers. The Sixth National Party Congress in December 1986 elevated him to the eighth position (of fourteen) in the Politburo; with the reorganization of the Council of Ministers in February 1987 he took on the additional post of a deputy prime minister (making him second of nine in the Council). He is now also a principal architect of economic policy, having recently been appointed to head a commission on economic relations with foreign states.

Thach is a gracious diplomat articulate in English (which he learned during his imprisonment by the French). He began with a statement: "We have been dreamers for ten years; now we must face reality." Vietnam's economic policies, he continued, "were devised to improve and equalize living standards, but the result is, instead, an equality of poverty. We have rewarded the lazy worker along with the productive one. In the future we must relate reward to effort, and the state cannot continue to sell imported products at one-tenth of their cost." He explained how rice sold by the government at one-fifth the cost of production is resold for a profit. Workers receive thirteen kilograms of rice per month at the subsidized rate

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of four to five dong per kilogram; rice bought on the free market costs forty to sixty *dong*.

The Sixth National Congress, Thach said, had adopted reforms to remedy these problems. For example, private businesses were selectively to receive permission to obtain bank loans, borrow foreign exchange, and set their own prices.

Regarding relations with the United States, Thach focused on the question of the some 1,800 American servicemen who remain missing or unaccounted for. He emphasized that Vietnam is exerting every effort to provide a full account of the missing demanded by the United States as a precondition to establishment of diplomatic relations. Thach added that the Foreign Ministry has been so preoccupied by the problem that he personally was criticized at the Sixth Congress on the grounds that Vietnam's war wounds are far greater than those of the United States. Thach insists that Vietnam's peasants are the only significant source of information regarding the location of remains, and they are pressing party leaders to find and remove land mines from their paddy fields before searching for bones.

(Some American officials have charged that the Vietnamese use the MIA issue as a ploy, releasing information about MIAs or remains when they perceive an advantage in doing so. The charge may have some validity, since the Vietnamese know the political pressures on the Reagan administration to achieve a full accounting.)

On Vietnam's military occupation of Cambodia, Thach reiterated Pham Binh's assurances that all Vietnamese troops would be withdrawn by the end of 1990. He also called on the three Indochinese states to meet to find a political solution on Cambodia. Vietnam imposes only two conditions: the Khmer Rouge must not participate as an organized political entity of the resistance movement, and the conference must not be held under U.N. auspices (because of its continued reluctance to accept the present Phnom Penh regime as the lawful government).

The next day I met an official who approached matters in a different manner. Le Xuan Dong is director of the Propaganda Committee of the Communist Party. In expounding the doctrinal decisions of the Fifth and Sixth Party congresses (1982 and 1986), he held that the only path to truth is strict adherence to the laws of scientific socialism and insisted the nation's economic problems stem from a hasty effort to industrialize from an inadequate economic base.

In our talk Dong emphasized economic dilemmas that have beset the state since the war ended in 1975. "After the war," he said, "we had almost no power, only 2,000,000 tons of petroleum for 60,000,000 people. That is why we still have bicycles instead of motor bikes. At present we have only one iron and steel complex with an annual capacity of 20,000 tons."

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Dong emphatically denied that recent changes in the leadership implied a reduction of state control. He explained the replacement of the previous party general secretary, Truong Chinh, by Nguyen Van Linh (whom the foreign press frequently characterizes as a reformer) and the extensive personnel changes within the Council of Ministers as merely managerial changes.

According to Dong, the most urgent economic priorities are to produce more grains and foodstuffs, more consumer goods, and more exports. He anticipated that an official plan, seven years in the making, would be announced soon. It would increase the pace of agricultural development and allot greater decision-making authority to factory managers. As has been the case elsewhere in the communist world, the effort is to apply Marxism-Leninism within a context of existing realities.

The director of international cooperation at the Ministry of Agriculture, a relaxed forty-year-old technocrat named La Xuan Dinh, then provided some revealing information about the difficulty in feeding 60,000,000 Vietnamese. The Ministry of Agriculture calculates a minimum requirement of 300 kilograms of food per capita annually, while 240 kilograms per capita are absolutely essential. The country produced approximately 18,500,000 tons of grain in 1986, or about 280 kilograms, including 16,100,000 tons of rice and 400,000 of maize. Shortage of protein remains a major dietary problem.

On the New Economic Zones, Dinh insisted, as had Nguyen Trung, that relocation has been voluntary, and that the true figure is probably about 1,500,000 (Trung had suggested a million). The program is designed to move people from the overcrowded cities (Ho Chi Minh City has a population of 4,000,000) and from the densely farmed deltas to the new zones in the highlands.

The only confrontational session of my visit took place on the morning of my departure with the director of the North American Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dang Nghiem Bai. He was highly critical of the United States and was the only offical I spoke with who was more interested in old hurts than in reconciliation. Unfortunately, he is the man with whom American officials usually deal.

Evaluation

I left Vietnam with the sense that the country's decision makers desperately seek hard currency capital assistance to avert further economic disaster and are dismayed over their isolation resulting from the Cambodian adventure. I was surprised at the depth of hatred of China repeatedly expressed by officials, and by equivocal remarks concerning the Soviet Union.

Issues separating the United States and Vietnam are real and entrenched, yet a desire for change exists in both countries. Reso-

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lution of the MIA issue is now sought with less rancor because it has been subsumed in a broader humanitarian agenda. Since I returned to the United States, Washington has agreed to help heal "the wounds of war" in Vietnam by permitting private efforts to supply orthopedic services and artifical limbs for Vietnamese amputees; Hanoi has agreed to resume an orderly departure program to permit numbers of Vietnamese to join relatives in the United States. Also, the Vietnamese government will permit emigration to the United States of some Amerasian children, a relaxation of the previous stance that the United States take all of them or none. Senator Mark O. Hatfield (Republican of Oregon) and Representative G. V. Montgomery (Democrat of Mississippi) have introduced identical resolutions calling for "the establishment of technical resolution offices in the capitals of both countries" to speed an acceptable MIA accounting, and to address other "unresolved humanitarian issues" such as the "health and safety of Indochinese refugees in the camps along the Thai-Kampuchean border." It seems that the time to talk has arrived.

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SOUTH ASIA: TOO LATE TO REMOVE THE BOMB?

by Richard N. Haass

South Asia has more importance than many American observers appreciate. This has less to do with the size of its populations or the volume of trade and investment, though these should not be overlooked, and more to do with the frightful danger that the region potentially poses. The war in Afghanistan and tensions between India and Pakistan are two well-known problems. The capability to produce nuclear weapons makes these issues of special concern; and the fact that four of the world's greatest military powers — the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and India — interact here further enhances the danger. Local conflict between India and Pakistan or India and China can escalate to the superpower level. Moreover, local conflict is frequent; in early 1987 alone, there was intermittent fighting between India and Pakistan on the Siachen glacier (by Kashmir) as well as near-crises along India's borders with Pakistan (late January/early February), and along its border with China in May. In short, both the high stakes and the potential for conflict justify a close look at the South Asian policy of the United States.

Background

American interests in South Asia were not vital during the three decades after 1945. The U.S. government had modest aims in the region: it sought to establish friendly ties with both India and Pakistan, it provided modest military and massive economic assistance to both countries, and it drew Pakistan (non-aligned India would have nothing to do with them) into a series of multilateral and bilateral security arrangements.

From the outset, however, U.S. policy was frustrated by Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Its sources were several: traditional religious and ethnic enmity between mostly Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan, the "divide and conquer" legacy of colonial rule and the hasty British departure that left little time for normal relations to develop, and disputes over territory. This last issue constituted the proximate cause of the 1965 war over the contested border region of Kashmir. In the wake of this war, Washington suspended military assistance to both countries, an ostensibly evenhanded gesture that in fact hurt Pakistan

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far more, given its almost total dependence upon Washington for materiel. This created new opportunities for other powers to gain influence — the Soviet Union in India, China in Pakistan — at the expense of the United States.

American policy toward South Asia changed dramatically soon after President Richard Nixon came to office in 1969. Nixon and his adviser Henry Kissinger recognized that the growing gap between Moscow and Peking provided the United States with the leverage to improve its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, its principal adversary. In an effort to develop relations with China, they perceived close Chinese-Pakistani ties as useful and encouraged Chinese influence in Pakistan as a balance to Soviet inroads in India. Thus, Pakistan became the preferred channel for developing U.S.-Chinese relations.

War broke out in South Asia in 1971, triggered by Pakistani repression in its eastern territories that led to a surge of refugees into India. The Indian army intervened against Pakistan, purportedly to end the refugee flow, but also to weaken Pakistan and establish Indian primacy on the subcontinent. This crisis demonstrated the inherent limitations of the Nixon administration's approach to South Asia. China was too weak to do more than protest. For its part, the United States, already over-extended in Indochina, could dispatch only a show of naval force after East Pakistan (soon to re-emerge as Bangladesh) had been detached from the rest of the country — too little too late to satisfy the Pakistanis, but enough to confirm American hostility for Indians.

The aftermath of the 1971 war saw the United States retreat from South Asia. Assistance remained modest. Arms sales to the region resumed with a one-time sale of arms to Pakistan in 1973 and the full lifting of the arms embargo to both countries in February 1975. American protests of India's 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion" were perfunctory. The U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean underwent a modest expansion. Most attention was focused elsewhere: the final throes of war in Vietnam, détente in Europe, volatile conditions in the Middle East, and the impact of the oil price hike.

President Jimmy Carter assumed office committed to halting the spread of nuclear weapons. For understandable reasons, South Asia was near the top of his concerns, what with India having tested a nuclear device and Pakistan seemingly capable of following suit. That both countries refused to sign the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or make all their nuclear facilities open to international inspection exacerbated matters. Pakistan acquired the capacity to enrich uranium far beyond levels needed to generate power, prompting the Carter administration to terminate security assistance. This had little effect; Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared his country's readiness to "eat grass" if necessary to catch up to India in

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the nuclear sphere. With Indian mistrust of policy remaining high, Washington's influence in the region reached its nadir in 1979.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Day 1979 forced a reassessment of U.S. policy. Coming as the invasion did on the heels of the disintegration of the U.S. position in Iran, Pakistan assumed a new strategic significance. Not only were Afghan refugees streaming across the border, but Afghan resistance groups were using Pakistan as their primary staging area. The Carter administration, however, continued to emphasize nuclear non-proliferation objectives; accordingly, its policy reassessment involved minor changes. Pakistan was offered only modest amounts of assistance and Pakistan's new leader, President Zia ul-Haq, dismissed the American offer as "peanuts," clearly suggesting that the United States had to offer much more to persuade him to provoke Moscow or rethink his nuclear weapons commitment. Nor was the possibility lost on Zia that a Republican successor to Jimmy Carter might come up with a more generous offer.

The Reagan Years

This is in fact what happened. Although the Reagan administration sought to deflect Pakistan's desire to acquire nuclear weapons, it believed that denying aid to gain access to all nuclear facilities would prove futile. Moreover, the administration argued that a strong security relationship with the United States would provide Pakistan with an alternative means of gaining security while the United States, as the principal source of conventional weaponry, would gain leverage in the process.

But leverage worked in both directions. The United States would incur great costs to its Afghanistan policy if it terminated aid to Pakistan. Put differently, nuclear non-proliferation competed with removing the Soviets from Afghanistan. And of the two, the latter was more important to the Reagan administration. It required that a strong, pro-Western Pakistani government stand up to Soviet intimidation and allow both refugees and the Afghan resistance to be based on its territory.

The Reagan administration, however, was reluctant to choose between its anti-Soviet and non-proliferation objectives, and sought to square the circle with a five-year, $3.2 billion aid program. The aid was designed to reassure Pakistani leaders, making them feel less need to turn to nuclear weapons and more able to stand up to the Soviet Union.[1] This policy met with considerable success, at least as regards the latter objective. Substantial U.S. assistance enabled Pak-

[1] For a summary of this approach, see Under Secretary of State Michael H. Armacost's speech before the Asia Society, Washington, D.C., April 29, 1987, Department of State, Current Policy No. 953.

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istan to undertake some much needed modernization of its army and air force. The aid muted some of the anti-American sentiments in the Pakistani military and throughout Pakistani society. Pakistan accepted millions of Afghan refugees and supported the Afghan resistance to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars of arms to Pakistan-based guerrillas. As a result, the Soviet Union was unable to pacify Afghanistan, nor could it depart the country and hope that a pro-Soviet government would remain in power. At the same time, it is clear that U.S. aid did not persuade Pakistan to reconsider its commitment to developing nuclear weapons; at most U.S. aid may have slowed Pakistani efforts.

Meanwhile, U.S.-Indian relations also improved. The administration offered advanced technology in 1985 that only the United States in some instances could provide (computers and jet engines in particular). An increase in U.S.-Indian trade and investment followed, as intended. An agreement in mid-1982 allowed France to supply uranium to India's U.S.-built Tarapur nuclear power plant, thereby removing a major irritant of the U.S.-Indian relationship.[2] High-level political contacts began, including several meetings between Ronald Reagan and the Gandhis, Indira and Rajiv. Caspar Weinberger, in October 1986, became the first U.S. secretary of defense to travel to India. Military sales resumed, and in 1986 the United States announced that India could purchase the GE 404 engine to power its planned light combat aircraft. Soviet attempts to improve relations with India's arch-rival China — a process that gained strength following Mikhail Gorbachev's assumption of power — provided the right backdrop to this effort.[3]

This progress notwithstanding, the ability of the United States to deal effectively with each of these bitter antagonists simultaneously ran up against sharp limits. The Indians resented the fact they were not eligible to receive the most advanced American technology, owing to understandable U.S. fears that it would end up in Soviet hands. For years the United States would not allow India access to the F-20 fighter technology. Until recently, the sale of a Cray supercomputer (purportedly sought by the Indian government to improve weather forecasts and thereby improve agricultural output) was on hold. The Indian authorities wanted nothing less than the state of the art, while the Defense Department wanted them to make do with a somewhat less capable but still formidable model. In October 1987, a deal was finally reached by which the United States would

[2] The United States would not agree to supply nuclear fuel unless India accepted safeguards on all its nuclear facilities, including the Tarapur plant. India refused to accept such "full scope" safeguards, so the United States arranged for France to step in. This allowed India to get its fuel and the United States to avoid compromising its policy in principle if not in spirit.

[3] On Mikhail Gorbachev's July 28, 1986, Vladivostok speech, see Richard Haass, "The 'Europeanization' of Moscow's Asia Policy," *SAIS Review*, Summer-Fall, 1987.

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provide the lesser model under tight safeguards. Computer capacity was never the real issue; the symbol, or more precisely the test, of American willingness to treat India as an independent, non-aligned state, assumed greater importance than the technical substance.

Indians resent U.S. military support for Pakistan even more. American explanations that the aid is provided in the context of Afghanistan and not the Indo-Pakistani rivalry carry little water in New Delhi; similar glosses in the past did not prevent U.S. arms from being used against Indian targets. At issue is Pakistan's request for a U.S. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). Pakistan wants the highly capable Boeing E-3A system to provide warning of Afghan fighter-bombers that attack guerrilla sanctuaries in Pakistan with increasing frequency. New Delhi argues that AWACS makes little military sense for this use, given (1) the great quantity of Afghan aerial activity near the border that could quickly overwhelm Pakistan's ability to scramble fighters in response to every possible attack and (2) the vulnerability of guerrilla staging sites to artillery attacks. Not without cause, the Indian leaders fear that Pakistan will one day turn the AWACS against them. The Reagan administration has rejected Pakistani requests for the E-3A; instead, it offered the somewhat less capable Grumman E-2C Hawkeye AWACS, an offer that was predictably received poorly in both Islamabad and New Delhi: it was seen in the former as too little, in the latter as too much.

Afghanistan and Indo-Pakistani Tensions

The issues that drive South Asian politics and hem in the United States are likely to remain problematic for some time. Of these, the most important are the war in Afghanistan and Indo-Pakistani tensions.

With regard to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is learning that countries are easier to invade than to leave. This is not to suggest the Soviets want to stay in Afghanistan; to the contrary, Mikhail Gorbachev has good reason to bring his troops out. The war is expensive to wage and unpopular at home (not to mention abroad), creating problems he can do without. Gorbachev's domestic reform agenda and his effort to spruce up the Soviet Union's international reputation require disengagement from Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Anatoly Dobrynin (head of the international department of the Communist Party's Central Committee) visited Kabul in January 1987 to explore the possibility of broadening the political base of the Afghan regime and to see about improving the performance of its troops. The Soviets also championed a cease-fire and national reconciliation proposal. And they continue to monitor closely the proximity talks in Geneva that seek a political formula for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

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But all proposals to end the Afghan conflict run aground on the issue of the pace of Soviet troop withdrawals. The Soviets want a slow withdrawal so that they can manipulate political developments; the Pakistanis and the Afghan resistance want a rapid pullout to deny the Soviets just that opportunity. The two sides also disagree on the nature of the regime that would rule Afghanistan after a Soviet withdrawal; Moscow seeks assurances that the Communist party will play a leading role in any future government. The resistance refuses to accept this.

Meanwhile, the Soviets have other troubles. Efforts to "Afghanize" the war are going badly, as government troops show poor discipline and capabilities. At the same time, the Afghan regime remains isolated abroad and unpopular with the bulk of its own people. The approximately 120,000 Soviet troops are unlikely to return home soon, for no pro-Soviet regime could survive for long without a sizable Red Army presence. Barring a major policy reversal in either Moscow or Islamabad, both the war and the negotiations are likely to drag on for some time.

Simultaneously, Indian concerns about Pakistan periodically heighten tensions between the two states. The most recent crisis occurred in early 1987, when a large Indian military exercise ("Operation Brass Tacks") in the border state of Rajasthan prompted a Pakistani mobilization. India may have sought to intimidate Pakistan for any number of reasons — to remind Islamabad of India's regional primacy, to persuade Pakistan to terminate alleged support for Sikh terrorists, or simply to provide a foreign distraction for domestic political purposes. What is certain, though, is how events nearly slipped out of control, and a fourth South Asian war (after those of independence, 1965 and 1971) was narrowly avoided by last minute diplomacy resulting in a mutual stand-down.

This recent confrontation highlights the need to find ways to avoid the breakdown of diplomacy and resort to force. Most effective — more so than traditional diplomatic efforts — would be the development of confidence-building measures. These would limit the size, number, and locale of military exercises, provide advance notification of exercises, and permit the exchange of observers. Demilitarized zones would also contribute to stability.

Useful as they are, however, such measures can only go so far. They do not address territorial differences, while arms reductions are probably out of the question, given that India sizes its forces not simply against Pakistan but also China. The atmosphere is poisoned by mutual fears about aid to and manipulation of internal tensions: alleged Pakistani aid to Sikh separatists in India, alleged Indian aid to Sindhi separatists in Pakistan. All of this ensures a continuation of the climate of mistrust and suspicion between the two states.

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The Nuclear Issue

Above all, though, it is the nuclear issue that looms largest over Indo-Pakistani relations and U.S. ties with each. Congress allowed the security assistance program for Pakistan to proceed only after waiving the Symington amendment, the provision that forbids aid to states that import enrichment materials for making nuclear bombs. Despite high hopes, the five-year $3.2 billion U.S. aid program that began in 1982 did not tempt Islamabad out of the nuclear business; to the contrary, the Pakistan government continues to seek technology to produce weapons-grade uranium and explosive devices.[4] Pakistan still refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and will not open its nuclear facilities to international inspection. A. Q. Khan, the head of Pakistan's Kahuta nuclear research facility, was quoted in March 1987 as saying that his country was indeed producing weapons grade uranium and possessed the bomb.[5] Although his statement was later denied, most experts believe that Pakistan does possess or is on the verge of developing a basic nuclear weapons capability.[6] The official Pakistani government position is that while it has the capability to enrich uranium above levels required for peaceful uses and build a bomb, it has not done so and has no intentions to.[7]

There is no public proof that Pakistan has crossed the nuclear threshold. In October 1986 the Reagan administration certified that Pakistan "does not possess a nuclear explosive" and that U.S. aid "significantly" reduces the risk it will acquire one.[8] The aid submission was accompanied by a request that Congress waive the Symington amendment for all six years of the proposed $4.02 billion assistance program scheduled to begin in fiscal year 1988. Congressional committees balked, agreeing in the end to only a two year waiver, after which time the issue would again be visited. Congress also added a provision that the waiver would be rescinded automatically should India accept international safeguards on its nuclear facilities. This manifestation of congressional concern gave substance to statements by the U.S. ambassador to Islamabad and other administration figures warning the Pakistani authorities that their nuclear ambitions jeopardized relations with the United States.

[4] See Rodney W. Jones, "Pakistan's Nuclear Options" in Hafeez Malik ed., *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 199-216.

[5] For a summary of this flurry of statements and reactions see "A Pakistan Bombshell," *Newsweek*, March 16, 1987, p. 45.

[6] So writes, for example, Leonard S. Spector in *Going Nuclear* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 101-24.

[7] Interview with Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq, *Time*, March 30, 1987, p. 42.

[8] This language is required by Public Law 99-83, which in August 1985 amended Section 620 E of the Foreign Assistance Act. Section 620 E is the waiver provision that allows aid to go to a country that acquires unsafeguarded enrichment or reprocessing facilities; such aid is otherwise precluded under Section 669 of the same Act.

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Subsequent developments threaten to undo this compromise. The July 10 arrest in Philadelphia of a Canadian citizen of Pakistani origin for seeking to purchase and export to Pakistan twenty-five tons of maraging steel (an alloy used for uranium enrichment processes) alienated key members of Congress. If authorized by the government of Pakistan, this export effort would trigger the Solarz Amendment prohibiting aid to countries that attempt illegally to export items from the United States that "contribute significantly" to making a nuclear explosive device.[9]

The administration's certification of Pakistan's nuclear status could be correct; Pakistan may not yet possess actual explosives. Indeed, U.S. policy has almost certainly persuaded Pakistan not be acquire or develop an overt nuclear capability. The United States aid program apparently forced Pakistani efforts to become more covert. Thus, Pakistan simulated rather than tested certain capabilities. Overall, American efforts may also have slowed the Pakistani effort by making key technologies unavailable and by persuading Pakistan to forgo certain activities that would jeopardize U.S. aid. But while more U.S. assistance sustains Pakistani helpfulness towards Afghanistan, it does not induce Islamabad to compromise significantly its nuclear ambitions. Long-standing fear of India coupled with doubts over the reliability of the United States have fostered a go-it-alone mentality in Pakistan. Nuclear weaponry appeals to many Pakistanis.

India has done nothing to terminate its own efforts to build full-fledged nuclear weapons. Pakistan's nuclear plans as well as its conventional buildup are part of the reason; mistrust of China is another part. India maintains power and research reactors, heavy water facilities, and plants for reprocessing spent fuel and producing plutonium. Many of these facilities lack IAEA or any international safeguards. India also boasts scientists and technicians capable of carrying out a modern space and missile program, opening up the possibility that at some point in the not too distant future India could marry its nuclear explosive capability to advanced delivery systems.

We are thus on the verge of entering a new era in South Asia, and this should have far-reaching consequences for the region and the world. South Asia could soon be home to two countries with nuclear weapons. Each might produce low-yield devices for delivery by manned aircraft. With time, as alternate delivery systems become available, the number and efficiency of the weapons should increase. Such a prospect is fraught with danger.

But it is not certain that the region is going in this direction, for each side is eyeing the other's nuclear installations. A 1985 agreement between Zia and Rajiv Gandhi not to attack one another's nuclear

[9] The Solarz amendment, named for its sponsor Congressman Stephen Solarz of New York, became law in August 1985 as part of the International Security and Development and Cooperation Act of 1985, P.L. 99-83.

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facilities was not signed, a victim of mutual suspicions and contrasting strategies. India seeks modest upgrading of cultural, trade, and consular ties to Pakistan but suspects the utility of grand non-aggression pacts. Pakistan desires the symbolic equality implicit in such pacts but fears that contacts and exchanges between the two countries would overwhelm it. More immediately, India or conceivably even Israel (which fears any Muslim country gaining the bomb) might choose to attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities. India in particular could carry out an attack using non-nuclear military capabilities, either air power or special operations. An attack along these lines could occur within an ongoing war or as an isolated action.

Were the two states to manage the transition to nuclear weaponry without major incident, there is no assurance that the resulting situation would prove stable. In part this danger is technical — a vulnerable nuclear force invites pre-emption. Although both India and Pakistan possess a number of advanced aircraft capable of traveling considerable range, and despite India's impressive strides in developing a space program, each country is far away from possessing a stable retaliatory capability. In part the issue is also political, in that leaders and populations of the two countries lack the experience and perhaps the proven capacity to cope responsibly with nuclear weapons. That both India and Pakistan have experienced difficulties sustaining domestic political stability and face separatist challenges raises additional doubts about their capacities to manage nuclear weapons.

Others take a more sanguine view of the prospect of proliferation in South Asia. They argue that the two countries possess the technical capacity for stable deterrence, and this should deter an attacker as it has in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. They also take issue with the notion that the leaders of India or Pakistan would act any less responsibly than their Soviet and American counterparts if they came to possess nuclear weapons.[10]

Though it is ultimately impossible to predict the impact of a transition to a world of regional nuclear capacity, this causes concern if only because it takes us into uncharted waters. It is impossible to be optimistic about the prospects that India and Pakistan can navigate safely and peaceably the transition from Indian conventional military superiority to mutual nuclear arsenals capable of deterrence. It must also be remembered that any nuclear conflict in South Asia would

[10] There is a rich literature on the likely impact of nuclear proliferation. An iconoclastic view that suggests proliferation might be stabilizing is Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). A recent expression of Pakistani sentiment along these lines is Musahid Hussain, "Why Pakistan Needs a Nuclear Option," *Washington Post*, July 29, 1987. For the more traditional perspective see Albert Wohlstetter, et. al., *The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy: Moving Towards Life in a Nuclear Armed Crowd?* (Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 1975); Lewis A. Dunn and Herman Kahn, *Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 1975-1995: Projections, Problems and Policy Options* (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, 1976), provides a valuable survey of issues relating to managing (rather than preventing) proliferation.

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bring not just devastation to the region but would raise the danger of a broader conflict involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.

The U.S. Dilemma

For the United States, these developments pose a true dilemma. The problem is not as simple as the need to choose between providing aid for Pakistan in order to sustain the Afghan policy or denying aid to give teeth to the non-proliferation policy — although this choice would be tough enough. The trouble is, American actions cannot solve either the Afghanistan or proliferation problem. Soviet withdrawal and peace in Afghanistan remain distant, while Pakistani leaders seem intent not to foreclose the nuclear option.

So long as Pakistan's bomb remains only potential or hidden, the United States government can finesse the problem. But should Pakistan test a nuclear device or some other evidence confirms its possession of a nuclear weapon, the United States government (with Congress probably taking the lead) may find itself forced to terminate or drastically reduce its aid. This would in turn reduce supplies to the Afghan resistance. Should the Pakistani government still be undemocratic, it would find few defenders at such a point. If Congress refuses to accept Pakistan's explanation of its role (or rather non-role) in attempts to circumvent U.S. non-proliferation law, this situation may be fast approaching.[11]

This looming dilemma raises a longer-term issue. Should the United States stop trying so hard to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons and instead try to prevent the use of such weapons by those who have acquired them? The answer is no. Gaining support for a policy of management would be extremely difficult; so difficult that no administration is likely to attempt it unless it has no other alternative. Nor is there any guarantee it would succeed. Given the uncertainties and risks, the United States government is right to try to prevent a nuclear South Asia. An active non-proliferation policy mixing technical denial and security assistance, with warnings that the latter cannot be sustained if Pakistan violates certain nuclear norms, is a must. The April 1987 agreement of the United States, Japan, and five European countries not to export large missiles (defined as ca-

[11] As of this writing, it appears that the Pakistan aid program will continue, although in a modified form. Pakistan is likely to receive $480 million in security assistance for FY88, $200 million less than that requested by the administration. Congress also appears willing to grant Pakistan a 2½-year waiver from sanctions under the various U.S. nuclear non-proliferation laws.

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pable of carrying a 1,100 pound warhead more than 190 miles) is a useful complement.[12]

Yet despite the best efforts of the United States and other advanced industrial countries, this policy may not prevail. For better or worse, India and Pakistan seem likely to provide a laboratory for a new phase of regional competition. What will make South Asia unique — and uniquely dangerous — is the nuclear dimension of the competition. No amount of American activism is likely to prevent the nuclearization of South Asia; indeed, to a significant extent it is already a fact. If and when it becomes an undeniable one, the United States may well want to shift directions and replace a policy of prevention with one of management. This would entail continuing to provide a non-nuclear security option, namely security assistance, once Pakistan had nuclear weapons. A Pakistan facing defeat with conventional weapons or resorting to nuclear arms — possessing only the option of "massive retaliation" reminiscent of NATO during the 1950s — should scare Washington. In such circumstances, the United States would want to work with both Pakistan and India to promote arms control and to enhance their command and control systems to lessen the likelihood of accidental war. It could even selectively enhance nuclear capabilities to strengthen retaliatory potential and, thus, reinforce mutual deterrence.

The acceptance of nuclear arms in South Asia would not necessarily signal states in other regions that they should follow the same path. The United States could manage proliferation in this region while pursuing non-proliferation in other regions. Indeed, Washington's de facto acceptance of Israel's nuclear weapons capability and continuing opposition to the nuclear ambitions of Libya and Iran implies that the United States long ago replaced a global nonproliferation policy with a regional one.

Being singled out for special treatment will not necessarily sit well with either Islamabad or New Delhi. Indeed, the attempt to fashion friendly and close relations with India and Pakistan — which parallels U.S. efforts to do the same with Israel and the Arabs or Greece and Turkey — has been a mainstay of U.S. policy since the late 1940s.[13] Such a policy of conflict management requires restraint; too much American diplomatic activism not only will meet with frustration but may actually retard a solution to the region's problems. It also would benefit from the implementation of confidence building measures that diminish the chances of conflict and make time for diplomatic efforts. And for the foreseeable future the policy neces-

[12] See John Cushman, Jr., "7 Nations Agree to Limit Export of Big Rocket," *New York Times*, April 17, 1987.

[13] For the application of this approach to other regime conflicts see Richard Haass, "Paying Less Attention to the Middle East," *Commentary*, August 1986; and "Managing NATO's Weakest Flank: the United States, Greece, and Turkey," ORBIS, Fall 1986.

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sitates the continuation of security assistance to Pakistan. In light of South Asia's nuclear future, the margin for error is small. We should consider ourselves fortunate in the extreme if we succeed.

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AN INF TREATY DISCREDITS ARMS CONTROL AND PROMOTES CONFLICT

by Bruce D. Berkowitz

A Euphoric Moment

Almost everyone was optimistic when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced in February 1987 that he was willing to negotiate a treaty limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) separately from an agreement on space-based weapons and strategic weapons. Limits on intermediate, strategic, and space-based weapons had been linked since 1985, when the Soviets returned to the Geneva arms talks. (They had walked out in 1983 in response to NATO's deployment of Pershing IIs.) Since the superpowers could not agree on limits for strategic or space-based weapons, the INF agreement was held hostage, though the two sides were not far apart on this issue. Gorbachev's concession broke the log jam.

The proposed agreement offered something to all sides. The White House gained some breathing space from the Iran/Contra arms affair, and was able to rebut reports of having become a lame duck. Arms control proponents believed the proposal would begin to salvage the Soviet-American negotiating process, which had been derailed at the Reykjavik summit. Even hard-line skeptics of arms control seemed pleased, for Gorbachev had essentially proposed a rehash of the "zero option" tabled by the United States five years earlier; the Soviet shift seemed to prove that tough bargaining and refusing to make concessions was indeed the way to approach arms control.

Once Gorbachev agreed to uncouple INF from strategic weapons, only a few minor issues seemed to stand in the way of an INF agreement. The main concerns of U.S. officials (as well as most analysts outside the government) were methods of verification and limits on short-range missiles, and the Soviets were willing to negotiate both.

Yet an INF agreement may not be the all-win, no-lose proposition it seems. It could leave the Soviet nuclear threat to NATO virtually unchanged. More important, after the initial euphoria of the treaty has faded into memory, the treaty may actually sharpen the tension between the two superpowers and may discredit arms control for

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the future. A simple fact, overlooked by many commentators, will make the treaty ineffective: The United States and the Soviet Union are no longer constrained by SALT and can substitute additional or upgraded strategic weapons for any intermediate-range forces they give up under an INF treaty.

The SALT limits on offensive strategic weapons broke down partly because of Soviet violations and, later, by explicit U.S. policies taken in response to these violations. The most notable Soviet infractions included building the large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk (violating the ABM Treaty) and testing the SS-25 and SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), violating SALT II, which limited each country to one new ICBM. In addition, there were other "possible" violations the Reagan administration cited, though these were supported by somewhat ambiguous evidence or could be justified under certain readings of the treaty.

In response, the Reagan administration announced in May 1986 that the United States would no longer adhere to the SALT II limits on strategic weapons. Two months later, the American delegation to the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) informed its Soviet counterpart that the United States would no longer discuss compliance issues concerning SALT II at their meetings. The following November the United States converted its 131st B-52 bomber to carry cruise missiles, exceeding SALT II's limits on multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).

Soviet Ways to Circumvent the Treaty

Once the United States explicitly discarded SALT II, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet authorities no longer consider themselves constrained by the treaty. This being the case, any INF treaty is meaningless. The Soviets could agree to INF limits, discard their SS-20s, and make up the difference with new strategic weapons at minimal cost. They can circumvent the ban on intermediate range forces in several ways.

First, the Soviet Union could evade the new treaty by deploying additional SS-25 intercontinental missiles. This should not be difficult because of the way the Soviet military develops its large solid-fuel ballistic missiles; historically, the Soviets have developed a single generic design having two derivatives: a three-stage intercontinental ballistic missile, and a two-stage intermediate range missile (IRBM). So, for example, in the 1960s the development of the SS-133 ICBM was accompanied by the SS-14 IRBM, and in the 1970s the development of the SS-16 ICBM was accompanied by the SS-20 IRBM. Today the Soviets are reported to be flight testing a yet-to-be-ob-

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served replacement for the SS-20. If the Soviets follow their earlier pattern, this new IRBM would be a two-stage sibling of the SS-25.[1].

The differences between the IRBM and ICBM version of each generation of Soviet solid-fuel missiles have been minimal — so slight, in fact, that Soviet solid-fuel IRBMs can be considered an ICBM with the first stage removed (or, depending on how one looks at it, Soviet ICBMs can be thought of as IRBMs with an extra stage added). For example, the SS-20 is an SS-16 with a third stage and a three-warhead post-boost vehicle replacing the single-warhead "bus" used by the ICBM.[2] The SS-16 is only about two meters longer than the SS-20 and is stored in a horizontal position, so the two missiles are even able to use the same mobile launcher and basing garage.

The SS-20 is now more than ten years old and represents late-1960s technology, so it would probably have been due for replacement in the next five or ten years even if the INF talks had not taken place; assuming the Soviets followed their previous pattern, they would now be planning a two-stage SS-25 sibling. If this is the case, then an INF ban requires only relatively minor changes in Soviet plans. Instead of replacing the SS-20s with a new IRBM, Moscow could replace them with additional SS-25 ICBMs, which are no longer limited. The Soviets have often assigned ICBMs to European and Asian targets, so this would not be a radical step.

It would also not cost much. The additional expense would mainly lie in the cost of the third stage that converts the SS-20 follow-on into an SS-25; logistics, training, and manning would be virtually unchanged. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has a single service responsible for both their intermediate and long-range missiles — the Strategic Rocket Forces. (In the United States, the air force operates long-range missiles such as the Minuteman, while the army operates the intermediate-range missiles such as the Pershing.) Changing personnel, target assignments, and logistics would, therefore, be a relatively simple undertaking.

Should the Soviets compensate for the lost SS-20s in this way, the INF treaty would have had a perverse effect. It would leave the number of warheads aimed at West European targets unchanged, and the United States would have agreed to remove its Pershings

[1] The SS-14 was deployed in only limited numbers, possibly because it failed to live up to expectations. Deployment of the SS-16 was prevented by SALT II in order to simplify U.S. verification of Soviet compliance. The Reagan administration accused the Soviets in 1985 of violating this ban by keeping some SS-16s operational at Plesetsk. The SS-16 also demonstrated less-than-satisfactory performance, and this may have contributed to the Soviets' willingness to accept the limitations on the missile in SALT II. Unless otherwise stated, all references to Soviet forces and weapons are based on the 1985, 1986, and 1987 editions of the Department of Defense publication *Soviet Military Power*.

[2] The post-boost vehicle (PBV), commonly called a bus, is the part of a ballistic missile that actually carries the warheads. Equipped with maneuvering rockets, the bus can change its attitude in the coasting portion of the missile's flight as it sequentially releases the warheads. This enables a single missile to be assigned several targets. The bus is what provides a missile a MIRV capability.

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and cruise missiles on condition that the Soviet Union agree to add an additional stage to its new IRBM!

Moscow could also circumvent the INF agreement by modifying its ICBMs to carry additional warheads, then assign these to the targets previously covered by SS-20s. For example, the Soviets could easily add one to two warheads to each SS-25. Up to now they have tested the SS-25 with only a single warhead, probably because of wanting to maintain the appearance of complying with SALT II, which permitted a flight test of only one new missile. (The Soviets declared that this new missile was the SS-24, and have tried to pass off the SS-25 as an update of their old SS-13, which carried only one warhead.)

With SALT II a dead issue, there is no reason for the Soviet Union to maintain this charade. Since the SS-20 uses a three-warhead bus, it seems likely that its follow-on would have been equipped with a MIRVed bus, too. If so, this bus could be easily adapted to the SS-25, converting it into a multiple-warhead missile. (The added weight of the warheads might reduce the range of the missile so that it could not be used against the United States, but this would not matter if the objective was to compensate for the banned SS-20; the key question would be whether it retained the range to avoid being classified as an IRBM under the INF treaty.) Indeed, the three-warhead bus may even already exist, in which case it could be deployed on SS-25s after just a few test flights.

In some cases, no modifications are even necessary for the Soviets to add warheads to their ICBMs in order to replace the SS-20 warheads eliminated by the INF treaty. Some Soviet missiles currently have space for additional warheads. That is why, for example, the U.S. government says the Soviet SS-18 carries "at least" ten warheads; it has the ability to carry at least two and perhaps as many as four additional warheads. (Some U.S. missiles, such as the Poseidon and Trident submarine-launched missiles, also have this capability.)

The SALT II treaty prohibited either side from flight testing ICBMs with more than ten warheads; now that SALT II has been discarded, the Soviets could test the SS-18 with additional warheads in order to prove the reliability of the system, and then fill the remaining spaces on the 318 SS-18s. The cost of doing this would be virtually nil — mainly the cost of the warheads themselves — and would, by itself, make up for many or most of the 1,275 SS-20 warheads the INF treaty eliminates. All of this would be perfectly legal under the INF treaty being negotiated.

Finally, the Soviets could evade the INF limits by deploying additional cruise missiles. The Soviets could not deploy their new SSC-X-4 (a missile similar to the American Tomahawk). But they could deploy additional air-launched cruise missiles, such as the AS-15,

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which is now in production and being deployed on Tu-95 and Bear-H and Blackjack bombers.

The Twisted Course of Arms Control

These trends in Soviet nuclear forces are well-known to analysts both within the U.S. intelligence community and outside the government. And it seems obvious that limits on shorter-range weapons make little sense if longer-range weapons are unrestricted. How, then, did we stumble into such an unhappy situation?

Much of the problem results from the twisted course of arms control negotiations since 1981, when President Reagan first proposed a plan to eliminate INF forces, the so-called zero option. According to this offer, NATO would cancel its plans to deploy Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles if the Soviets dismantled the SS-20s they had begun to deploy in 1977. The Geneva talks broke down in 1983 when the Soviets balked, and NATO proceeded to deploy the Pershings. The talks were resumed following the 1984 elections, when the Soviets and Americans agreed to fold together both strategic and intermediate forces into the same negotiations.

By that time, the Reagan administration had announced its Strategic Defense Initiative, so this system was also added to the talks. After that, the Soviets rejected any limit on INF forces that did not also ban "Star Wars" defensive weapons; this created the impasse at the Reykjavik summit in October 1986 which lasted until February 1987, when Gorbachev announced that the USSR would agree to separate limits on intermediate forces. Soviet political leaders deserve credit for crafting a beautifully elegant offer. The Soviet plan combines the essential elements of a proposal presented by the United States earlier, making it difficult to reject out of hand, plus the allure of a treaty that will "completely eliminate an entire class of weapons." Together, these ingredients are almost irresistible, especially when world opinion is considered.

The INF treaty might unintentionally spur the deployment of additional strategic nuclear forces, hurting the prospects for future arms control agreements.

The problem is that, when the United States proposed the "zero option," the SALT treaties were still in effect. (Soviet and American leaders had informally agreed to comply with the treaty, even though it had never been ratified by the U.S. Senate.) Now the SALT ceilings on strategic weapons are gone, so limits on intermediate-range weapons became meaningless.

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The Soviet Union also has an advantage in holding the political high ground on the issue of the breakdown of SALT, which is a key ingredient in the threat of circumvention now posed by the "zero option." Although the Soviet Union is at least as much to blame for this breakdown as the United States (and arguably more), the fact remains that it was the United States that explicitly abrogated SALT II, not the Soviet Union; Moscow has never admitted its violations of the agreement. If INF is problematical because SALT is no longer operative, the Soviets can shrug and claim they are not to blame.

Politics in the United States played a large part, too. Gorbachev offered to uncouple INF from other arms in late 1986 when the Reagan administration needed to regain political momentum. The administration had seen the Republican party lose control of the Senate; had suffered through the Reykjavik summit that brought the administration's prudence in international negotiations into question; had a credibility problem because of its insistence that the United States had not traded a spy for a journalist in the Nicholas Daniloff affair; had lost its chief of staff and national security adviser; and had been castigated by the Tower Commission for its conduct of the Iran arms initiative. The potential to move quickly on INF and regain momentum seemed to appear at just the right time.

Some of these developments were unavoidable. But the fact that the Soviet Union capitalized on them so effectively says much about the abilities of the new generation of Soviet leaders.

The Threat to Superpower Relations

By a strict standard of military security, the INF treaty is not a major disaster, even if the Soviets do attempt to circumvent the limits by deploying additional ICBMs or adding warheads to their existing missiles. The weapons eliminated by the INF treaty comprise only a small portion of the superpowers' nuclear forces (about 3 percent of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, 1 percent of the U.S. nuclear forces). In addition to its long-range nuclear forces, the United States will retain its short-range nuclear missiles and artillery in NATO. Also, aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons will remain, as will the British and French nuclear forces.

Rather, the main cost of the INF treaty will be strained Soviet-American relations and a discrediting of the arms control process as a whole. The skill of U.S. negotiators will be brought into question, which by itself will increase the burden on U.S. representatives in future negotiations and could compel the United States to take a tougher position with the Soviets than it might otherwise (or, for that matter, should take by any objective standard). This would be especially ironic, considering the current view of many analysts that

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the INF represents an arms control breakthrough and will facilitate future agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States.[3]

The only way to plug the loopholes in the proposed INF treaty is to develop new limits on strategic weapons. Unfortunately, when Gorbachev announced that the Soviets would consider a separate INF agreement, he specifically said that any new agreement on strategic weapons depended on the willingness of the United States to accept limits on SDI testing. (This part of Gorbachev's statement was largely overlooked by the American media.) This position has been reaffirmed by top Soviet officials several times since. The Reagan administration has steadfastly refused to accept such limits on space-based weapons, and an agreement that was both effective and verifiable would be difficult to negotiate in any case. This would suggest strategic offensive weapons will remain uncapped, and it will not be possible to close the opportunity for circumventing the INF agreement.

If the Soviets take any of the previously described measures to circumvent the INF limits, the United States would lack even a regular venue at which to protest, having barred discussion of SALT II at the SCC. Some observers, such as Gerard Smith, have argued that the United States should reinstate Salt II because of the opportunities its demise leaves the Soviets to augment their forces. Given the linkage Gorbachev has made between strategic limits and limits on SDI, it is unlikely that the Soviets would accept a U.S. re-affirmation of SALT II unless the United States also accepted the Soviet position on defensive weapons.

Moreover, opponents of arms control are bound to charge the Soviet Union with deception, generally poisoning superpower relations. If the Soviets circumvent the proposed INF accord by deploying additional SS-25 missiles, the United States might respond by adding to its strategic forces. For example, more B-52 bombers and Polaris submarines could be modernized or additional warheads put atop the Trident II missile. The INF treaty might unintentionally spur the deployment of additional strategic nuclear forces, hurting the prospects for future arms control agreements.

A preview of what we can expect occurred after SALT I, when the Soviets exploited ambiguities in the treaty to replace light SS-11 ICBMs with medium-sized SS-17s and SS-19s. During the SALT I negotiations, the United States proposed a cap on "heavy" ICBMs — specifically, the SS-9 and its successor, the SS-18 — and proposed prohibiting enlarging any existing missile silos by more than 15 percent. The Soviets accepted the limit on heavy ICBMs but rejected the limits on enlarging silos. (The United States put this provision

[3] As an example of current expectations, see David Aaron, "Verification: Will It Work?" *New York Times Magazine*, October 11, 1987.

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into a unilateral statement, but, of course, this had no binding authority.) Soon after SALT I was approved, the Soviets began to replace their SS-11 light ICBMs with SS-17 and SS-19 missiles. The new missiles were significantly larger than the SS-11 (though smaller than the SS-18)) and carried MIRVs. Since the United States government hoped SALT I would limit Soviet missile warheads and the threat they posed to U.S. forces, the deployment of the SS-17 and SS-19 generated considerable controversy. Some U.S. analysts accused the Soviets of deceiving the United States; others blamed the Soviets for stretching the language of the treaty beyond any reasonable interpretation.

In truth, these Soviet actions followed the strict rule of the treaty and could have been anticipated, given that the United States had tried and failed to obtain Soviet acceptance of limits on silo enlargements. Nevertheless, this "deception" became a bloody shirt for opponents of arms control after SALT I. This greatly complicated later negotiations of SALT II, contributing, for example, to U.S. demands for the Soviets to accept throw-weight reductions, ongoing congressional oversight of the negotiations, and demands for strict equality in future limits.

The results of Soviet circumvention of the INF limits will be similar. Indeed, the damage could be even greater because of the considerable political capital the United States had to spend to gain European (and especially West German) acceptance of the elimination of intermediate range weapons. Thus, the INF treaty of 1987 that revives the Reagan administration and promotes détente in 1988 could well be the cause of the superpower confrontation of 1989.

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Politics and the Ethiopian Famine, 1984-1985. Jason W. Clay and Bonnie K. Holcomb.

WORLD POLITICS
by Adam M. Garfinkle

Democracy, Strategy, and Vietnam: Implications for American Policymaking. Edited by George K. Osborn, Asa A. Clark IV, Daniel J. Kaufman, and Douglas E. Lute. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1987. 369 pp. $42.00 ($16.95, paper). Four faculty members at West Point have collected seventeen essays discussing the impact of the Vietnam War on U.S. foreign policy. The least coherent section, "Vietnam in

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the Context of U.S. Security Policy," contains musings passing as essays. "Did Vietnam Make a Difference? Policymaking" looks at the Congress, the press, the intelligence community, higher education, the U.S. Army, and the Executive Office of the President. All the authors seem to answer their question in roughly the same way: "Maybe, but it's too soon to say."

The section, "Did Vietnam Make a Difference? The Use of Force," offers a more lively debate. Andrew Krepinevich, William P. Bundy, William Kaufmann, William J. Taylor, Jr., and David Petraeus square off and disagree interestingly with each other. At the end, however, one reaches the melancholy conclusion that if the army had it to do all over again, it would proceed in more or less the same way, leading to the same result. "The Consequences of Vietnam for U.S. Foreign Policy" is given over to senior figures to reach broad conclusions. Robert Osgood, John Mueller, and Robert Komer offer individually worthy essays, but they do not fit together. Finally, the editors attempt a verdict. Notwithstanding the caution of most of their authors, they pronounce unhesitatingly. "Did Vietnam make a difference? No! . . . . Vietnam was not a great event; the U.S. national security system is not fundamentally different after and because of the Vietnam experience" (p. 322). After all, the editors reason: containment remains American policy, the U.S. political culture still exists, and the U.S. political system is intact. Therefore, things like the War Powers Act, the adversarial press, the gutting of the intelligence community, and the radicalization of an entire generation of Americans, are mere "microchanges." Perhaps this is why the editors saw no reason for chapters on the antiwar movement, the evolution of the Democratic party, or the broader dimensions of American political culture. Can it be that by trying to catch the reader's eye with the unexpected, the editors have stumbled into serious error?

Halford Mackinder: A Biography. By Brian W. Blouet. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1987. 235 pp. $21.50. Blouet, lifelong scholar of the great British geographer Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), here sums up his research. What really brought Mackinder acclaim as a foremost geographer was the Heartland Thesis in which he predicted the decline of Britain as a great power and the ascendancy of Russia, resulting from its control over the Eurasian "Pivot Area." This would provide Russia with "vast continental resources for fleet building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight. This might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia." Mackinder never ceased warning through the three variants on the Eurasian Heartland thesis (1904, 1919, 1943) that Russia and Germany must be kept apart. His ideas had a greater impact outside Britain, especially in Germany, both prior to and after Hitler's seizure

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of power (e.g., on Karl Haushofer) and on the American geopolitical school (Nicholas Spykman, Robert Strausz-Hupé). Through the Americans, he contributed in important ways to the formulation of the U.S. strategy on containment.

Though particularly rich in biographical details, many presented here for the first time, the volume pays relatively little attention to Mackinder's ideas. With a graceful pen, Blouet covers most of the lacunae in Mackinder's career as a politician, teacher, and propagator of geography in English universities.

— Milan L. Hauner

The Harper Atlas of World History. Edited by Pierre Vidal-Naquet. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. 340 pp. $29.95. It is hard not to be delighted by the arrival of a lavish atlas that covers the whole of world history. The pictures are bound to be compelling, the maps fascinating, and no matter how much you know, you are sure to learn something new on almost every page. This said, it is hard to feel special enthusiasm for *The Harper Atlas*. For one, its coverage of the non-Western world is too nominal to justify the term "world history." For another, despite a few later additions, the account really ends in 1974 — why else does the last map deal with "The World Economy in Continuing Crisis," a topic many years out of date? The maps are stingy and routine, and they lack the striking graphics and novel concepts an ambitious atlas should provide. Other complaints include an abundance of minor errors, the strong biases of the original French text, and the inexplicable absence of a table of contents. Though much more expensive, the stunning maps, lucid texts, and bold presentation of the superb *Times Atlas of World History*, edited by Geoffrey Barraclough (Hammond, 1979), make it still the history atlas of choice.

— D.P.

If I Had a Hammer .... The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left. By Maurice Isserman. New York: Basic Books, 1987. 288 pp. $18.95. Conventional wisdom holds, unpersuasively, that the New Left of the 1960s had no ancestry in the Old Left. But immaculate conceptions do not exist in politics; Isserman shows that the New Left was no exception. By investigating the collapse of the American Communist party in the 1950s and learning what became of its members and sympathizers during the next decade, he traces the origins of the New Left. Thanks to Isserman's study, we now see why, in a mere six years, SDS changed from an idealistic, anti-centralist, somewhat anti-communist movement to a Marxist-Leninist organization, seething with violence and tempted by vanguardism.

That is not Isserman's main intent or interest, however. He himself wants to debunk the notion that Sixties radicals were all

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bourgeois, pathological misfits who hated their wealthy parents. And he particularly wants to understand the genesis of radical mass movements, for this former SDSer is no conservative, and he looks forward to the next round of radicalism. No matter. *If I Had a Hammer . . .* adds much to the growing literature on the origins and nature of the New Left. Its intellectual sophistication and scholarship far surpass James Miller's *"Democracy is in the Streets" From Port Huron to the Seige of Chicago* (reviewed, Fall 1987).

Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations From Nixon to Reagan. By William G. Hyland. New York: Random House, 1987. 271 pp. $19.95. Having served as a close aide to Henry Kissinger (both on the National Security Council staff and at the State Department), Hyland has interesting things to say about détente. He praises the opening to China, the attention to tensions in NATO, and the attempt to restrain the rising power of the Soviet Union at a time of declining U.S. power. He seldom criticizes Kissinger — not even taking him to task for the flaws in the drawn-out disengagement from Vietnam and the resulting erosion of public support for the Nixon administration.

Hyland's memoir adds much of value toward an understanding of the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process during 1969-1977. Particularly interesting is the assessment of the debate over SALT and the proposed anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. Like so many other participants in the making of U.S. foreign policy, Hyland castigates the incessant, often disruptive intrusion of domestic politics on relations with Moscow. For him, the villain was Senator Henry Jackson, whose opposition to most-favored treatment for the Soviet Union soured Brezhnev on détente and helped dispose him in 1975 toward intervention in Angola.

The author also applies his shrewd understanding to the Soviet challenge of the future. Though convinced that the danger of nuclear war has sharply diminished, he is far from optimistic about the future of U.S.-Soviet relations, seeing a continuing confllict of interests. Hyland also doubts that Gorbachev will overcome the opposition to his plans for change and fears that "the temptation to try foreign adventures to compensate for internal failures may prove irresistible, as it did for Khrushchev in the Cuban missile crisis."

— Alvin Z. Rubinstein

The Origins of Alliances. By Stephen M. Walt. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987. 321 pp. $32.50. Why do states form alliances? Is the stronger motive "bandwagoning," the desire to join a large state whose power is waxing? Or is it "balancing," an effort to establish counterpoises to such waxing powers? Walt holds the second point of view, and shows how the contemporary literature on international relations has neglected balancing. To illustrate his thesis,

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and to find out when and why one pattern predominates over another, Walt studies alliance behavior in the Middle East between 1955 and 1979. Depending, perhaps too confidently, on the standard literature in the field, he extracts thirty-six alliance commitments and eighty-six "national decisions." Not surprisingly, Walt confirms his main contention.

The Origins of Alliances is probably better than most studies of this sort, but it has its share of methodological, historiographic, and political problems. Methodologically, Walt has chosen to study a simple dichotomy, but this forces him to minimize the possible significance of other factors — cultural, economic, ethnographic, personal. Historiographically, his complaint against the modern literature is well founded, but older studies of alliances have made his point, from Machiavelli to Harold Nicolson. So the thesis itself is not so very novel, although nothing is lost by illustrating it anew with recent data.

Finally, a homeostatic metaphor suffuses the book, implying a mechanistic optimism that alliances will always arise, sooner or later, to balance rising powers and that human beings (policy makers) are merely passive instruments of this inexorable logic. The author would surely fight this interpretation, but it inheres in his method and thesis. Politically, this implies that we need not worry too much about the Soviet Union for, by its aggressive behavior, it is even now producing its own antithesis. This is not much consolation if "sooner or later" is measured by centuries.

Political Frontiers and Boundaries. By J.R.V. Prescott. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987. 315 pp. $39.95. Americans tend to associate geography with the glossy pictures and cheerful prose of the *National Geographic*, and ignore the benefits that derive from this looking at the world through its lens. In fact, the geographical study of international relations offers an important way of approaching issues, one no less useful than the historical, the economic, or the political.

Looking around the globe, Prescott observes that Europe has the distinction of being the only continent where boundary evolution was an entirely indigenous process. Latin America stands out by virtue of its frequent recourse to arbitration. The author disputes the conventional view that "the scramble for Africa" ignored the Africans themselves, asserting that there is "plenty of evidence to show that boundaries were drawn to preserve existing indigenous social and political units." He divides the Middle East into two regions, the northern (Turkey and Iran), where the local powers drew their own boundaries; and the southern (the remaining thirteen states of South West Asia), where Britain and France had preponderant roles. Recalling Lord Curzon's dictum that "frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war and peace,"

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Prescott points to the many times when land disputes have led to war and the suprising fact that differences over maritime boundaries have never caused hostilities.

— D.P.

Political Handbook of the World: 1987. Edited by Arthur S. Banks et al. Binghamton, N.Y.: CSA Publications, 1987. 850 pp. $84.95. Although this is the fifteenth edition of a reference work that has come out irregularly since 1927 under a variety of titles and sponsors, it appears to be taking shape as an annual publication. If so, it is to be welcomed, for the *Handbook* provides timely and comprehensive data on governments, political parties, legislatures, cabinets, and the media.

Of course, a massive compilation of this sort must contain its errors and uncertainties. The Palestine Liberation Organization receives an entry of its own, as though it were a government — indeed, its listing exceeds in length that, for example, of East Germany. Despite the claim to having made "particular effort" to standardize the transliteration from Arabic, howlers abound. But errors are relatively few and the *Handbook* stands out as the best of its kind.

— D.P.

Les Relations Internationales à L'Age Nucléaire. By Jacques Vernant. Paris: Editions la Decouverte, 1987. 335 pp. FF 90. Vernant, an important figure in French defense and foreign-policy thinking for many years, served as secretary general of the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère from 1945 to 1978. He provided a window on the outside world for the French intelligentsia from the vantage point of a monthly article in *Défense Nationale*. This collection of his essays (compiled by Janet Finkelstein, an American specialist living in Paris) most usefully reveals the evolution of Gaullist thinking on defense policy. That subject offers insights into the French concern to maintain their autonomy, as well as their thoughts on the meaning of autonomy in the nuclear age.

— Robbin Laird

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
by Patrick Clawson

Beyond Our Means. By Alfred Malabre, Jr. New York: Random House, 1987. 166 pp. $17.95. Malabre, economics editor and columnist for

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the *Wall Street Journal*, provides anecdotes instead of analysis in a book that could have been important. For example, as evidence that Americans are no longer working as hard, Malabre writes that Friday afternoon summer rush hours leaving Manhattan to the Long Island shore now begin around 2:00 p.m., whereas in the 1950s they started only about 4:00. The theme is captured in the subtitle: "How America's long years of debt, deficits, and reckless borrowing now threaten to overwhelm us." Malabre never presents any serious argument why the increase in debt (corporate, personal, and federal) presents a problem. After all, the debt financed some important benefits, including greater acquisition of assets and higher levels of consumption. Malabre presents three scenarios for dramatic resolution of the debt buildup: rapid inflation, sharp deflation, and increased government regulation of the economy. His description of the pressures for and the consequences of each is well done, if somewhat overdramatic. One is left hoping for a muddle-through compromise of the sort that the American political system is so adept at.

Dollar, Debts, and Deficits. By Rudiger Dornbusch. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987. 231 pp. $20.00. Dornbusch, a highly respected academic economist, presents in a lively style policy advice that is both politically realistic and economically sound. With the exception of two essays, on the high value of the U.S. dollar, those with even a smattering of economics can follow the arguments. In another piece on this subject, "The Overvalued Dollar" (adapted from testimony to the Senate Finance Committee), Dornbusch forcefully presents a weak argument, namely, that the dollar's strength in 1981-85 owed little to financial speculation or to foreigners seeking a "safe haven." Rather, he says, the dollar was boosted solely by economic fundamentals — the gap between U.S. policy (which raised interest rates while increasing the government deficit) and German and Japanese policy (which lowered interest rates while reducing the government deficit). The three most interesting of the essays gathered here deal with Latin American debt. In "Overborrowing: Three Case Studies," Dornbusch shows that the debt crisis has specific origins in each country, as well as more general causes: in Argentina, capital flight; in Brazil, government financing of public investment; in Chile, an overvalued currency that stimulated excessive consumption of imports. The collection closes with two articles on budget deficits, including a critique of "Mrs. Thatcher's financial squeeze" for paying too high a price in unemployment for gains in financial stability.

Foreign Aid Reconsidered. By Roger Riddell. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. 301 pp. $35.00. A strong argument in favor of foreign aid by an author who emphasizes the moral case and does not consider such concerns as national security. Riddell argues

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that aid need not be either sufficient or necessary for development to be morally desirable; it need only speed up the development process from a morally unacceptably slow pace. He considers and rejects the radical left view that aid results in a kind of economic development that helps elites but hurts the poor. He examines in more detail the influential views of P. T. Bauer, that aid permits or even encourages governments to intervene more actively in the economy, which frustrates the market forces that are the foundation of economic growth. Riddell is unsympathetic to pro-market theories, arguing that the private sector is neither able nor willing to respond strongly to better incentives. Nevertheless, he seems prepared to accept the policy conclusion Bauer drew from his analysis, namely, that aid should go to governments that pursue liberal economic policies. Riddell presents little evidence in support of his criticism of markets; his strength is in drawing out the logic of the arguments of the debate, not in analyzing data.

A High Technology Gap? Europe, America, and Japan. Edited by Andrew Pierre. New York: New York University Press, 1987. 114 pp. $20.50. The Council on Foreign Relation's Project on European-American Relations, which sponsored this short book, worries about the consequences if Western Europe falls behind Japan and the United States in technology. In the words of one author, "such a Europe would be unconfident, protectionist, politically unreliable, and Eastward-looking." The best analysis of Europe's problems and their solutions comes from Carol de Benedetti, the chairman of Olivetti. In addition to the factors usually cited by Americans — the split between scientists and industrialists and the fragmentation of markets by national boundaries — de Benedetti points to Eurosclerosis: the rigidities, by law and by social custom, that prevent quick response in rapidly changing industries. As he notes, key elements of European society — government, finance, labor, industry — have become more aware of this problem. Indeed, the fashionable concern in France at the moment is about national decline and sloth. In Western Europe, as in this book, the concern is as much or more about competition from Japan rather than the United States. It is left to the Japanese contributor, Keichi Oshima, to point out that the newly industrializing East Asian countries are rapidly becoming serious competitors in some technologically advanced industries. The challenge may be for the United States and Japan, not simply Europe, to remain competitive into the twenty-first century.

International Financial Intermediation. By Ralph Bryant. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987. 181 pp. $9.95 (paper). Bryant surveys the internationalization of finance: the meaning of the term, the history of the phenomenon, its costs and benefits. He

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presents useful data on the extent of the internationalization of finance and shows that it has outpaced the growth of world trade. The author recognizes the many limitations of the data he presents, which makes for informative footnotes and source lists but cluttered tables and charts. The main thesis is presented clearly: by facilitating capital flows, financial internationalization has been a good thing. He points to the need for "a vigorously growing world economy" in "flexibility for substantial intercountry transfer of savings." It is, however, by no means evident that the world has benefited from capital flows that (1) allow Japan to postpone raising its spending to match its income, (2) finance excessive consumption and capital flight in the Third World, and (3) permit a huge deficit in the U.S. budget without much pain to the U.S. economy. Bryant honestly recognizes the strength of current discontent with the functioning of the international financial system and predicts substantial changes in it. He foresees a move either toward enhanced multilateral decision making (which he prefers but which faces formidable obstacles) or the "dis-integration" of financial markets into national or regional markets.

Japan and the U.S. Today: Exchange Rates, Macroeconomic Policies, and Financial Market Innovations. Edited by Hugh Patrick and Ryuichiro Tachi. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. 234 pp. $25.00. Most essays from a conference sponsored by Columbia's Center on Japanese Economy and Business, Japan's Ministry of Finance, and the Foundation for Advanced Information and Research (a Japanese foundation) center on prospects for 1987-88, without paying much attention to historical evolution or the outlook. The exception is the piece by Bonnie Loopesko and Manuel Johnson, now vice-governor of the Federal Reserve Bank, which explains the long-term trends in savings and productivity that have affected the yen-dollar relationship. The collection focuses on finance, which has been less contentious than trade; nevertheless, shying away from blunt statements about U.S.-Japanese bilateral relations serves no one well. The most interesting piece is the discordant note from Albert Wojnilower, managing director of the First Boston Corporation, who argues the case for increased financial regulations as a way to bring greater stability to exchange rates. He also proposes that the most significant issue in trade relations is soon to become the United States and Japan versus the new economic powers of East Asia.

Latin America's Debt Crisis. Edited by Robert Pastor. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987. 164 pp. $14.95 (paper). The product of the first symposium at the Carter Center of Emory University, this book reads like a collection of fourteen op-ed pieces by some well-known names, including the moderators, Howard Baker and Jimmy Carter. The emphasis is on policy prescriptions, with little on

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how the crisis arose and even less on prognoses. These brief articles generally lack the analytical depth to consider the complexities of the Latin American debt crisis. A proposal that sounds reasonable when set forth in a five-page essay may address one aspect of the problem while ignoring the unacceptable side effects. Some difficult trade-offs are involved about the distribution of the costs of adjustment, not only between Latin America and the industrial nations but also among conflicting groups within each set of countries, as pointed out by the rapporteur, Richard Feinberg. Feinberg's essay is truly first-rate: he succinctly captures the differing perspectives in fourteen pages that focus on the central issues for analysts and policy makers. The other most useful part of this book is the documents in the appendices, including communiqués of the Cartagena Group of debtor nations.

The Political Morality of the International Monetary Fund. Edited by Robert Myers. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987. 175 pp. $14.95 (paper). Most of the eleven articles in this collection about the IMF from the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs are only vaguely about morality. They range from Lance Taylor's impugning of the professional competence of IMF economists to Gale Johnson's praise for the Fund's emphasis on eliminating the heavy taxation of farmers common in the Third World.

On the morality issue, John Williamson defends "compartmentalization," under which the Fund concentrates on certain issues while leaving to separate organizations the pursuit of other equally desirable goals. While much can be said for keeping the Fund out of explicitly political issues, Williamson ignores the difficult question of which issues about domestic economic policy the Fund should tackle — an area in which some morally dubious decisions have been made. For instance, the Fund is not the appropriate institution to attack apartheid, but when the Fund approved a loan to South Africa, its staff did not see fit to write about the substantial barriers to labor mobility that raise costs and hinder international competitiveness. George Von Furstenberg presents an interesting concept of the Fund as a market maker, bringing together industrial country creditors and Third World borrowers for an exchange: economic reform that improves the ability to repay in exchange for more financing. He further emphasizes a point often forgotten by radical reformers: if Fund membership becomes too expensive for the industrial countries relative to the benefits they receive, then the industrial countries will not provide the Fund with the resources it needs to be a major actor.

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WAR STUDIES
by John H. Maurer

Calculated Risks: A Century of Arms Control, Why It has Failed, and How It Can Be Made to Work. By Bruce D. Berkowitz. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. 223 pp. $18.95. Berkowitz has written a thought-provoking account of the twentieth-century history of arms control. The particular value of this study lies in its use of examples of negotiations predating the nuclear era; Berkowitz shows that the experience of the naval arms control treaties of the 1920s and 1930s provides insight into the attempts by the United States and the Soviet Union to control nuclear weapons. He argues that the arms control treaties of the interwar period achieved little more than the scrapping of obsolescent ships and failed to stop the technological innovation that was creating new, more lethal, and more costly weapons. Thus, he depicts the Washington Conference as having scant impact in dampening the great powers competition in navy building.

Berkowitz argues that similar superpower attempts to negotiate limitations for nuclear weapons have achieved little. Indeed, they may even have spurred the development and deployment of some weapons and technologies precisely because they were not restricted by agreement. This serious critique of the shibboleths of arms control will prove unpalatable to many commentators on strategic affairs and Soviet-American relations, but it offers an important and timely reminder of the pitfalls in arms negotiations.

The Causes and Prevention of War. By Seyom Brown. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 274 pp. $32.50; **How to Stop a War**. By James F. Dunnigan and William Martel. New York: Doubleday, 1987. 312 pp. $18.95; **War in International Society**. By Evan Luard. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987. 468 pp. $32.50. Wars, especially stopping or preventing them, are favorite topics of twentieth-century writers notwithstanding their general ineffectualness. All three books under review here follow in this tradition, hoping for better results. Unfortunately, the worst of the three (by Brown) is likely to be read by people with impressionable minds, while the best of the three (by Luard) is not.

Brown's contribution to the literature is best characterized as unfortunate. He stakes out a dispassionate "peace" position hoping, perhaps, that an academic vocabulary will prove more persuasive than Caldicottish cant. Although he never tires of setting up "common," "conventional," "usual," and "official" definitions and attitudes as strawmen, he accepts many tired ideas himself. He is against strategic defense, the U.S. use of force, ASAT, and large military budgets; he is predictably for non-nuclear zones, negotiations, confidence-

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building measures and non-ideological standards for U.S. foreign aid. What makes this commonplace spiel so annoying is that it rests within a seemingly reflective philosophical treatment that is really not very reflective at all. Argument and description continually trip over each other yielding, in the end, no coherent argument and no systematic consideration of evidence. With chapter 10, "Toward an Integrated Strategy of War Prevention and Control," any semblance of humility vanishes, too, in a rush of high-sounding generalities and pleadings.

Dunnigan and Martel provide a refreshing contrast, albeit one of limited scholarly importance. They perused statistics from two hundred years of warfare, following in the tradition of Quincy Wright, Lewis Richardson, Singer and Small, Pitirim Sorokin and others. But where their predecessors produced complex studies, Dunnigan and Martel can package the wisdom of the ages into ten sentences that fit on the back their volume's dust jacket. Not that the wisdom errs, but it speaks so generally as to be trivial. What is one to do with "Most wars start as internal disputes; one way to stop a war is to keep the peace at home"? Nevertheless, undergraduates can read *How to Stop a War* to great advantage — so long as they have good professorial guidance. It raises questions starkly and argues common sense propositions that students should consider: e.g., that the data show some nations to be more war-prone than others.

Everything that *How to Stop a War* is not, *War in International Society* is, and more. Luard's study of war goes back not two centuries but five, and it is empirical without being quantitative or "scientific." He covers dynastic wars, religious wars, wars of sovereignty, nationalist wars, and wars of ideology. The chapters, however, bear titles such as Issues, Motives, Decisions, Profitability, Procedures, and Beliefs. Luard's impressive mastery of historical detail gives his study an interpretive clarity and wisdom.

Interestingly he echoes in more nuanced form many of the conclusions that Dunnigan and Martel fling at us like broadsides: wars are not profitable; they often happen by accident and misperception; they seldom settle the issues that caused them; nuclear weapons serve as a sobering deterrent. But in Luard, we are taught *why* such things tend to be so. Dunnigan and Martel are the student's prod; Luard is the student's pedagogue in the best sense of the word. But, alas, *War in International Society* is stylistically the sort of book that makes most American undergraduates rue the day they went to college.

— A.M.G.

The Fall of the Athenian Empire. By Donald Kagan. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987. 456 pp. $39.50. Questions raised by Thucydides about the inevitability of war and the politics of strategic decision making have a timeless validity. Thus, those interested in the study of war will welcome this fourth and final volume in

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Kagan's wise history of the long struggle between Athens and Sparta. Earlier volumes examined the origins of the war, the opening campaigns, and the inability of either side to obtain a decisive victory; this one covers the last campaigns of the war, when Athens fought desperately to preserve its empire and stave off defeat from the coalition of adversaries that had formed against it.

Kagan offers political history at its best. He does a masterful job of laying out the strategic choices confronting ancient Greek statesmen and generals, then explaining why events took the course they did. He carefully weighs the available evidence to reconstruct the politics and strategy of the belligerents in this final round of their conflict. (And this is no easy task because Thucydides' history abruptly ends in 411/410 B.C. — six years before Athens's final defeat.) Kagan shows a remarkable gift for drawing analogies to more recent wars to illuminate this struggle between ancient great powers. These insightful analogies also help us understand better the imperial rivalries and wars of our own troubled century.

Latin America: A Naval History, 1810-1987. By Robert L. Scheina. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 460 pp. $32.95. Scheina's comparative history of Latin American navies during the past 175 years is especially welcome given the unfortunate neglect of this topic in the English-speaking world. Scheina does a particularly fine job of providing the Argentine perspective on the 1982 Falklands War. Based on extensive interviews with Argentine naval officers, this account clears up many unanswered questions about the Argentine navy's operations during that conflict. This is a useful corrective to most accounts of the war, which are written solely from a British perspective.

But Scheina's account is less satisfactory in telling the story of the battleship-building rivalries between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile during the decade before the First World War. His chapter on this topic does not improve on the account written over forty years ago by Seward Livermore. This fascinating episode in Latin American history — an intriguing case study of a regional arms race — would have benefited from more research in Latin American archives, coupled with a deeper analysis of the political and strategic factors propelling those states to engage in such a rivalry.

Military Assistance in Recent Wars: The Dominance of the Superpowers. By Stephanie G. Neuman. New York: Praeger, 1986. 200 pp. $29.95 ($9.95, paper). The superpowers have had a prominent role supplying arms in the recent wars of the Third World. Based on a wide variety of sources, and on a comparative examination of eight recent conflicts, Neuman presents a sophisticated analysis of the importance of these arms supplies. She presents a wealth of data in a

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number of very clear tables and graphs. Unlike many other studies on this topic, which focus on military hardware, Neuman does not neglect the importance of so-called human factors — training programs, military doctrine, morale, and command ability — in determining the effectiveness of arms transfers. She concludes that the superpowers "have retained control of the quality if not the quantity of the arms trade, and ultimately, therefore, over the technological sophistication at which wars can be fought in the Third World."

Policy Versus the Law: The Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty. By Raymond L. Garthoff. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987. 117 pp. $8.95 (paper). The Reagan administration's determination to test and deploy space-based strategic defenses has pitted it against a broad coalition of political adversaries. This coalition views the SDI program as a threat to the 1972 ABM Treaty, which in turn is the cornerstone arms-control agreement between the superpowers. The administration contends that it can abide by the treaty and, at the same time, carry out a wide range of tests designed to develop defenses against ballistic missiles.

Garthoff's vitriolic attack on the Reagan administration damns its contentions as a "serious distortion of the facts, a fatally flawed interpretation of the treaty, and a travesty of the law." As an important participant in the negotiation of the treaty, Garthoff is admirably placed to assess its terms. He zealously clings to the view that the administration's interpretation, as put forward in reports by the State Department's legal adviser, Abraham Sofaer, is an attempt to subvert the meaning of the treaty. Indeed, he believes the administration is engaged in a deliberate provocation of both the Soviet Union and the U.S. Congress. This provocation not only puts the ABM Treaty at risk but also future arms control pacts with the Soviets.

Somewhat surprisingly, Garthoff neglects to include in his appendix (containing the terms of the treaty) the unilateral statements made by both sides regarding their understanding of the treaty. These statements are important because they are public declarations on the goals of the treaty. One such statement, made by Ambassador Gerard Smith, said that the ABM Treaty should be the prelude to "more complete limitations on strategic arms." If these did not take place within five years of the treaty's signing, "U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty." Here, then, is the real focus for debate. Have the expectations of the signing parties of the 1972 pact been fulfilled? Are new technologies invalidating the strategic environment codified by the ABM Treaty's terms? And can a dynamic program to develop strategic defenses be used as a lever to promote arms control? These questions should be the starting point for a

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debate on promoting mutual security through arms control — not legalistic squabbling between the administration and its detractors.

Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight. Edited by Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987. 392 pp. $34.95 ($14.95, paper). As the Senate prepares to debate the ratification of the INF agreement, and the administration negotiates for deep reductions in strategic nuclear forces, there can be no better time for an analytical study of past arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition to its timeliness, Carnesale and Haass's collection of essays offers an excellent assessment of the record of superpower arms control.

They begin with a section on superpower arms control negotiations during the past quarter century. The editors provide a basis for comparing the case studies by elaborating ten hypotheses or questions about arms control. Of the case studies, Fen Osler Hampson does a particularly fine job in examining SALT I, and Stephen J. Flanagan presents a valuable analysis of SALT II. In the cross-cutting studies, Sean M. Lynn-Jones analyzes the lulling and stimulating effects of arms control on weapons programs. And Haass presents a thoughtful assessment of verification and compliance.

The editors' conclusions constitute a useful guide to arms control, and the last sentence of the book states one of its most important lessons: "If the history reveals anything, it is that arms control has proved neither as promising as some had hoped nor as dangerous as others feared." This sober judgment offers a good starting point for understanding the role played by arms control in superpower relations.

THE MIDDLE EAST
by Daniel Pipes

The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities. By Simha Flappan. New York: Pantheon Books, 1987. 278 pp. $18.95. Poor Israel; it must be the only state other than the United States where some of the most talented citizens devote their life's work to bashing their own government. Flappan, a left-wing Israeli activist, has done serious work researching Arab-Israeli relations between 1948 and 1952 but his strident political agenda turns the work into an anti-Israel diatribe.

Flappan seeks to refute seven "myths": that Zionists accepted the U.N. partition and planned for peace; that Arabs rejected the partition and launched war; that Palestinians fled voluntarily, in-

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tending reconquest; that all the Arab states united to expel the Jews from Palestine; that the Arab invasion made war inevitable; that defenseless Israel faced destruction by the Arab Goliath; and that Israel has always sought peace, but no Arab leader has responded. According to Flappan, the Arab states did not intend to destroy Israel but only tried to stop King 'Abdallah of Jordan's Greater Syria plan; because the Zionist leaders seemed to tolerate that plan, the Arabs attacked the nascent Israeli state.

This contention flies in the face of many facts. To take just one: Flappan asserts that London regarded 'Abdallah's Greater Syria plan "as the perfect vehicle for its strategic interests." But Yehoshua Porath has conclusively proved from the British archives (*In Search of Arab Unity*, 1986) that the British did not support the Greater Syria scheme. This destroys Flappan's central thesis that "Arab fears of 'Abdallah's ambitions eclipsed their concern over a Jewish state," for Arab leaders had no reason to fear 'Abdallah on his own.

The International Dimension of Palestinian Terrorism. By Ariel Merari and Shlomi Elad. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 147 pp. $18.00. Merari, director of the Project on Terrorism at the Jaffee Center in Tel Aviv University, has established himself as perhaps the pre-eminent specialist on terrorism. A key to his success has been the project's extensive data base; by virtue of his access to the quantitative nature of terrorist activity, Merari has been able to transcend the limitation on specific details that plagues most students of the subject.

The strength of this approach is evident in the present book, a study of Palestinian terrorism outside of Israel. While this represents but a minuscule fraction (less than 4 percent) of the attacks conducted against Israel itself, the authors show that international PLO activities have had a disproportionately large influence on the evolution of terrorism — coming up with such techniques as aircraft hijacking, airport attacks, blowing up aircraft in flight, and the taking hostage of diplomats. The statistics (covering 1968-1984) tell a fascinating story. They show that though only twelve attacks have occurred on U.S. soil, Americans have been targeted fifty-one times; conversely, all the major European states have hosted many more attacks against Israeli and American targets than against their own nationals. For example, forty-three attacks occurred in Italy, but only eight of those were directed against Italians; in Turkey the figures are twenty-three and zero. Equally instructive is that Israelis have been targeted 131 times and Arabs 121 times. Or this: despite a 1974 PLO decision to cease terrorism outside Israel, the annual rate of incidents has stayed exactly even. This slim volume offers the best single source for information on worldwide PLO activities.

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The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms and Why. By Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi. New York: Pantheon, 1987. 289 pp. $18.95. *The Israeli Connection* holds that Israel's arms sales policies continue the state's general policy, developed in the 1950s, to oppose de-colonization worldwide. Israel sells arms to despicable tyrannies not because it must, for diplomatic or commercial reasons, but because it wants to for ideological reasons. Its war against the Third World has allied Israel to South Africa, despite the pro-Nazi past of that country's white leadership, out of sheer rapport. Worse, these Israeli policies belong not just to right-wing Zionists but to all Zionists. It is a myth that "Zionism was once a progressive and humanistic movement"; for a hundred years, Beit-Hallahmi argues, Zionism has allied itself with imperialism.

Beyond the absurdity of its thesis, this anti-Israel screed is dense with error and slander. Beit-Hallahmi identifies Israel as the primary aid to South Africa's nuclear program, but even United Nations reports authored by Third World scholars admit that the Israeli role is less than that of many West European countries. Quotations from reputable journalists, notably Hirsch Goodman, are ripped from context and their intentions misrepresented. And for facts, the author, a psychologist, seems to have taken uncritically what best suited his arguments from the ideologically expansive Israeli press. His reviewers found no fault, however; they include some of the best known haters of Israel to be found anywhere (including Israel) — Eqbal Ahmed, Noam Chomsky, Cheryl Rubenberg, Edward Said, and Israel Shahak to name a few.

Those interested in Israel's arms sales policies should read Aaron S. Klieman's *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy* (Pergamon-Brassey, 1985); it offers more accuracy, more objectivity, and is none too polite about Israeli excesses.

— A.M.G.

Jordan and the 1967 War. By Samir A. Mutawi. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 228 pp. $29.95. On the correct premise that only Israel's vantage point on the June 1967 war is at all known in detail, Mutawi offers a Jordanian perspective. The book's strength lies in the fullness of its account, the author's access to sources, and the many new details he adds to this much-studied event. He relates how King Husayn was the one to prod Nasser into blocking Israeli access to the Straits of Tiran, how Richard Murphy (today in charge of the State Department's Middle East bureau) inexplicably urged Amman at a critical moment to appease Nasser, and how the Syrian leaders "were almost gloating" at the Arabs' six-day defeat. In perhaps his most telling observation, Mutawi explains why Amman ineluctably did its part to create the crisis that led to war: "the Jordanian government found itself engaged in activities which it felt

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were ultimately detrimental to the Arab cause but which were essential if it was to maintain its integrity in the eyes of its people." Fortunately, the Arab state system has lost strength since Nasser's time and this sort of self-inflicted harm has become rare.

The book's weakness lies in the fundamentally apologetic tenor of the undertaking. Syria and Egypt especially, but also Israel, the Soviet Union, and the United States all get the blame. In contrast, the Jordanian government retains a purity of intention and an innocence of action. However major a source for specialists, this limitation renders Mutawi's account hazardous for the uninitiated.

The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security. By Charles A. Kupchan. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987. 254 pp. $39.95 (14.95, paper). Born an Oxford dissertation, this study offers a competent and readable analysis of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf over the past forty years. It offers a fine analytical narrative based on thorough research. The first four chapters cover the period from 1946 to the invasion of Afghanistan. A fifth chapter discusses the early years of the Rapid Deployment Force and a sixth examines its political context. Chapters seven and eight explore the European angle, where Kupchan proves that he well understands the reasons for European flaccidity.

The final chapter, alas, disappoints. Kupchan rolls out a regionalism-globalism dichotomy, plus ever-popular (and sometimes useful) quasi-Jervisean ideas from cognitive psychology. Girded with this armor, he argues that "Washington's illusory assumptions about the dynamics of international politics" lead it to worry too much about the Soviets and too little about regional complexities. He may well have a point. But Washington's actions cannot be dismissed by merely waving the flag of political science — e.g., "decision-makers in the United States must recognize that the problem is a perceptual and cognitive one." Most of Kupchan's suggestions to improve policy are too vague to help ("more coordinated intelligence and surveillance operations"), but a few (arrangements should be made for the "use of European civilian aircraft to ferry U.S. forces to the continent") hold interest.

— A.M.G.

Qaddafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign Policy, 1969-1987. By Ronald Bruce St. John. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1987. $35.00. St. John offers a reliable account of the major events during the eighteen years of Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi's rule but little more. Rather than pursue his topic chronologically — and in this way show the logic of how events developed — he carves Qaddafi's foreign policy into seven themes. The result is a jumble of familiar events (Libyan attempts at union, confrontation with neigh-

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bors, terrorism) that pile on top of each other. St John knows his subject; too bad he did not give it more thought before publishing a book.

This said, he does reach two conclusions that bear remembering when assessing Libya under Qaddafi. First, "the bizarre quality of Libyan foreign policy often derived from its utter certainty and constancy." In other words, Qaddafi is an extremist, not a madman. Second, "innovative but doctrinaire, Qaddafi's foreign policy was also singularly unsuccessful." The ideology has gone ignored and the government has been isolated. This means that however evil he is, in the end Qaddafi poses only a minor menace compared, say, to Hafiz al-Asad of Syria or the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran.

The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom. By Sandra Mackey. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987. 433 pp. $19.95. Saudi Arabia dropped from sight when the oil glut began in 1981, in part because decisions made there mattered less, in part because the gilded age had come to an end. Mackey's coverage of the 1982-84 period helps bring the Saudi story up to date.

She covers one topic especially well: the economic and psychological dilemmas Saudis face as their income diminishes. "All that was created during the years of plenty must now be maintained or it will be reclaimed by the relentless punishment of the desert." The phenomenal growth of the 1970s carries other implications too. "Saudi Arabia is learning that although the desert can be made beautiful, for every tree and blade of grass that is planted, it takes technology to pump the water and manpower to tend the soil to make them grow. As a result, the xenophobic Saudis have come out of the oil boom inextricably bound up with their foreign work force." And all this takes money; Mackey's conclusions point to a continued need for maximum income from oil and (therefore) a low price per barrel.

The strength of Mackey's book lies in her first-hand experience and the vividness of her anecdotes; its weakness lies in the inaccurate and superficial efforts to tap the scholarly literature for explanations of such subjects as Islam and Arabian history. Skip these and you gain much valuable new information.

Somalia: Nation in Search of a State. By David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar. Boulder: Westview, 1987. 198 pp. $28.00. An American and a Somali have co-authored another fine study in the growing Westview Press series of "Profiles" on modern states. The subtitle neatly captures the topic's central irony: although Somalis constitute one of the very few peoples of Africa who fit within the European concept of nationhood, the vagaries of colonial history left them divided between four states (Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya). Efforts to bring all Somalis under one roof has been the Somali government's

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overriding objective since independence in 1960, to the torment of the country's three neighbors and great power patrons.

Laitin and Samatar have written a survey full of charm. Perhaps most appealing is the portrayal of "a nation of poets," and the demonstration of poetry's critical place in the country's cultural and political life. Imagine the sight "of a group of nomads in the deep recesses of the bush huddled around a small shortwave transistor, somberly discussing the contents of a poem just broadcast over the BBC Somali service, while their camels lazily graze nearby, oblivious of their owners' impassioned literary criticism." Also fascinating is the influence of the camel on modern Somali life and the description of the post-colonial reversion to a non-industrial economy.

The one major fault has to do with the authors' embarrassingly simple acceptance of Marxist methods and goals. They are honest enough to admit that the "scientific socialism" of the 1970s ruined the country's economy; but they seem bewildered at this unhappy result. Ignore the efforts at economic analysis, however, and the book makes for a splendid introduction to an obscure yet engrossing country.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
by Arthur Waldron

Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945-1948. By Steven I. Levine. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. 325 pp. $35.00. In 1948, the Chinese Communists achieved victory in the key strategic region of Manchuria. That victory, according to the standard mythology, represented a rural revolution engulfing the cities. But Levine shows it was no such thing. Instead, it represented a success on the conventional battlefield which then produced an "internal domino effect." Thus, the struggle in Manchuria was not between social systems, but between large and comparable armies. The Nationalists benefited from the training and re-equipping of some of their forces by the Americans. The Communists received aid first from the Soviet presence in Manchuria in 1945, then from weapons transfers and from logistical aid for the railway system. Levine, however, resists the full implication of these facts, which in effect questions the whole notion of a "revolution" in China. Engagingly, the author notes that his present work began as the "dissertation of a 1960's-era graduate student," and the stamp of that era is all too clear. Levine continues to use the vocabulary of revolutionary mythology, and also a remarkably conventional analysis of

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the international context of the time. Nevertheless, he has taken an important step in the ongoing process of demythologizing the communist victory in China.

Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond. Edited by John Bresnan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 298 pp. $30.00 ($10.95, paper). Written largely before Mrs. Aquino came to power in February 1986, this collection of authoritative and elegantly written essays remains highly informative. The first essay, Theodore Friend's "Philippine-American Tensions in History," confirms the authors' deep concern with relations between Washington and Manila. But most of what follows focuses on the details of the Philippine situation itself. Carl H. Lande's masterful survey of the political crisis links basic forces — the Marcos system, nationalism, the Catholic Church, and the Communist party — by showing how the same Philippine elite penetrates all of them. Bernardo Villegas's summary of economic developments is a sharply analytical catalogue of largely missed opportunities. If the authors have a common program, it would appear to call upon the United States to remain friendly to the Philippines, keep its distance in matters of internal politics, and make military and security requests limited and specific. Questions of the economy, certainly the key to the long term, elicit varied emphases: some look to aid and loans; others find the free-market model more appealing.

Ideological Conflicts in Modern China: Democracy and Authoritarianism. By Wen-shun Chi. New Brunswick, N.J. and Oxford, England: Transaction Books, 1985. 385 pp. $29.95. Chi's attempt to sum up the meaning of modern Chinese history follows an ancient tradition of indirectness by choosing a series of short biographies as his vehicle. These profiles treat figures from K'ang Yu-wei to Mao, and explore their ideas about the reconstruction of China — with particular attention to the suitability of democratic or authoritarian political systems. Though the approach may seem simple-minded to sophisticates, the book in fact demonstrates that people precisely like Chi (a Tsinghua graduate, teacher of Chinese to a generation of Americans, and researcher at Berkeley) get things right. He knew his China too well to imagine that 1949 marked a fundamental transformation. He could see — when most Westerners still took Mao as the key — that Chinese aspirations for democracy, however ill-defined, had been at the heart of almost a century's development, and would certainly emerge again. Chi relates abstract ideas to practical politics, most notably as he traces the ties between thinkers and rulers, one of the most basic relationships in Chinese politics. Clearly organized and full of information, *Ideological Conflicts in Modern China* is en-

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hanced by Chi's ability to clinch his points with just the right sentence from Mencius, Mao, or Locke.

Indian Security Policy. By Raju G. C. Thomas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 310 pp. $37.50. The substantial changes that have taken place in India's security policy since independence give this study its significance. Thomas, an Indian-born American citizen, surveys the major issues with a combination of intimate knowledge and scholarly detachment.

Externally, India has witnessed the forging of closer ties between the United States and China; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, plus American efforts to counter it by renewing military ties with Pakistan; India's detonation of a nuclear device in 1974, and Pakistan's attempts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. According to Thomas, such changes have transformed India's defense strategy from one of "sufficient defense" against Pakistani and Chinese attacks, to one of "limited deterrence" based on a conventional as well as a nuclear weapons capability.

Internally, Thomas argues, the concept of national security has been broadened to include problems of political violence and turmoil, resulting in a merger of the decision-making bodies that deal with internal and external security. This has altered the civil-military balance, reducing the military's input into policy making even as its responsibilities in quelling domestic unrest have been increased. Thomas also relates India's security policy to its changing political, economic and technological capabilities. A final chapter explores prospects for the future under Rajiv Gandhi.

Unfortunately, a few errors have been allowed to slip through so fine a volume. Morarji Desai was not prime minister in 1975 (p. 105), and Mrs. Gandhi could not have proposed Venkataraman as vice president in 1985 (p. 188) as she was assassinated in 1984. But these complaints are minor.

— Shaheen Ayubi

Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880-1985. By Kingsley M. De Silva. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1986. 450 pp. $36.50 ($19.75, paper). For the first time, the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka is subjected to a thorough, systematic and full-length analysis. De Silva, a leading historian, reviews the two-thousand-year course of the island's troubled history, then concentrates on the last century. He contends that the events of recent years have been shaped by the age-old rivalry between the Sinhalese and Tamils, operating through the pressure of historical memories. De Silva concludes that Sri Lanka's democratic political system possesses a capacity for compromise and accommodation, for the pragmatic and non-ideological resolution of controversy, and thus

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gives hope for a peaceful management of the ethnic issue. Sri Lanka's pluralism makes it a perfect laboratory for examining ethnic tensions, and De Silva's work is thus useful both to those interested in South Asian politics and conflict management.

— Shaheen Ayubi

The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947. By Sumit Ganguly. Boulder: Westview, 1986. 182 pp. $21.50. Many case studies have attempted to explain one or another of the three Indo-Pakistani wars (1947-48, 1965, 1971), but Ganguly seeks a comprehensive explanation. He finds it in three facts of post-colonial history. First, a hasty and ill-conceived British disengagement policy failed to work out clear-cut plans for transferring power to the native elites. Second, the resulting collapse of authority and the rise of ethnic violence exacerbated ideological differences between India's major political parties — the Congress and the Muslim League. The Congress espoused a secular politics, while the League drew its inspiration from Islamic tenets. When sharpened, these competing views gave rise to incompatible polities. Third, the uncertain status of Kashmir — it had a Hindu monarch ruling a Muslim majority — made it the focus of Pakistani irredentism. The Indian government, meanwhile, determined to demonstrate that all minorities, including those of Kashmir, could thrive under the aegis of a secular government. Once set in motion, Ganguly asserts, the forces of disengagement, ideological difference, and conflict over Kashmir led to the three wars on the subcontinent. His book is well-researched and thought-provoking, but its organization and style present problems.

— Shaheen Ayubi

The Political Dynamics of Japan. By Jun-ichi Kyogoku. Translated by Nobutaka Ike. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1987. 239 pp. Yen 3,800. This abridged translation of a Japanese best seller considers the vexed question of the fit between the present Japanese political structure and the country's older traditions. Unlike those foreign commentators who have been impressed by Japan's cohesiveness and order, Kyogoku notes that Japanese society in the early twentieth century was characterized by disagreement about basic policy issues. In most democracies, he argues, this sort of debate occurs within the electoral process — but not so in contemporary Japan. There, the Liberal Democratic party has a permanent majority. Conflicts surface elsewhere — in the press, the bureaucracy, and in local elections — and at times are fought in ideological terms. But such displacements are no substitute, the author suggests, for confronting fundamental policy issues, most of which concern economics and security. Only when the electoral process deals with them can real answers and real leaders emerge. The author concludes by asking how long the Jap-

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anese political system will allow the leadership to continue to evade these basic disagreements.

Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith. By Rajiv A. Kapur. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986. 272 pp. $29.95. The grievances of India's Sikh minority burst upon the world in 1984. First came the storming of the Golden Temple in northern India, then the murder of Mrs. Gandhi and brutal anti-Sikh violence following the assassination. Kapur attempts to explain these events by showing how long-term social, political, and economic developments led to a reformulation of Sikh identity and the emergence of Sikh separatism.

He opens the discussion by locating the seeds of Sikh separatism, demonstrating how they were nurtured by British administrators, and how they flourished under the guidance of the Akali Dal party, which has dominated Sikh politics for the past sixty years. He examines the (pre- and post-independence) strategies and tactics of Akali Dal, and of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee (SGPC) — the Sikh organization for which Akali Dal is the political wing. Kapur pessimistically concludes that, barring a dramatic shift in the communal ideology of Sikh politics, the prospects for peace in the Punjab remain bleak. Well-researched, authoritative, balanced and informative, Kapur's analysis has historical and contemporary interest.

— Shaheen Ayubi

Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Edited by Hafiz Malik. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 431 pp. $37.50. An international seminar brought scholars together from three different constituencies — the diplomatic, military, and academic — to produce this collective volume on Soviet-American relations with Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The volume's lack of a coherent outlook is not surprising once one multiplies the regional viewpoints, by the superpower viewpoints, by the disciplinary viewpoints.

The nineteen essays fall into four sections, asking four sets of questions. First, what are the strategic interests of the United States and the Soviet Union, and how do these interact with regional forces? Second, what are the superpowers' relations with Pakistan? Third, how has Iran dealt with the superpowers, with the Arabs, and with the economic impact of the Iran-Iraq war? Fourth, how has Soviet intervention in Afghanistan affected Pakistan and world opinion. Since the authors of this last section all spent many years in Afghanistan, their first-hand knowledge of the country is particularly illuminating. A concluding chapter provides a commentary and criticism of various papers.

— Shaheen Ayubi

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Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance. By Douglas Pike. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 287 pp. $29.85. The present close ties between Vietnam and the Soviet Union are of recent origin. Cooperation during the Vietnam War established them; then the isolation of Hanoi, resulting from its diplomatic and military errors, strengthened them. Today, the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute helps keep the ties in place, but there are questions about the future.

Pike's consideration of this relationship is a solid work of scholarship and analysis, concise and engaging. It draws freely on Vietnamese and Russian sources, and shows real analytical power. But its greatest strength derives from the author's manifest sense of Vietnam — of its culture, mores, and deeply rooted attitudes. Possessing this sense of place, the author recognizes that material and military factors are not the whole of the Vietnamese-Soviet relationship. It also involves what an excellent chapter calls a "Subliminal Dimension." This was a dimension that American policy never adequately recognized, and the question is: will the Soviets do any better? Pike (who served in Vietnam) felt a sense of déjà vu after recent meetings with top Indochina specialists in Moscow. He left convinced that "official Soviet opinions of Vietnam, from which will flow important future decisions, are simple, neat and wrong — and this history has often shown to be the formula for catastrophe."

What's Happening to India? By Robin Jeffrey. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986. 249 pp. $37.50 ($17.50, paper). What led to unrest among India's Sikhs? To challenges against India's federal constitution? To the assassination of Indira Gandhi? Jeffrey searches for the underlying causes of these events by focusing principally on the Punjab. He operates from two basic premises. First, modernization has spurred Punjab's turmoil since 1980 and has heightened its sense of ethnic identity; and this effect repeats itself in other regions as larger portions of the rural population undergo the same process. Second, Indira Gandhi's meddlesome attempts at central control were not the surest way to govern 730 million people. Jeffrey contends that what India requires is a more genuine spirit of federalism on the part of the central government. Attempts at centralization, he believes, only worsen the problems that accompany modernization, particularly in a country with as many potential ethnic divisions as India. Finally, the author tries to conclude on a positive note by suggesting that the forces of modernization underlying the explosion in the Punjab will also produce scores of grass-roots organizations committed to humanitarian change.

Jeffrey has written a readable analysis of the burning issues confronting India; unfortunately, his disproportionate treatment of the Punjab narrows the book's scope. While the author himself asserts that similar problems are evident in the regions of Assam, Andhra

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Pradesh, Kashmir and Sikkim, he fails to cover those areas adequately or prove his thesis.

— Shaheen Ayubi

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
by Vladimir Tismaneanu

A Captive Lion. The Life of Marina Tsevetayeva. By Elaine Feinstein. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1987. 289 pp. $19.95. The life of Marina Tsvetayeva epitomizes the tragic destiny of a poet caught in a whirlwind. Unlike other great Russian poets — such as Anna Akhamatova, Boris Pasternak, and Osip Mandelstam — Tsvetayeva left Russia following the Bolshevik triumph and one of her most famous cycle of poems — "The Demesne of the Swans" — celebrates the White Guards.

Though recognized as a great poet, her husband's connections to Stalin's secret police made her a pariah among Russian exiles. Poor, shunned, and frightened by Hitler, Tsvetayeva made the fateful decision in 1939 to return to the Soviet Union. Soon after, her husband and daughter were arrested and "Marina the Martyr" (as Anna Akhmatova called her) had to fight desperately to survive. Life was almost impossible for someone of her delicate nature. The primitive standards of socialist realism forbade the publication of her poetry. Tsvetayeva found the Leninist principle of *partiinost* appalling: " . . . something that is self-evidently not human, not animal, and not divine, which destroys in a person the human being, the animal, and the divine." Many of her friends had been harassed, deported to the Gulag, or executed. War with Nazi Germany made suspect her fluency in German and her admiration for Rainer Maria Rilke. Tsvetayeva fled Moscow for a small provincial town with her alienated son. Lonelier than ever, she committed suicide on August 30, 1941.

Is this the way poets die? Or is it the only solution for those who cannot bear such burdens? A year before her death, Tsvetayeva explored her distress: "The only Russian quality in me is my conscience, and it would not have allowed me to enjoy the air, the silence, the blue, knowing and never for a moment forgetting that at the same instant somebody else was suffocating in the heat and the stones." For such poets, living under tyranny is torture. Together with Simon Karlinsky's pioneering study on Tsvetayeva published in 1986, this biography should interest all those concerned with Soviet cultural history.

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The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police. By George Leggett. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. 514 pp. $19.95. A history of Lenin's political police, the Cheka, provides important evidence for understanding the institutional organization of the totalitarian system. Leggett highlights Lenin's personal role in the establishment of systematic mass terror and offers useful biographical data about Felix Dzerzhinskiy (founder of the Cheka) and his collaborators.

Leggett shows that, contrary to widespread belief, Lenin's actions were utterly inimical to any form of democracy and freedom. Leggett's investigation into the early years of the Soviet secret police confirms that Lenin invented and tested the chief vehicles of totalitarian domination. It was Lenin who dismissed legal considerations in the application of "revolutionary justice" and affirmed instead the principle of expediency. His letters to Dzerzhinskiy, extensively quoted here, brim over with resentment and hatred. Leggett shows Lenin to be a ruthless pragmatist, concerned solely with his party's triumph over all rivals, and ready to use all means to achieve this end. He created the Cheka as an instrument to defend and preserve the Bolshevik monopoly of power. Stalin employed similar methods after Lenin's death in 1924, and extended them, for he totally subordinated the political police to himself.

Glasnost — How Open? Perspectives on Freedom No. 8. New York: Freedom House, 1987. 130 pp. $7.75. Freedom House assembled prominent dissidents and American scholars to assess the current thaw in the Soviet Union, then published these in a timely volume. Vladimir Bukovskiy sees *glasnost* primarily as a campaign of official criticism; Gorbachev aims to strengthen the *nomenklatura* by improving the quality of the party elite. Aleksandr Nekrich shares this skepticism; in his view, "the special role of the Party, and the way of thinking on the part of the Party leaders and the Soviet elite imposes limitations on the possibility of real democratic development in the Soviet Union." Other participants believe genuine change is taking place. Novelist Vassiliy Aksyonov holds that some of Gorbachev's advisers are really committed to change, not because they are liberals, but because "they see quite clearly that they are speeding toward the abyss, toward catastrophe." Sculptor Ernst Neizvestniy notes that many intellectuals associated with Gorbachev's "new course" spent their training years in Prague as editors of the magazine *World Marxist Review* in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Yuriy Andropov was the idol and protector of this group who would represent "what is known in Russian history as police socialism."

Among scholars, Paul Hollander sees little fallout in East Europe from Gorbachev's reforms. Others argue that the Polish and Hungarian regimes might take advantage of *glasnost* to pursue their own reforms. According to Rudolf Tokes, the process can engender un-

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predictable developments: "Gorbachev's reforms are likely to cause disturbance, instability, confusion in Eastern Europe and could lead . . . to very explosive times." In all, the views collected here suggest that *glasnost* has significantly modified politics and culture in the Soviet Union, but it has not affected the fundamental institutions nor the ideological monopoly of the Communist party.

The Kazakhs. By Martha Brill Olcott. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987. (One of the "Studies of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R.") 341 pp. $31.95 ($15.95, paper). With a population of some 7 million, the Kazakhs constitute the second largest "nationality" into which the Muslims of the Soviet Union have been divided. They differ from most other Soviet Muslims in their centuries of contact with Russians and having been the best integrated into Soviet policy; thus, the evolution of Kazakh relations with Moscow is likely to serve as a bellwether for all Soviet Muslims.

Olcott emphasizes the importance of cultural autonomy in the Kazakhs' ability to maintain their identity. Although heavily influenced by Russian ways, she suggests that a new phase of assertiveness lies ahead. That Kazakhs have a very high birth rate and are likely to outnumber the Slavs in Kazakhistan before long is the key development. It encourages the Kazakhs to become more assertive about their history, religion, and language. Indeed, the Kazakhs' heavily politicized culture could offer a basis for "another long period of Russian-Kazakh antagonism" and eventual efforts toward controlling their own political life.

— D.P.

Moscow 2042. By Vladimir Voinovich. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987. 424 pp. $16.95. Combining the tragic and the grotesque in his trademark manner, Voinovich travels through time to the Soviet Union of the twenty-first century. In the best Russian satirical tradition of Gogol, Zamyatin, Zinoviev, and Zoshchenko, he describes a society based on fear and hypocrisy. In this universe, everything has to be approved by the party, whose leader, the "Genialissimo," — an unmistakable allusion to Stalin's generalisimo title and presumed genius qualities — is the earthly equivalent of God. Like God, the supreme leader is revered as infallible and omnipotent, invisible and unfathomable. Marx's class ideology has by now evolved into a spiteful doctrine of extreme nationalism, subservience to the party, extravagant religiosity, paranoia, and militarism. Recent reports of Russian nationalists with close links to the party apparatus suggest that Voinovich's nightmarish picture is not entirely fantasy.

Voinovich sees the rise of religion exacerbating repression. In the Moscow of 2042, religious institutions have been absorbed into the ideological monolith: "Now the church is considered the party's

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younger sister and has been granted enormous rights and powers, under only one condition — that the church not preach faith in a God who, as we know, does not exist, but faith in communist ideals and the person of the Genialissimo." Bleak though it is, Voinovich's masterful literary experiment touches the most disturbing issues of contemporary Soviet life. After all, should Gorbachev's *glasnost* campaign fail, the Soviet Union might resemble the appalling society Voinovich delineates here.

The Velvet Prison: Artists Under State Socialism. By Miklos Haraszti. A New Republic Book. New York: Basic Books, 1987. 163 pp. $14.95. Haraszti, a leading dissident and a highly gifted writer, explores the intellectual's status in contemporary Hungary, finely capturing the spiritual pollution that hangs over communist states. Haraszti analyzes the mechanisms of censorship and the forms of complicity with power, concluding that the intellectual class has accepted moral resignation as its compromise with the totalitarian status quo.

The politics of co-optation have replaced the harsh censorship of Stalinism; the system now relies on willing collaboration. The intellectuals have been integrated into the establishment and cooperate with the rulers in the symbolic reproduction of the system. Though harboring no illusions about the true nature of totalitarian domination, they do not envision the possibility of genuine resistance.

But Haraszti tends to overestimate the power of the state. The intelligentsia in communist countries is not a heterogeneous stratum, and significant distinctions exist even among those who apparently endorse official values. The pessimism of *Velvet Prison* is rooted in the belief that Soviet-type regimes have anesthetized the critical consciousness of the intelligentsia. But if the democratic opposition has been isolated in Hungary, the emergence of Solidarity points to other trends; indeed, Haraszti admits that developments in Poland have challenged some of his most despairing hypotheses. Whether one agrees with every point or not, this essay provides a basic source for understanding relations between intellectuals and the post-Stalinist totalitarian state.

The Wolf of the Kremlin: The First Biography of L. M. Kaganovich, the Soviet Union's Architect of Fear. By Stuart Kahan. New York: William Morrow, 1987. 331 pp. $19.95. One of the Soviet leaders most actively involved in exterminating the Bolshevik Old Guard in the 1930s and in organizing mass terror, Lazar Kaganovich now lives as a quiet nonagenarian in Moscow. Kahan, an American journalist and Kaganovich's nephew, visited Kaganovich in his Moscow flat and interviewed him about Stalin's times. The resulting portrait he draws is frightening. Kaganovich does not repent his role in Stalin's excesses but limits his criticism of Stalin to the dictator's last years, when he

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suspected even his most loyal collaborators, including Kaganovich, of treason.

Kahan documents his uncle's complicated relation to his Jewish background. Kaganovich's conspicuous role as Stalin's lieutenant led many Russian nationalists to hold Jews responsible for horrors perpetrated in the name of socialism. Even today, members of the chauvinistic association Pamyat continue to single him out as the Jew who organized the destruction of Christian monuments in Moscow. Ironically, these accusations are hurled at a man who had adamantly repudiated his Jewishness and identified himself whole-heartedly with Stalin's cause. To serve it, he broke with his family and betrayed his friends, renouncing all scruples. Fanatic and opportunistic, he symbolized the type of Stalinist apparatchik who has decisively contributed to the shaping of the Soviet system.

Stalin's chief accomplices in the establishment of a one-man dictatorship in the Soviet Union have rated very few biographies. Therefore, this is a welcome attempt to fill in an important gap about the making of the Stalinist system.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
by Michael Radu

Africa in Perspective: Myths and Realities. By Olusegun Obasanjo. Foreword by Cyrus R. Vance. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987. 51 pp. $10.00. As the former military dictator of Nigeria (1976-79), Obasanjo arrived in New York with the credentials to wear an elder statesman's hat, and former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance says he found Obasanjo's lectures "important" and the lecturer "an invaluable repository of wisdom and experience."

Is he? Yes and no. Obasanjo does ackowledge that post-independence African leaders failed to fullfil the expectations of their people, and that the West, colonialism, and other external factors are only partially to blame. Fine, as far as it goes; but then Obasanjo finds the main cause of Africa's problems in, of all things, "instant communication, with its biases and destructive power." What he really means by this is freedom of the press. Obasanjo clearly has not shed the outlook of his military past, despite his civilian clothes. And while he claims to be an admirer of Western democracy, he is obviously a distant admirer. "An institutionalized loyal opposition," he says, "may be a luxury Africa cannot afford right now." Yes, he admits, the debt is a problem, but debtor countries did not create it "alone": they were "goaded by commercial banks ... and the creditor nations

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which supported their banks." In short, this unfortunate series of lectures offers an insight into the mentality of today's African elites.

Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy. Edited by Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1987. 335 pp. $35.00. Keller and Rothchild bring together a number of excellent case studies on Afro-Marxism, and the result contributes much to the small but growing literature on Africa's revolutionary regimes. Several essays deserve special mention, including those on Angola (by John Marcum and Gillian Gunn) and on Ethiopia (by Marina Ottaway, Adele Jinadu and Desalegn Rahmato). John Saul's chapter on Mozambique's "development" strategies is the one truly disappointing study in the book. He is apparently unable to grasp the reasons for Mozambique's economic and social collapse, namely, the policies of the ruling FRELIMO party. The two useful chapters on Zimbabwe raise a different question. The two editors correctly draw a distinction between the more orthodox communist regimes of Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia and such radical states as Benin, Congo, Madagascar and Zimbabwe. Given the strong case they make, why is Zimbabwe included in this collection?

The concluding chapter (by Rothchild and Michael Foley) offers an unsurpassed general analysis of Marxist-Leninist regimes in Africa. They make the often missed point that, in Africa, the inherently totalitarian tendency of Marxism-Leninism is consistently linked to a weak state, one which is unable to penetrate the entire national territory, let alone control it. In a vicious circle, the more the center tries to do, the more its ideological tenets clash with ethnic and religious realities, and so the more the peripheral regions pull away. Such conflicts lead inexorably to resistance movements, such as those pwerful ones in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. One might say that Marxism-Leninism in Africa suffers from an inherent contradiction.

Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War. By Stephen M. Davis. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987. 238 pp. $8.95 (paper). A solid, objective and realistic assessment of the African National Congress (ANC) has long been sorely needed and, with the publication of *Apartheid's Rebels*, it still is. Davis reveals new facts about the ANC at the same time that he reveals much naiveté and wishful thinking.

The most useful part of his book deals with the structure of the ANC military branch, Umkhonto we Siswe, and particularly with that organization's techniques for infiltrating South Africa. The rest presents a thinly disguised apologia for the ANC, making preposterous and unjustifiable claims. For example, we are told the ANC has an "aversion to terrorist tactics," something that will come as news to

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the families of the hundreds and hundreds of blacks burned alive by ANC followers. Only under Western pressure did the ANC leaders disavow that inhuman tactic. Or another statement: the Angolan army's dismal performance through the years does not stop the author from calling it a "formidable" force.

In the end, Davis seems not to understand the nature of the ANC. He wastes page after page demolishing the straw man that the ANC is communist-controlled. Having accomplished this, he feels justified to conclude that the ANC leadership is "moderate" and "pro-Western." But the ANC's ties to official communist parties are less and less relevant; what counts is that the ANC itself has become a Marxist-Leninist organization.

Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice. By C.O.C. Amate. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 603 pp. $45.00. Amate, a former Ghanaian diplomat at the Organization of African Unity (OAU), provides a well-documented, over-long, and mostly boring description of that institution. Unfortunately, he does not provide an analysis of the OAU's institutional failure. Indeed, he appears not even to recognize the bleakness of the OAU's record, and that takes some doing. The OAU has an even poorer record than the United Nations or the Organization of American States. It has not solved any important intra-African conflict — not the Angola problem, the Western Saharan mess, the Somali-Ethiopian war, Tanzania's invasion of Uganda, or Libya's invasion of Chad. Amate serenely describes some of these troubles without acknowledging the OAU's inability to solve them. He does, it is true, provide one accurate glimpse of reality, when he observes plaintively that "the UN and its non-African member-states take the OAU more seriously than do some of the OAU's own members." But even then, he does not explain why this is so.

Amate's subtitle is an accurate definition of the OAU, but this leads to another dreary conclusion, which Amate also shies away from: that the OAU's failure spells the failure of Pan-Africanist nationalism itself. The more powerful force of state nationalism has overcome the Pan-Africanist dreams of two and three decades ago. OAU bureaucrats in Addis Ababa cannot provide national security, governmental stability, economic development, or military power. One may deplore this situation, as the author implicitly does, but one cannot escape it.

Politics and the Ethiopian Famine, 1984-1985. By Jason W. Clay and Bonnie K. Holcomb. Cambridge, Mass.: Cultural Survival Inc., distributed by Transaction Books, 1987. 224 pp. $9.95 (paper). In a dry, unemotional tone, Clay and Holcomb pronounce a terrifying indictment of the Ethiopian government for its role in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens during the induced famine

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of 1984-85. Their account relies on a survey conducted largely among Ethiopian refugees in the Sudan, and limited to former inhabitants of the Tigray, Wollo, Illubabor, Kefa, and Wollega provinces. (Because the battle zones of Eritrea, Bale, and Sidamo are not covered, one may assume that a significantly larger number of people have died from government abuses than the authors here document.)

A picture emerges of government policies that systematically aim to destroy the traditional way of life of the Ethiopian peasantry. These policies include a terrible increase in taxes (in one area, up 700 percent between 1977 and 1984) and services never provided. In some cases, communities have even paid for their own destruction. Thus, one Tigray peasant says: "We paid a special tax for . . . education. The school we built under Haile Selassie was bombed by this government." But taxes are not the worst of it. State confiscation of grain and seed stockpiles have caused mass starvation. Forced labor has left peasants unable to work on their own remaining plots, producing more starvation. The resettlement and forced collectivization of peasants have caused yields in agriculture to decline precipitously.

Clay and Holcomb's conclusion is unavoidable: "Famine has resulted primarily from government policies that have been implemented in order to accomplish massive collectivization . . . and to secure central government control. The government of Ethiopia is establishing a social and economic system that will produce starving people for generations to come." To this, the West responded with "We Are the World" and massive humanitarian aid. As the authors show, misplaced humanitarianism turned Western governments and charities into the gullible accomplices of a murderous regime. The Ethiopian famine of 1984-85, like the Ukrainian famine of the 1930s, never existed. From the beginning, both were genocide.

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According to schedule, the Winter 1988 issue of ORBIS would normally be Volume 31, Number 4. As you see, however, it is in fact Volume 32, Number 1. The editors have made this change in order to align the volume number with the calendar year. From now on, the volume will begin with the new year. The abbreviated volume 31 will not affect subscriptions in any fashion. The decision was made to make this change so that a new color scheme can be put into effect. Each volume and calendar year will be represented by a different color. This will allow subscribers who do not bind their journals to tell the years apart at a glance.

— The Editors

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